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Introduction
Medieval scientists used to believe that, when metal was heated, it lost his metal-like
properties (brilliance,  luster,  cohesiveness and so on),  due to  the loss of a principle
dubbed “quicksilver”; the process through which a metal loses its quicksilver was called
“calcination” and the result (the metal without quicksilver) “calx”. At the same time,
scientists held that the process of combustion consisted in the loss of another principle:
“sulfur”, which makes substances such as wood and charcoal solid and combustible.
Many years later, in the 18th century, George Ernst Stahl discovered that there is only
one principle  involved in  calcination and combustion: he observed that  a  calcinated
metal can be recovered by heating the calx in presence of charcoal and baptized this
principle (possessed by both metals and charcoal) “phlogiston”, which was supposed to
be  emitted  both  by  bodies  undergoing  combustion  and  by  heated  metals.  Several
phenomena were thought to be related to the presence of the absence of phlogiston. For
example, from the fact that the flame of a candle in a closed container dies out before
the  candle  is  consumed,  it  was  inferred  that  air  can  absorb  a  limited  amount  of
phlogiston and from that point on, the burning body cannot emit phlogiston. Moreover,
scientists observed that, if one puts an animal in the container after it is saturated with
phlogiston,  it  dies  because  it  cannot  breathe;  and  what  was  inferred  from  this
experiment is that respiration consists in removing phlogiston from the lungs and that
phlogiston does not support life.  
In order to explain observed phenomena, scientists deploy terms that are expected to
individuate entities that cannot be directly observed, in fact or in principle. For example,
that the maximum “kinetic energy” of a pendulum occurs at  the lowest point of its
swing, or that the “entropy” of a closed system decreases if we put work into it, or that
“phlogiston” does not support life. Over the course of the history of science, the sets of
beliefs, theoretical descriptions and intended applications associated with such terms
widely changed. In some cases, for example “mass” or “time”, we continue using the
same terms, even if the theories by which they had been introduced have been modified
or  even  rejected.  In  other  cases,  like  “phlogiston”,  the  term  is  no  longer  in  use.
Philosophers of science have been interested in many question concerning the status of
those  terms:  for  example,  they  ask  to  what  they  refer  (if  anything),  what  is  their
extension,  what  we are  talking  about  when  we use  sentences  in  which  they occur,
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whether they have a meaning (and what determines it) or whether they have intension.
Moreover, the meaning and the reference of scientific terms have often been expected to
be relevant to the truth of the sentences in which they are used: referential success (the
fact that the entities singled out by theoretical terms exist) is often considered a basic
desideratum for any true scientific sentence. It is hard to imagine how a sentence such
as “phlogiston does not support life” can be true, once we have acknowledged that it
does not exist. But, on the other hand, as the No Miracle Argument claims, it is quite
intuitive  that  scientific  theories  owe  their  empirical  success  to  the  fact  that  they
individuate some essential features of the world with good approximation; otherwise,
the  success  of  their  empirical  predictions  would  be  a  “miracle”.  And,  since  the
phlogiston  theory does  explain  many phenomena in  the  chemical  field,  perhaps  we
should  believe  that  it  is  true,  in  some  sense,  even  if  the  term  “phlogiston”  (or
“dephlogisticated air”) is non-referential. Most realists would accept at least some of the
following claims:
• mature and successful scientific theories are approximately true;
• the  main  terms  of  mature  and  successful  scientific  theories  are  genuinely
referential;
• the (approximate) truth of a theory is an adequate explanation of its empirical
success;
• the  (approximate)  truth  of  a  theory  is  the  only  explanation  of  its  empirical
success;
• a  scientific  theory  may  be  approximately  true  even  though  its  terms  are
referentially empty;
• the history of mature and successful theories shows improving approximation to
the truth;
• the theoretical claims of scientific theories should be literally construed, as true-
or-false;
• scientific theories make genuine existential claims;
• the empirical success of a theory constitutes evidence for the referential success
of its terms;




All these claims take for granted an overall realist perspective that I am not going to
put in question throughout my work. Specifically I am taking for granted that there is a
strict relation between empirical success and approximate truth, even if it is far more
complex than the No Miracle Argument. Rather, in my work, I am going to defend a
theory about the relation between meaning, reference and truth of scientific terms and
my starting point is Thomas Kuhn's theory of scientific lexicons or lexical structures. A
lexical structure is a set of inter-defined terms, introduced together by means of the
same theoretical  laws and examples  of  application.  For  example,  the terms  “mass”,
“force”, “acceleration”, “weight” constitute a lexical structure, introduced by the laws of
classical mechanics (the laws of motion, the law of gravitation, Hooke's law) and a set
of  exemplary  (paradigmatic)  applications  (inclined  plane,  simple  pendulum,  the
planetary system and so on). So, a theory is constituted by a mathematical core and a
domain of intended applications, which is not intensionally or extensionally given, but
only by a list of exemplary applications (accepted by the relevant scientific community).
By means of this concept, I will approach the questions that I have asked in the above
list,  but  my  work  is  not  intended  as  a  historical  reconstruction  of  Kuhn's  ideas.
Establishing  whether  Kuhn  was  realist  or  anti-realist,  relativist  or  anti-relativist  or
whatever is out of the bounds of this work. Moreover, as regards the main question of
my  work,  i.e.  whether  the  lexical  structures  theory  entails  the  rejection  of  the
correspondence theory of truth, my answer totally diverges from Kuhn's one. In the end,
I will use (and sometimes modify) his theory of meaning and reference of scientific
term  to  face  problems  that  are  actually  discussed  by  the  philosophers  of  science,
especially concerning the concepts of selective confirmation and truth. 
In fact, even though Kuhn has been the first to arise the most important of these
problems (referential change, pessimistic induction and so on), in the meanwhile the
debate has evolved and several intriguing concepts have emerged; in particular, I am
talking about the concepts of selective (or preservative) confirmation and deflationary
truth. The former points out that not only the truth, but also the approximate truth of a
theory can be a sufficient explanation of its empirical success. To that extent, we should
look for the parts of scientific theories that are responsible for their empirical success
and they are usually supposed to be those parts that are preserved over the course of the
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history of  science.  The  latter  affirms  that  the  truth  is  a  property without  nature  or
essence and all we can say about it is exhausted by the Equivalence Schema: “p” is true
if and only if p”; therefore it has no explanatory power. Thus, we cannot use the truth to
explain the empirical success of science and to state that the truth of a theory should
entail  its  empirical  success.  The  relation  between  selective  confirmation  and
deflationism goes as follows. Selective confirmation replies to pessimistic induction,
which aims to undermine the inference from empirical success to truth resting on the
fact that many successful scientific theories were proven to be false (like the phlogiston
theory); on the contrary, selective realism is more modest, since it says that only some
parts  of  the  theories  were  responsible  for  their  empirical  success  and  that  their
preservation  is  sufficient  to  save  the  inference  from empirical  success  to  truth  (for
example, the laws of motion are preserved as limiting cases in Einstein's theory, even
though Newton's  theory is  false,  strictly speaking).  On the  other  hand,  deflationism
attacks the other side of the inference (from truth to success), since it claims that truth is
not a sufficient explanation of any phenomena, because it is not an effective property.
The main problem is to justify the inference from empirical success to truth and the
other way round from a “partial” perspective, using a concept of truth which mirrors
that  of  selective  confirmation:  an  approximate  truth  not  committed  to  a  one-to-one
correspondence between theoretical entities and “real entities”; and therefore consistent
with the fact that reference is not a direct or neutral relation between name and object. 
The main theses that I will defend in my work are that: 1) the reference of scientific
terms is a function of the lexical structure they belong to (it is not language-independent
or theory-independent); 2) the meaning of scientific terms is structurally fixed (through
the mutual relations between the nodes of the structure) in a contextualist way (through
the applications of the theory by which they are introduced); 3) pace Kuhn, this does not
imply that the correspondence theory of truth it is not applicable to scientific knowledge
(at  least  in  the  weak  variants  that  do  not  assume  an  isomorphic  relation  between
propositions and facts). For this purpose, my work is dived in three parts. Part 1 deals
with  the  relation  between  meaning  and  reference,  following  and  improving  Kuhn's
perspective; Part  2 analyzes the reasons (related to the theory of scientific lexicons)
which urged Kuhn to reject the correspondence theory; Part 3 is devoted to the defense
of a weak correspondence theory which is consistent with the perspective outlined in the
previous parts.
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In Part 1 I will claim that the relation between scientific terms and objects is not a
one-to-one  relation,  but,  rather,  it  involves  the  structural  relations  between different
terms, applications and problem situations. Their meaning is determined by this relation,
while reference is a function of the structure. At first, I will analyze how objects are
singled out  by paradigms,  especially referring to the constitutive role played by the
combination  of  physical  laws  and  concrete  applications  (interpreted  mathematical
structures).  Then,  I  will  focus  on  the  theories  of  meaning,  adopting  a  perspective
characterized by meaning eliminativism, structuralism and contextualism,  which can
account for meaning shift and the distinction between co-referential changes (which do
not affect interpreted structures) and substantial changes. 
The main point of Part 2 is that, contrary to what Kuhn himself believed, the theory
of  meaning  and  reference  defended  in  Part  1  does  not  imply  the  rejection  of  the
correspondence theory of truth; and, in particular, it focuses on the role of exemplary
applications in scientific lexicons. Firstly, I will further analyze the relation between
mathematical  core  and  concrete  applications,  in  order  to  individuate  those  parts  of
scientific  theories  which  are  essential  for  their  application  and  empirical  success
(referring in particular to the process of scientific training). Moreover, I will focus on
why this theory of reference is supposed to be an objection against the correspondence
theory, by means of the incommensurability thesis and the comparison objection. My
argument is that those objections may apply only to strong correspondence theories.
Finally, in Part 3, the claim is that weak correspondence is consistent with the theory
of scientific lexicons and that, additionally, the concepts of exemplary application and
interpreted structure can constitute evidence for the correspondence theory. By “weak
correspondence”, I mean that the truth is a property with (minimal) explanatory role,
which expresses a relation between linguistic and non-linguistic entities (which make
propositions  true),  but  does  not  postulate  a  direct  relation between propositions and
facts,  a  unitary  account  of  the  correspondence  relation  and  treats  the  facts  in  a
deflationary  way.  The  main  problems  that  weak  correspondence  solves  are:  the
comparison  objection;  the  lack  of  a  unitary,  context-independent  correspondence
relation;  the  use  of  concrete  lexical  structures  rather  than  models  and uninterpreted
mathematical  structures;  the  inference  from  truth  to  empirical  success,  from  the
perspective of the approximate truth of the theories.
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Part 1: Meaning and Reference
The main problem that I will face in the first part of my work is the relation between
meaning  and  reference  of  scientific  terms,  especially  referring  to  the  language-
dependent nature of the relation between scientific languages and the world. In order to
do this, I will discuss, clarify and improve the perspective presented by Thomas Kuhn in
his  latest  works.  To that  extent,  this  is  the  part  of  my work interested in  historical
questions  about  Kuhn's  ideas,  for  the  most  part.  Sections  1  and  3  are  intended  as
historical reconstructions of his theses, while section 2 aims to put them on the table of
the current debate on scientific realism, referential change, pessimistic induction and so
on. Finally, section 4 is both historical and theoretical, since it tries to modify some of
Kuhn's claims to express that theory of meaning in a clear and satisfactory way. The
main claim of this  part  is that the relation between scientific terms and objects that
populate  the  world  is  not  a  one-to-one,  neutral  or  direct  correlation,  but,  rather,  it
involves  the  structural  relations  between  different  terms,  applications  and  problem
situations.  Roughly,  the  meaning  of  scientific  terms  is  determined  by  the  relations
(lexical structures), while their reference is language-dependent, since it is a function of
the relevant lexical structure.  For this  purpose, in the first  part  (sections 1-2) I will
analyze  how  objects  (if  any)  are  singled  out  by  scientific  theories  and  paradigms,
concluding that there is no language-independent way to achieve this aim. In section 1 I
will summarize Kuhn's conception of physical laws, on the basis of Wittgenstein's and
Kant's  ideas  that  influenced  him,  arguing  that  symbolic  generalizations  (structurally
construed) play a constitutive role in the constitution of the world of science and in the
individuation of the entities that we recognize in it. In section 2 I will discuss how the
structural  access  to  the  experimental  processes  is  related  to  scientific  realism,  and
especially selective realism, which aims to find out those parts of scientific theories that
cannot be rejected without turning into a scientific revolution: from this perspective,
interpreted mathematical structures are supposed to suffice.  Moreover, in the second
part  (sections  3-4)  I  will  specifically  focus  on  the  relation  between  meaning  and
reference, outlining a theory of the meaning of scientific kind terms. At first, in section
3, I will criticize the causal theory of reference by means of Kuhn's arguments against it:
I will show that the causal theory cannot account for the relation between mathematical
core and applications and, focusing on co-referential terms, it trivializes the concept of
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reference. Finally, in section 4, I will summarize the theory of meaning I am defending,
concluding  that  it  is  characterized  by  meaning  eliminativism,  contextualism  and
structuralism. The main advantage of this theory is that it can deal with meaning shifts
in the history of science without asserting the existence of all entities postulated by the
theory. 
Section  1:  Analytic/Quasi-Analytic/Syntetic  A  Priori.  Kuhn's
Kantianism
1. Introduction
In his analysis of the structure of scientific paradigms, Thomas Kuhn states that we
should not consider physical laws “laws”, but rather “law sketches”. These laws (for
example f = ma or I = V/R) constitute the mathematical core of scientific theories and
allow scientists to deal with them as mathematical structures, justifying the application
of logical tools and manipulations. But the expression “law sketches” means that such
equations do not specify how scientists are expected to apply them to the empirical
context and puzzle-solving. Scientific symbolic generalizations change case by case: f =
ma is transformed in mg = (d2s / dt2) for the case of the free fall, or in other ways for the
simple pendulum. Kuhn means that symbolic generalizations are incomplete in so far as
they are separated from the specific context to which they apply; that is to say, from
paradigms strictly construed. From this perspective, paradigms are exemplary problem
solutions (for example, the simple pendulum or the inclined plane), which specify how
physical laws attach to nature, through concrete examples of application. The empirical
content of scientific theories consists in the combination of laws and paradigms: this is
why, throughout his works, Kuhn refers to physical laws as analytic, quasi-analytic or
synthetic a priori. Here I will analyze Kuhn’s conception of such laws and I will focus
(following  the  expression  “synthetic  a  priori”)  on  the  Kantian  and  Wittgensteinian
legacy  that  influenced  Kuhn.  Although  Kuhn’s  Kantianism  has  already  been
investigated (Hoyningen-Huene 1993), I think that a more detailed examination of his
concept of “synthetic a priori”1 can clarify some points concerning scientific realism
1 Hoyningen-Huene briefly refers to Kuhn’s synthetic a priori in (Hoyningen-Huene 1993: 211); see
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and the relationship between paradigms and reality. 
In fact, everyone knows that Kuhn claims that “the world changes over the course of
scientific revolutions”. Against the constructivist and anti-realist interpretations of the
“world  changes”  thesis,  Hoyningen-Huene  demonstrated  that  we  can  identify  two
meanings  of  the  word  “world”  (and  “nature”)  (Hoyningen-Huene  1993:  31-36)
coexisting in Kuhn’s works (especially in  The Structure of Scientific Revolutions). On
the one hand, “world” means something that changes over the course of the history of
science,  like  Kant’s  “nature  in  the  material  sense”  or  “aggregates  of  appearances”.
Roughly, it is the “phenomenal world” and epistemic subjects are co-constitutive of it.
On the other hand, the word “world” means also something which remains uninfluenced
by radical theory changes. It is similar to Kant’s “thing-in-itself”, unknowable by direct
perception  and scientific  theories.  The world-in-itself  is  independent  from epistemic
subjects,  while  the  phenomenal  world  consists  of  the  interaction  of  the  objective
features with the subjective ones.
In the constitution of the phenomenal world, synthetic a priori propositions play a
major role. In the following section I will employ Wittgenstein’s concept of “grammar”
to clarify Kuhn’s Kantianism.       
2. Analytic, quasi-analytic and synthetic a priori propositions 
In the introduction I have sketched Kuhn’s attempt to distinguish between symbolic
generalizations  and  exemplary  problem  solutions.  Such  a  distinction  moves  the
empirical  content  of  scientific  laws  to  exemplary  solutions  (or  paradigmatic
applications). This is the basic reason which urges Kuhn to describe such propositions
as “analytic”, that is to say (as a first approximation) “non-falsifiable”; every state of
affairs  is  consistent with such universal laws. As we will  see further below, Kuhn’s
target is the ultimate structure of Newton’s mechanics. The famous astrophysicist Arthur
Eddington had already affirmed that the first law of motion can be expressed as follows:
“every body continues in its state of rest or uniform motion in a straight line, except in
so far as it doesn’t” (Eddington 1929: 124). As everyone knows, the correct sentence
states “except in so far as it may be compelled to change that state by impressed forces”.
Eddington provides many examples of possible refutations of the first law of motion,
also Irzik, Grünberg (1998).
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which are rejected on the basis  of the existence of invisible forces which influence
moving bodies (for example frictional resistance, gravitation and so on). Clearly, this
does not mean that Newtonian physicists were wrong in defending their theory against
alleged falsifications.  It  means only that,  from a logical  viewpoint,  no experimental
process can directly falsify the fundamental laws of motion.  Some philosophers (for
example  the  Popperians)  might  reply  that  this  depends  on  “normal”  scientists’
dogmatism and  that  it  is  a  problem which  threatens  to  impede  progress  (Lakatos,
Musgrave 1970).    
On the contrary, I will argue that these propositions are not falsifiable not only for the
dogmatic attitude of scientists, but also for the structural role they play in scientific
theories. Although Kuhn emphasizes this property of scientific laws in the “Postscript-
1969”, since The Structure of Scientific Revolutions he has noticed that normal science
is characterized by some propositions which present a dual nature, both analytic and
synthetic. Here he focuses on the analytic nature of symbolic generalizations, i.e. their
ability  to  resist  empirical  refutations,  which  makes  them  look  like  necessary
propositions (Kuhn 1970: 78). Kuhn refers to them as “purely logical statements” or
“tautologies” (Kuhn 1970: 78, 131-133). He recalls Newton’s second law of motion and
says  that:  “though  it  took  centuries  of  difficult  factual  and  theoretical  research  to
achieve, [it] behaves for those committed to Newton's theory very much like a purely
logical statement that no amount of observation could refute” (Kuhn 1970: 78). Later,
Kuhn comes back to this question: he analyzes Dalton’s work on the chemical law of
fixed proportions and affirms that Dalton’s thesis that atoms could only combine one-to-
one or in some other simple whole number ratio
enables him to determine the sizes and weights of elementary particles, but it also
made the law of constant proportion a tautology. For Dalton, any reaction in which
the  ingredients  did  not  enter  in  fixed  proportion  was  ipso  facto not  a  purely
chemical process. A law that experiment could not have established before Dalton's
work, became, once that work was accepted, a constitutive principle that no single
set of chemical measurements could have upset. (Kuhn 1970: 133)    
Nevertheless,  Kuhn’s emphasis on the analytic  nature of  universal  laws does not
allow us to figure out another important feature of symbolic generalizations. Indeed,
from a different viewpoint, these propositions seem more synthetic than analytic: we
cannot  consider  them  a  mere  product  of  conventional  stipulations  and  arbitrary
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definitions, but, rather, the result of both “factual and theoretical research”. This is why
in the seventies Kuhn describes universal laws as “quasi-analytic” propositions (Kuhn
1977: 304 n. 14 and Kuhn 2000: 187 fn. 17). The question is explicitly linked to the
identification  of  the  hard-core  of  scientific  theories  and  to  the  distinction  between
normal  and  revolutionary  changes  in  the  history  of  science:  “I  suspect  that,  quite
generally,  scientific  revolutions  can  be  distinguished  from  normal  scientific
developments  in  that  the  former  require,  as  the  latter  do  not,  the  modification  of
generalizations which has previously been regarded as quasi-analytic” (Kuhn 1977: 304
fn. 14). Or, to be more precise:  
The problem of distinguishing between a core and an extended core has a close
counterpart in my own work: the problem of distinguishing between normal and
revolutionary  change.  I  have  here  and  there  used  the  term  ‘constitutive’  in
discussing  that  problem too,  suggesting  that  what  must  be  discarded  during  a
revolutionary change is somehow a constitutive, rather than simply a contingent,
part or the previous theory. The difficulty, then, is to find ways to unpacking the
term ‘constitutive’.  My closest  approach to solution,  still  a  mere  aperçu,  is  the
suggestion that constitutive elements are in some sense quasi-analytic, i.e. partially
determined by the language in which nature is discussed rather than by nature tout
court. (Kuhn 2000: 187 fn. 17)
Kuhn’s description of quasi-analytic propositions is supposed to provide a distinction
between normal and revolutionary changes. A scientific change is revolutionary (i.e. two
paradigms  are  incommensurable)  if  and  only  if  the  change  involves  quasi-analytic
propositions.  Since  such propositions  define  their  own terms,  a  modification  in  the
tautologies results in a meaning change.
In his works of the eighties, Kuhn acknowledges that the expressions “analytic” and
“quasi-analytic”  were  misleading  and  inappropriate  (Kuhn  2000:  212).  Symbolic
generalizations  are,  to  some extent,  necessary (I  will  face  this  problem in  Part  2  –
section 1), but we should make some clarifications. The second law of motion cannot be
considered a tautology  tout court, at first because its terms (‘force’, ‘mass’) are not
independently available for use in a definition of the other; moreover, while analytic
propositions cannot be tested, the second law can be tested. Anyone can measure forces
and masses (according to their Newtonian meanings) and apply his results to the second
law  form;  in  this  way,  one  might  demonstrate  the  falsity  of  this  law.  Rather,  the
necessity of symbolic  generalizations is  language-dependent:  a revolutionary change
(i.e. a change in quasi-analytic propositions) is a meaning change and no substitute for
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the second law of motion could be used (without giving up Newton's language).
In order to fix the vagueness of his previous exposition, in his latest works Kuhn uses
the Kantian expression “synthetic a priori” to describe the role played by universal laws
in scientific practice (Kuhn 2000: 71, 73-74 fn. 19, Kuhn 1990: 306, 317 fn. 17). The
description of the analytic-synthetic nature of universal laws manifests the need for a
new definition of the language (of science)-world relation: 
Using the Newtonian lexicon, the statement “Newton’s second law and the law of
gravity  are  both  false”  is  itself  false.  Furthermore  it  is  false  by  virtue  of  the
meaning of the Newtonian terms ‘force’ and ‘mass’.  But  it  is  not  – unlike the
statement “Some bachelors are married” false by virtue of the  definition of those
terms. The meaning of force and mass are not embodiable in definitions but rather
in their relation to the world. The necessity to which I here appeal is not so much
analytic as synthetic a priori. (Kuhn 2000: 73-74 fn. 19)
Now, Kuhn provides a new analysis of the Newtonian terms of the second law of
motion and their relationships with the empirical content of the law (Kuhn 1989: 58-89
and Kuhn 1990). Kuhn says that physics students are usually introduced to the second
law as a description of the behavior of moving bodies; but the law and the term ‘mass’
are acquired together.  Thereafter  the second law can be used to supply the missing
measure of force (which has already been introduced, through the description of the
dynamometer), since mass is proportional to acceleration under the influence of a force.
Once students have learned the second law and the term ‘mass’, we can introduce the
law of gravity as an empirical regularity, showing that the mutual attraction between
bodies is proportional to the product of their masses. Now we can also establish some
expects of the Newtonian use of ‘weight’,  as a relational property dependent on the
presence  of  two  bodies.  Unlike  mass,  weight  is  variable  and  his  variation  can  be
captured by the spring balance2.
However,  Kuhn presents  also a  second way of  introducing the  terms  ‘mass’ and
‘weight’. It begins with the introduction of the term ‘mass’ (intended as ‘gravitational
mass’) and describing gravity as a force of attraction between bodies proportional to
their  masses.  So,  once  mass  has  been  stipulated,  weight  is  considered  a  relational
property,  the  force  resulting  from  gravitational  attraction.  Now  we  have  gained
knowledge about the terms ‘mass’ and ‘weight’ and finally we can introduce the missing
2 A spring  balance  measures  weight  (it  differs  from one  location  to  another),  while  pan  balance
measures mass (it depends on the body and is constant in every place).
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component of the theory (the second law of motion) as empirical law. 
The two routes thus differ in what must be stipulated about nature in order to learn
Newtonian terms,  what  can be left  instead for empirical discovery.  On the first
route the second law enters stipulatively, the law of gravitation empirically. On the
second, their epistemic status is reversed. In each case one, but only one, of the
laws is, so to speak, built into the lexicon. I do not quite want to call such laws
analytic, for experience with nature was essential for their initial formulation. Yet
they do have something of the necessity that the label ‘analytic’ implies. Perhaps
‘synthetic a priori’ comes closer. (Kuhn 2000: 71)
Scientific laws have both an empirical and a conventional nature3.  But these two
features are inextricably interwoven: the empirical content of symbolic generalization is
not absolute (it does not depend only on the empirical basis), but, rather, it is relative to
which parts  of the theory scientists  consider  empirically testable.  There is  no sharp
distinction between descriptive and conventional propositions: “empirical content must
enter formalized theories from the top as well from the bottom” (Kuhn 1977: 300). So,
for  example,  you may study radio sources  (like supernovas,  quasars  and so on)  by
means of radio telescopes,  assuming that  they work in accordance with the laws of
electromagnetic radiation; to that extent, the term “radio source” is theoretical referring
to electromagnetism. And the same applies to optics, but this does not mean that radio
sources are theoretical relative to other fields of scientific investigation.
Irzik  and  Grünberg  analyze  Kuhn’s  Kantianism  referring  to  Whorf’s  linguistic
relativity. They affirm that Whorf and Kuhn agree at least about three basic points: 1)
language structures thought and experience; 2) the categorization of the world depends
on  language;  3)  radically  different  languages  give  rise  to  different  sciences  (Irzik,
Grünberg  1998: 215). I  understand Irzik and  Grünberg’s point and sometimes Kuhn
considered himself  a Whorfian (Kuhn 1999: 34).  But  I  think also that  the thesis  of
linguistic relativity can lead to a misunderstanding about the dual nature of scientific
laws that Kuhn investigates. On a Whorfian basis, one may associate Kuhn with the
relativist ideas of Feyerabend (1975)4, since, above all, it draws the attention to the  a
priori nature of scientific lexicons, while we are dealing with their  synthetic a priori
nature.  For these reasons, I  prefer to use a different linguistic model to analyze the
relationship between paradigms and reality: Wittgenstein’s grammar. 
3 The same remarks apply to the analysis of Ohm’s law as well (Kuhn 1977: 303-304). 
4 Note that Feyerabend refers to Whorf much more often than Kuhn. Except the above passage, the
only references to Whorf in Kuhn’s works are Kuhn 1970: vi and Kuhn 1977: 258.
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In  fact,  some  scholars  have  already  noticed  that  the  role  played  by  symbolic
generalizations in scientific practice according to Kuhn is similar to which played by the
standard meter and color-samples in language games according to Wittgenstein (Malone
1993, Baltas 2004). In his investigation of the synthetic a priori nature of the second law
of motion, Kuhn himself quotes Wittgenstein; he asks whether Newtonian mechanics
could withstand the revision of the second law, of the third law, of Hooke’s law, or the
law of gravity and he answers: “these are not questions that individually have yes or no
answers. Rather,  like Wittgenstein’s ‘Could one play chess without the queen?’ they
suggest the strains placed on a lexicon by questions that his designer, whether God or
cognitive evolution, did not anticipate its being required to answer” (Kuhn 2000: 72).
In  fact,  like  Kuhn’s  symbolic  generalizations  are  grounded  in  both  scientific
language  and  reality  at  the  same  time,  Wittgenstein’s  samples-rules  or  units  of
measurement  are  pieces  of  extra-linguistic  world  captured  by language and used in
language  to  speak  about  the  world.  Roughly,  the  difference  between  descriptive
propositions and propositions that present samples can be explained as follows: we use
to ask if a given body is really a meter long; but it is meaningless to ask if the standard
meter  is  really  a  meter  long.  The  truth-value  of  sample-propositions  cannot  be
determined by world experience without falling into an infinite regress. A proposition
such as “this is the standard meter” shows a sample and, like tautologies and equations,
it is not a description of the world (a candidate for truth or falsehood), but rather the
formal  matrix  of  empirical  truth-value attributions.  After  the  Tractatus,  Wittgenstein
defines pseudo-propositions as “grammatical rules”. Saying that something is a unit of
measurement implies showing some grammatical rules.
The rules of grammar are arbitrary in the same sense as the choice of a unit of
measurement. But that means no more than that the choice is independent of the
length of the objects to be measured and that the choice of one unit is not ‘true’ and
another ‘false’ in the way that a statement of length is true or false. Of course that
is only a remark on the grammar of the word “unit of length”. (Wittgenstein 1974:
185) 
Here arbitrary does not mean “merely conventional”, or better perhaps, it is a kind of
conventionality very similar to which Kuhn attributes to symbolic generalizations; here
arbitrary means non-testable through normal experience (Wittgenstein 1974: 186-187).
Thus, it points out the same sense of language-related necessity that Kuhn attributes to
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analytic,  quasi-analytic  and  synthetic  a  priori  propositions:  “the  only  correlate  in
language to an intrinsic necessity is an arbitrary rule. It is the only thing which one can
milk out of this intrinsic necessity into a proposition” (Wittgenstein 1958: 116). Finally,
another  brief  clarification  has  to  be  made.  We have  seen  that,  for  Kuhn,  empirical
content is not absolute and synthetic a priori propositions can be considered empirical or
conventional depending on the accepted interpretation of the theory. In the same way,
according  to  Wittgenstein,  there  is  no  ultimate  distinction  between  descriptive  and
grammatical  propositions:  his  aim is  not to  propose again the old analytic-synthetic
dichotomy. There are not two kinds of propositions, but two different  uses: describing
the world and showing a rule. These uses are linked to different language games: a
statement  is  empirical  or grammatical  only within a  language game.  These remarks
introduce  a  new  conception  of  the  relationship  between  language  and  reality
(Wittgenstein 1958: 89), to some extent consistent with Kuhn’s conception that I am
going to analyze with the help of the other philosophical reference of Kuhn: Kant.    
3. The conditions for the possibility of experience
I  have  recognized  some  analogies  between  Kuhn’s  theory  of  symbolic
generalizations and Wittgenstein’s theory of grammatical propositions. To sum up, the
truth-value of this sort of propositions is related to definitions and meaning, but it is not
the kind of conventionality which, like analytic propositions, makes true a proposition
in virtue of its internal properties. Moreover, like synthetic propositions, they allow us
to tell something about the world, rather than about other words; but, unlike synthetic
judgments, their predictions cannot be empirically falsified. So, the first result I have
achieved about Kuhn’s Kantianism is that universal laws and symbolic generalizations
are not falsifiable because they constitute the grammar of scientific practice.
Nevertheless, in the analysis of Kuhn’s use of the expression “synthetic a priori”, a
question arises on the relation between (scientific) language and reality. We have seen
that  the  synthetic  a  priori  nature  of  symbolic  generalizations  implies  a  complex
combination of theoretical and experimental research. Now, that is because the “world
of science” (i.e. the object of scientific knowledge) is the result of the combined action
of reality and paradigm. The way paradigms contribute to determine experience is the
Kantian legacy inherited by Kuhn.
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Actually,  Kuhn  does  not  affirm  only  that  observation  is  theory-laden.  Rather,
following Kant,  he states that  the taxonomic structure of paradigms (Hacking 1993,
Chen 1997, Sankey 1998 and Massimi 2015 for a clarification of the taxonomic notion
of paradigm) provides a structure for possible experience: “insofar as the structure of
the world can be experienced and the experience communicated, it is constrained by the
structure of the lexicon of the community which inhabits it” (Kuhn 2000: 101). Kuhn
acknowledges  that  the  claim that  scientific  lexicon  is  a  structure  which  constraints
experience  is  a  Kantian  idea,  since  the  lexicon  provides  us  with  preconditions  of
possible experience, just like Kantian categories. Or, in other words: 
My structured lexicon resembles  Kant’s  a  priori  when the latter  is  taken in  its
second, relativized sense. Both are constitutive of possible experience of the world,
but neither dictates what that experience must be. Rather they are constitutive of
the infinite range of possible experiences that might conceivably occur in the actual
world to which they give access. Which of these conceivable experiences occurs in
that actual world is something that must be learned, both from everyday experience
and from the more systematic and refined experience that characterizes scientific
practice. (Kuhn 2000: 245)
The most important difference between Kuhn and Kant about the nature of the “a
priori” is that, while, for Kant, it justifies the universality and necessity of knowledge,
for Kuhn, the “a priori” is supposed to be relativized. The scientific experience of the
world is determined by taxonomic schemes, so that the world of science changes as well
as  the  paradigms5:  there is  a  plurality of  potential  worlds  of  science.  Indeed,  Kuhn
presents the worlds of science just like a plurality of possible worlds in the history of
science. Kuhn, like Kripke, considers a possible world a world which is stipulatable in
some  languages  (Kuhn  2000:  64);  in  other  words,  a  possible  world  is  a  world
conceptually  accessible.  This  difference  is  very  obvious  since,  according  to  Kuhn,
paradigms are historical things and many paradigms can accommodate the same set of
experimental  data.  But  this  entails  a  second difference as  well.  Kant’s  “a priori” is
transcendental: it is necessary and universal and grounds the possibility of experience.
5 This is Kuhn’s ontological relativism: the thesis that the world changes during scientific revolutions
(Kuhn 1970: 111-135). Sankey presents it as follows in his taxonomic interpretation: “The taxonomic
structure of the phenomenal world of a theory depends on the categorial scheme employed by the
theory. As a result, the phenomenal worlds of scientific theories associated with different categorial
schemes contain divergent systems of natural kinds. Thus, the set of natural kinds constitutive of the
phenomenal  world of  a  theory depends  on the categorial  scheme of  the  theory.  Given that  such
phenomenal worlds vary relative to the categorial scheme of operative theory, the existence of a set of
natural kinds which populates the phenomenal world of the scientist is therefore a form of existence
which is relative to prior choice of scientific theory.” (Sankey 1997b: 316).
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Instead, for Kuhn (and for Wittgenstein) paradigms are not transcendental forms: they
are immanent to human practices and this rules out the possibility of a metaphysical
foundation of scientific knowledge.  
The removal of the distinction between “possible world” and “world conceptually
accessible” automatically eliminates the “world-in-itself” from the specter of possible
worlds. Lexical structures are, to some extent, co-constitutive of possible worlds: being
a possible world means being accessible by some languages. In this way the world-in-
itself is not included in the set of possible worlds; that is because, by definition, it is
conceptually  inaccessible  to  any (scientific)  community sharing  a  language.  Kuhn’s
conception of the “thing-in-itself” is a controversial and ambiguous issue, so I will not
specifically  focus  on  it.  He  often  affirms  that  the  objective  reality  exists  and  is
independent of our knowledge and language. But he also states that such a reality is
almost or totally unknowable: his view is Kantian, but without “things-in-themselves”
and with changing categories of the mind, which follow the accommodation of language
and experience. But, for Kuhn, this view does not make the world less real (Kuhn 2000:
207).  The  point  is  that,  as  it  is,  the  thing-in-itself  may  be  useful  only  as  a
commonsensical defense against idealism and solipsism, since we posit its existence to
account for our perception of the world and we assume its immutability in so far as we
wish to rule out individual and social solipsism. In the end, he specifies that the thing-
in-itself is something “ineffable, indescribable, undiscussibile” (Kuhn 2000: 104). The
world-in-itself and the phenomenal world should remain separated because scientific
knowledge would be pointless without a cleavage between them, but scientific lexicons
contribute to determine scientific reality. We have seen that the world of science, in so
far  as  it  is  partially determined by symbolic  generalizations,  is  language-dependent.
Now I can add that, according to the necessarily public nature of grammar (Wittgenstein
1958: 81), the phenomenal world can be considered a language-dependent world, but
only from a social viewpoint. This clarification can explain some ambiguities about the
existence  of  the  mind-independent  reality.  The  world  changes  over  the  course  of
scientific revolutions as far as paradigms are shared by a (scientific) community. To that
extent, the metaphor of a mind-dependent world is misleading as well as the metaphor
of a constructed world since “it is groups and group practices that constitute worlds (and
are  constituted  by them).  And the practice-in-the-world of  some of  those groups  is
science. The primary unit  through which the sciences develop is thus, as previously
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stressed, the group, and groups do not have minds.” (Kuhn 2000: 103).      
Anyway, according to Kuhn, there is a structural relation between scientific language
(its  taxonomic  structure)  and  its  capability  of  giving  us  access  to  certain  possible
worlds. In other words, taxonomic categories provide a categorization of the “world” by
some  similarity-dissimilarity  relationships.  Kuhn  uses  the  expressions  “taxonomic
structures”,  “categories”,  “kind  terms”  in  his  latest  works.  In  the  seventies  the
similarity-dissimilarity relationships by which the paradigm attaches to the world were
analyzed by Kuhn through Wittgenstein’s notion of “family resemblance” (which plays
a  major  role  in  the  process  of  scientific  training:  see  Andersen  2000a).  Basically,
scientists have learned to master these family resemblances during their professional
education: the structure of scientific taxonomies implies a linguistic way of working in a
scientific world. Coming back to the previous example, in order to gain access to the
Newtonian world, physics students must understand and use interrelated terms such as
‘mass’, ‘weight’, ‘force’ and the laws in which they occur. I will analyze this point in
section 2 – part 2 – but, anyway, once a scientific community shares a lexical structure,
it gains access to many possible worlds, which only now are available to observation
and experimental verification or falsification.
Nevertheless, Kuhn stresses that different but compatible lexicon can make the same
possible  world  accessible;  but  incompatible  taxonomies  determine  different  possible
worlds:  scientific communities possessing a lexicon or a structured vocabulary have
access to the set of worlds that can be described through the relevant lexicon. But rival
lexicons give access to different sets  of possible  worlds and these worlds are never
entirely overlapping (even if  they are usually partially overlapping).  In fact,  Kuhn’s
theory of the linguistic access to possible worlds does not mean that a possible world is
conceptually accessible to any language: only certain languages create the conditions
for  the  access  to  a  possible  world.  He  specifies  that  only  the  possible  worlds
conceptually accessible by the lexicon of a linguistic community are available for it: 
Only the possible worlds stipulatable in that  language can be relevant  to them.
Extending  quantification  to  include  worlds  accessible  only  by  resort  to  other
languages seems at best functionless, and in some applications it may be a source
of error and confusion. […] At least in their application to historical development,
the  power  and  utility  of  possible-worlds  argument  appears  to  require  their
restriction to the worlds accessible with a given lexicon, the worlds that can be
stipulated by participants in a given language-community or culture.” (Kuhn 2000:
64-65)
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Consequently, we have seen that, according to Kuhn, a given possible world can be
the  object  of  experimental  investigation  if  and  only  if  it  is  stipulatable  in  a  given
lexicon.  That  is  because,  like  Kantian  categories,  scientific  lexical  structures  are
constitutive for the possibility of experience: without an appropriate lexical structure for
the access to a possible world,  the very field of possible experience collapses. As a
result,  like the access to possible worlds is  language-dependent,  possible worlds are
language-dependent as well. However, these observations do not lead Kuhn to some sort
of linguistic idealism. Kuhn does not abandon the idea of a mind-independent world.
Rather, his targets are naive realism and truth as correspondence6: “If, as standard forms
of realism suppose, a statement’s being true or false depend simply or whether or not it
corresponds to  the real  world-independent  of  time,  language and culture – then  the
world itself must be somehow lexicon-dependent” (Kuhn 2000: 77). Again, taxonomic
structures do not determine (actual) experience, but  possible experience. A world is a
set of possible states of affairs; and so we can consider an experimental fact (such as
verification or falsification) the actualization of a possible fact in the world actually
experienced by a given scientific community.
The truth-value of an empirical proposition is a question necessarily internal to a
lexicon, since it can be conducted only with a lexicon already in place, and its outcome
is influenced by the lexicon we are using. In so far as it is constitutive for the possibility
of experience, a taxonomic structure is the matrix of any truth-value attribution within
the experience field of its lexicon. But, precisely because it is a formal matrix, it  is
neither true nor false: “lexicons are not, in any case, the sort of things that can be true or
false”  (Kuhn  2000:  244).  Within  a  lexical  structure,  propositions  can  be  rationally
justified or falsified, but lexical change is a pragmatic matter. In the same sense that we
have seen referring to symbolic generalizations, the justification of a taxonomic scheme
is, to some extent, something conventional.
It  is  important to precise again that ‘conventional’ does not mean ‘arbitrary’  tout
court.  The essential point is that the relation between scientific language and reality
cannot be satisfied by the internal-external dichotomy. Since a paradigm provides the
conditions for the conceptual access to the world of science (its grammatical structure),
6 The rejection of the correspondence theory of truth is an important and underrated problem for Kuhn,
in particular in his latest works (see especially Kuhn 2000: 90-104). For a complete exposition see
Bird 2000: 209-266. I will focus on that problem in Part 2 – sections 3-4.
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from a Kuhnian viewpoint, it does not make sense to talk about paradigm and reality as
independent  of  each  other.  Kuhn  has  often  stated  that  knowledge  of  nature  and
knowledge of language are inextricably linked in the paradigm (Kuhn 1970: 110). As
regards  meaning  changes  during  scientific  revolutions,  he  explicitly  says  that  these
revolutionary changes within the categorial structures are about names or language as
well as about nature; and these features cannot be sharply separated. That is because the
taxonomic structures of paradigms is internally related to some knowledge of nature:
“each of the lexicons […] embodies knowledge of nature” (Kuhn 2000: 74).
In his comment on Richard Boyd’s realism (Kuhn 2000: 206-207), Kuhn considers
unsatisfactory the traditional idea of an accommodation of language to the world. He
thinks that it implicitly assumes the existence of one real world, largely unknown, but
toward  which  science  proceeds  with  increasing  verisimilitude.  Kuhn  expresses  his
puzzlement as follows:
What is the world, I ask, if it does not include most of the sort of things to which
the actual language spoken at a given times refers? Was the earth really a planet in
the  world  of  pre-Copernican  astronomers  who  spoke  a  language  in  which  the
features salient to the referent of the term ‘planet’ excluded is attachment to the
earth? Does it obviously make better sense to speak of accommodating language to
the world of accommodating the world to language? Or is the way of talking which
creates that distinction itself illusory? Is what we refer as ‘the world’ perhaps a
product of mutual accommodation between experience and language? (Kuhn 2000:
206-207)
The  last  question  is  clearly  a  rhetorical  question.  According  to  Kuhn,  scientific
development is a process of mutual accommodation between scientific language and
reality: the results of these mutual accommodations are the worlds in which scientific
communities live. The connection between language and nature is explained by Kuhn
by  means  of  the  metaphor  of  a  coinage  with  two  faces:  “the  criteria  relevant  to
categorization are ipso facto the criteria that attach the names of those categories to the
world. Language is a coinage with two faces, one looking outward to the world, the
other inward to the world’s reflection in the referential structure of the language” (Kuhn
2000: 30). Now, on the basis of the previous observations, we can fully understand this
metaphor. For what Kuhn says about synthetic a priori propositions and the conditions
for the possibility of experience,  scientific  language embodies  knowledge of nature,
which is  not falsifiable through experience.  So, a paradigm change (a  revolutionary
modification  in  the  synthetic  a  priori  propositions)  can  only  be  holistic,  because
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scientific experience does not exist outside the paradigm. In other words, the implicit
knowledge  which  changes  over  the  course  of  scientific  revolutions  consists  in  the
similarity-dissimilarity relations which determine the field of possible experience and
thanks to which normal science can take place.  Scientists  only now can check their
empirical statements. Kuhn’s theory affirms that two kinds of knowledge are combined
and acquired together through scientific training: knowledge of words and knowledge of
nature. In fact, physics students learn on the one hand the meaning of scientific terms
(their use in experimental practice) and, on the other hand, the sort  of things which
populate  the  world  and the  respective  behaviors.  Finally,  a  distinction  between two
kinds of knowledge – knowledge of words and knowledge of nature – is misleading:
“not really two sorts of knowledge at all,  but two faces of the single coinage that a
language provides” (Kuhn 2000: 31).
4. The world-language connection and the functions of normal science
In  the  last  section  I  have  argued  that  the  concept  of  synthetic  a  priori  entails  a
connection between world and language which is not localized in specific propositions
(protocol statements, base assertions and so on); rather, the Kantian and Wittgensteinian
conception of scientific knowledge determines a network of interwoven pieces of world
and pieces of language, so that experience pervades whole scientific theories, both from
the top and from the bottom. The referential  function of scientific lexicons is  not a
neutral connection between language and the “external world” or what is “really there”.
Rather, from the neo-kantian perspective, the notion of reference has to be refined from
an  internalist  viewpoint;  i.e.,  the  question  “what  do  the  real  world  consist  of?”  is
meaningful only within a paradigm, or a grammar.  This thesis  does not refer to the
language-dependence of scientific objects (the referents of scientific theories), since the
existence  of  objects  and their  ontological  autonomy and individuality deal  with  the
world-in-itself. Rather, it refers to the language-dependence of the connection between
paradigms and reality (the  reference  of scientific theories). The referential function of
scientific languages depends on the lexical structure of the languages themselves. To
individuate an object means to isolate it in experience, describing its spatio-temporal
boundaries and distinguishing it from similar and different objects in its background.
The emergence of objects comes from a segmentation of reality which allows scientist
25
to  discover  the  objects  (in  a  given  spatio-temporal  position).  This  is  a  preliminary
condition for referential success and is linked to the structure of the lexicon we work
with. In fact we identify objects by means of coherent sets of properties (such as mass,
acceleration,  weight  and  so  on  in  the  previous  example),  that  we  detect  through
experimental practices and measurements. The idea underlying Kuhn’s theory of lexical
structures is that a single property is not sufficient to single an object out and that we
should use a structural set of interrelated properties (Kuhn 2000: 58-89 and Kuhn 1990).
This  thesis  is  what  is  to  be  inferred  from the  above  analysis  of  the  hard-core  of
Newton’s  mechanics  and  is  linked  to  the  idea  that  we  can  change  the  structural
relationships between the fundamental concepts of classical physics to accommodate the
data in different ways and save the laws of motions against empirical falsifications. 
Now,  it  should  be  clear  what  Kuhn  means  when  he  speaks  about  the  mutual
accommodation  between  language  and  experience.  The  possibility  of  scientific
experience depends on the existence of paradigms, which give a structure to the “world
of  science”,  the  phenomenal  world  that  changes  over  the  course  of  scientific
revolutions.  Paradigms  influence  such  a  world,  since  singling  scientific  objects  out
requires a set of structural relations provided by the lexical structure. Therefore, to some
extent, nature adapts itself to the paradigm, although the existence of objects and their
individuality is a metaphysical question, which does not deal with scientific knowledge;
rather,  paradigms deal  with the epistemic conditions  of  science.  On the other  hand,
paradigms  adapt  themselves  to  nature,  since  their  structural  nature  (they  are  not
composed  of  isolated  concepts,  but  of  clusters  of  terms  that  influence  each  other)
enables meaning shifts, which make possible the accommodation of the experimental
data. Such an accommodation is mutual because every change in the paradigm entails a
feedback  mechanism between  paradigm and  nature  and  the  other  way round.  This
process characterizes both normal and revolutionary science: meaning change is not an
exclusive feature of revolutionary science, as I will claim in section 4. In fact, what is
supposed to change is the set of synthetic a priori propositions. A revolutionary change
is a scientific development which requires a radical change in propositions that have
previously  been  regarded  as  synthetic  a  priori:  “what  must  be  discarded  during  a
revolutionary change is somehow a constitutive, rather than simply a contingent, part or
the previous theory” (Kuhn 2000: 187 fn. 17). Since we have seen that the distinction
between synthetic a priori and empirical propositions is not qualitative (it depends on
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the role played by the proposition in the constitution of the theory), it follows that the
distinction between normal science and revolutionary science is not as rigid as it  is
usually  supposed  to  be.  Just  like  revolutionary  science,  normal  science  allows
significant  changes,  but  the  organization  of  the  theory  directs  the  “arrow  of  the
falsification”  toward  its  extended  core  (and  not  toward  the  core),  even  though  the
distinction between core and extended core is not so sharp.
In this context, an important issue in normal science is the function of measurement.
Kuhn individuates three fundamental aims of normal science (Kuhn 1970: 25 ff.):
1) The determination of the classes of facts which are particularly revealing of
the nature of things (according to the paradigm);
2) The  determination  of  the  classes  of  facts  which  can  easily  be  directly
compared with the predictions of the theory;
3) The empirical  work to  articulate  the paradigm, solving its  ambiguities  and
more and more original problems. 
The third aim is the most important and the most representative of the development
of normal science. It exactly consists in the mutual accommodation between paradigm
and nature that  I  have  outlined in  the  previous  parts.  In  turn,  the third aim can be
divided in three classes of puzzle-solving activities:
3.a)  the  determination  of  physical  constants  (for  example  the  empirical
determination of Avogadro’s number or Joule’s coefficient and so on);
3.b) the formulation of quantitative laws (for example Boyle’s law or Coulomb’s 
        law);
3.c) the application of the paradigm to new areas of interest.
Kuhn notes that, when scientists approach these normal problems, they do not look
for  the  agreement  between  theory  and  experiment,  but,  rather,  for  the  “reasonable
agreement” (Kuhn 1977: 184) between paradigm and experimental data. “Reasonable
agreement”  means  that  the  relationship  between  (scientific)  language  and  world
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depends,  as  I  have  stated,  on  the  paradigm  itself.  Scientists  usually  seem  to  be
struggling with facts or to harmonize the facts with the theory and the theory with the
facts.   
   
5. Conclusions
In  this  chapter  I  have  started  introducing  some  problems  of  Kuhn's  symbolic
generalizations and I have recognized some functions of paradigms-synthetic a priori
judgments, which constitute the experimental grammar of science and make possible the
access  to  some  portions  of  reality.  My  conclusion  is  that,  according  to  the
Wittgensteinian-Kantian model, this framework of the relation between language and
world is Kantian in two ways: 1) it considers scientific paradigms the boundaries of
objective experience (and not the other way round), although in a relativized and non-
transcendental way; 2) it entails an “internalist” conception of the referential function of
scientific language (so that we can speak of mutual accommodation between paradigm
and experience and not  of agreement between theory and reality).  Finally,  the main
point  is  that  universal  laws of  science are not  falsifiable  not  only for the dogmatic
attitude of scientists, but also, and above all, for their structure and function in scientific
theories. Of course, all the problems I have dealt with in this chapter require important
clarifications.  The  first  problem  is  how  they  are  related  to  the  current  debate  on
scientific  realism I  will  focus  on  in  section  2.  Moreover,  I  shall  specify  how  the
internalist view of reference can address the problem of the relation between meaning
and reference (of natural kinds) and I will do this in sections 3-4. Additionally, in this
chapter I have focused mainly on symbolic generalization, while, in Part 2 – sections 1-
2, I will explain how they are related to concrete applications. And finally, the most
important problem (that I will face in Part 2 – sections 3-4 and Part 3) is whether Kuhn
is right in saying that the ideas I have exposed in this chapter entail the rejection of the
correspondence theory of truth.
28
Section 2: Selective Realism and the Concept of Reference
1. Introduction
In the last chapter I have focused on the relation between scientific paradigms and
the world, starting with Kuhn's perspective; but his theses about this topic are actually
out of fashion and the contemporary debate about scientific realism diverges from the
points Kuhn raised. Therefore, I do not think that it would be helpful to ask whether
Kuhn was realist or anti-realist in the terms of the actual debate and this is not the aim
of this chapter. Additionally, I do not want to go into the details of scientific realism,
since it goes beyond the scope of my work, but it will be fruitful to introduce some basic
ideas that are at the heart of the discussion; basically, because they are useful to present
some questions that I will discuss in the next chapters (reference, selective confirmation,
mathematical  structure,  physical  interpretation,  approximate  truth,  pessimistic
induction, causal theory of reference and so on) and they are a good tool to approach the
language-dependence of reference (that I will analyze in Part 1 – sections 3-4). So, this
chapter is not intended as an official stance on scientific realism. I will conclude that
semirealism is a good option as regards the concepts of concrete structure and detection-
auxiliary properties, but I am not committing myself to the metaphysics of semirealism.
Actually, scientific realism is supposed to consist of three main theses (Psillos 1999,
2000):
1) The Metaphysical Thesis: the objective world exists and has a definite structure
independent of the content of our knowledge and its organization (ontologically
and causally speaking).
2) The Semantic  Thesis:  scientific  theories  are  truth-conditioned  descriptions  of
their intended domains; they should be literally construed as true-or-false.
3) The  Epistemic  Thesis:  mature  and  successful  scientific  theories  are
approximately true.
The first thesis is a modest statement of scientific realism. It implies only that there is
a  mind-independent  world  that  scientific  knowledge  tries  to  describe.  This  is  a
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metaphysical thesis very hard to demonstrate, but I will take it for granted and I will not
discuss it in depth. On the contrary my discussion is concerned only with the semantic
thesis  and  the  epistemic  thesis.  In  fact,  scientific  realism  is  characterized  by  a
presumptuous  claim about scientific knowledge as well: it  affirms that,  although the
world is largely independent of our cognitive abilities, science can succeed in providing
an  accurate  description  of  it;  that  is  to  say,  an  approximately true  description  (see
Wright  1992:  1-2  for  a  distinction  between  modest  and  presumptuous  realism).
Scientific  realism is  traditionally  introduced  in  opposition  to  anti-realism,  a  set  of
theories  that  includes  constructivism,  skepticism,  idealism,  logical  positivism,
instrumentalism and  many others.  On  the  contrary,  I  will  argue  about  other  realist
positions, which emerged after  The Structure of Scientific Revolutions: entity realism,
structural realism and semirealism. These theories have been dubbed “selective realism”
(or preservative realism) and suggest that we should not believe everything we are told,
i.e., we should not believe in all aspects of scientific theories (Chakravartty 2007: 29). 
In the following sections I will briefly describe structural realism and entity realism
and I will conclude that they are both incomplete positions which imply each other, in
spite  of  appearance;  and  I  will  argue  that  semirealism  can  answer  to  some  open
questions of such theories. But I will also note that both entity realism and semirealism
hold a causal theory of reference that I consider inappropriate (although entity realism
assumes  it  in  a  non-literal  interpretation  and  semirealism  in  a  descriptivist
interpretation). On the other hand, I think that structuralism can provide the framework
for  a  suitable  theory  of  reference,  which  takes  into  account  the  “Kantian”  or
“internalist” concept of reference determined by the lexicon that I have introduced in
section 1.
Before we start, let me add the last preliminary clarification. The semantic thesis and
the epistemic thesis deal both with the relationship between science and reality and with
the relationship between science and truth. Here, I will focus only on the former and I
will leave the latter question out. I think that scientific realism and truth are distinct
issues and we have to deal with them separately. Therefore, I will discuss truth in Part 2
and Part 3 of my work.
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2. From structural realism to entity realism
As  a  first  approximation,  structural  realism  is  a  theory  that  emphasizes  the
importance of relations and holds that “scientific theories offer faithful descriptions of
reality” does not mean that they tell us something about the essence of objects; rather,
they tell  us something about the structure of the world.  For example,  “informally a
structure is a system of related elements, and structuralism is a point of view which
focuses attention on the relations between the elements as distinct from the elements
themselves”  (Redhead  2001a:  74).  Structural  realism focuses  on  the  relation  itself,
rather than on the relata. It can be methodologically construed (structuralism concerns
the  nature  of  scientific  theories:  we  should  understand  them  as  sets  of  models),
epistemically  construed  (structuralism concerns  what  science  can  know:  we  cannot
know what there is  in the world, we can know only its structure) and ontologically
construed (structuralism concerns what there is:  the structure is all  there is) (Psillos
2006: 560). The main variants of structural realism derive from the epistemic and the
ontic versions: epistemic structural realism (ESR) and ontic structural realism (OSR)
(see Ladyman 1998).
2.1 ESR and OSR
ESR. It holds that we have to consider the limits of scientific knowledge: the nature
of the objects which constitute the world is out of the bounds of scientific practice.
Maybe in the world there is more than the structure, but we can know only the structural
aspects of reality and nothing about the things whose relations constitute the object of
scientific knowledge. ESR has been introduced by Worrall (1989)7. Worrall analyzes the
Fresnel-Maxwell historical case to argue that, from ESR’s viewpoint, scientific progress
is cumulative since, over the course of the transition from Fresnel’s theory of light to
Maxwell’s theory of light, scientific progress preserves the  structure of such theories,
i.e.  the  mathematical  core  represented  by  Fresnel’s  equations  about  reflection  and
refraction. Fresnel was wrong about the nature of light, since he believed that it consists
in vibrations transmitted through the ether. But he was right about the structure of some
optical phenomena, since the structure of light described by his equations survives and it
7 A historical reconstruction of epistemic structural realism in (Chakravartty 2004: 152-154).
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is common to Fresnel’s and Maxwell’s theories.
OSR. It holds that only structures exist and therefore we should believe only in the
structures described by scientific theories.  The concept of object is  meaningful only
from an “ordinary language” viewpoint, but it is philosophically and scientifically poor.
The  most  widely discussed  form of  OSR has  been  presented  in  (French,  Ladyman
2003). OSR proceeds from the analysis of a case study about quantum mechanics. In
fact, every kind of scientific realism seems to assume the existence of objects, where
“object”  means  something  characterized  by identity  and  individuality.  But  quantum
particles  deny  this  assumption.  Consider  the  distribution  of  two  indistinguishable
particles (a and b) over two states. In classical physics we have four possible situations:
1) a and b in the first state; 2) a and b in the second state; 3) a in the first state and b in
the second state; 4) a in the second state and b in the first state. We usually consider (3)
and (4) equivalent (since they result from the permutation of the particles) and then the
probability of having one particle in the first state and one particle in the second state is
1/2 (assuming that no combination is advantaged). On the contrary, quantum mechanics
claims that a permutation of the particles does not generate a new situation. While in
classical  physics  two  particles  are  distinguishable  although  they  are  identical,  in
quantum  mechanics  two  identical  particles  are  indistinguishable.  According  to  the
“Principle of Indistinguishability”, quantum mechanics must treat identical particles as
indistinguishable:  if  a  particle  permutation P is  applied to  any state  function for  an
assembly of particles, then there is no way of distinguishing the resulting permuted state
function from the original unpermuted one by means of any observation at any time
(French, Krause 2003: 99). Since in quantum mechanics the calculation of probability in
experiments  depends  on  the  state  function,  a  permutation  does  not  produce  any
experimental  difference.  OSR appeals to this  argument  to demonstrate that quantum
“objects” cannot be considered individuals.
2.2 Objections against OSR and ESR
OSR claims that, since the ordinary conception of “object” is not consistent with
quantum objects, we have to reject the metaphysics of objects. But this argument is not
convincing because it does not investigate all the possible conceptions of object. For
example,  Ladyman  himself  states  that  “objects  are  picked  out  by  individuating
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invariants with respect to the transformations relevant to the context. Thus, on this view,
elementary particles are just sets of quantities that are invariant under the symmetry
groups of particle physics” (Ladyman, 1998: 42). This requirement is satisfied for at
least one theory of objects, which is outlined by Chakravartty and that I will improve in
the next sections. Additionally, Chakravartty claims that ESR is unsatisfactory as well.
At first,  it can be attacked because of its definition of structure. I have taken as my
starting  point  the  idea  of  structure  as  the  fundamental  mathematical  equations  of  a
theory. Such equations survive over the course of scientific revolutions or we use to
consider them limiting cases of the new equations. In order to define “structure”, ESR
turns to Russell, who provides a very clear definition: “a class α ordered by the relation
R has the same structure as a class β ordered by the relation S, if to every term in α
some one term in β corresponds, and vice versa, and if when two terms in α have the
relation  R,  then  the  corresponding  terms  in  β  have  the  relation  S,  and  vice  versa”
(Russell  1948:  272).  The  core  of  this  definition  is  that  the  members  of  α  and  the
members of β may be absolutely different and the same idea applies to the relations R
and S. Russell  considers structure a high-order property,  i.e.  a property of relations.
Roughly, high-order properties are properties of relations, while first order properties
are properties of things. For example, bodies have masses and therefore “mass” is a first
order property of a body. Moreover every body is heavier than other bodies and lighter
than other bodies. “Heavier than” and “lighter than” are relations which depend on the
property  of  “mass”,  since  bodies  are  heavier  or  lighter  than  others  because  of  the
relation between their masses. The same applies to properties such as “longer than” or
“shorter than”. But the relations “heavier than” (or “lighter than”) and “longer than” (or
“shorter  than”) have also something in common: for example the property of “total
ordering”. Total ordering is a property of relations, i.e. a high-order property. However,
although  this  definition  of  structure  is  clear,  it  can  be  challenged  by  Newman’s
objection (Newman 1928: 140): the fact that a system has a structure provides us with
information about the cardinality of the system, but any collection of objects (if there
are enough) can be arranged to correspond to a given structure (Demopoulos, Friedman
1985). The problem comes from the idea that only high-order properties constitute the
domain of knowledge, because it is a consequence of second order logic that, given any
set α and any relation T, there exists in α a relation having structure T (assuming that T
is  compatible  with the cardinality of  α).  Moreover  ESR can be attacked by Psillos’
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objection about  the distinction between the form and the content  of knowledge, i.e.
between structure and nature (Psillos 1995, 1999).  He claims that the dichotomy of
structure and nature implies that the nature of scientific entities is separated from their
structures (ESR states that objects are something above the structure of the theory). But,
according to Psillos this is untenable because it is based on the metaphysical distinction
between form and substance (Psillos 1995).
2.3 Concrete and abstract structures
Russell’s definition of structure uses the concept of high-order property. But Redhead
distinguishes  abstract  structures  from concrete  structures  (Redhead  2001a).  Abstract
structures are the kind of structure described by Russell: formal properties of relations
without the need for knowing first order properties. On the contrary, concrete structure
refers to a relation between first order properties: a relation between properties of the
things  in  the  world.  The  concept  of  concrete  structure  implies  a  stronger  realist
commitment, since a relation between first order properties implies that the entities are
correlated as well.
Replying to Newman’s and Psillos’ objections, Chakravartty proposes that structural
realism should suggest that scientific theories are concrete structures. His theory appeals
to  the  intuitive  definition  of  structure  as  enumerating  the  parts  of  something  and
describing their relations and affirms that we can say that a structure is a relation (or set
of  relations)  between first  order  properties (Chakravartty 2007:  39-40).  The kind of
properties we refer to are the quantitative and determinate properties emerging from
scientific  experimental  practice  (for  example  mass,  charge  and so on).  This  remark
satisfies Newman’s objection since, if structures are construed as concrete structures,
knowledge is about the concrete. Two structures can share the same high-order, formal
properties and, at the same time, be different concrete structures. Moreover, it satisfies
also Psillos’ objection since it does not hold the distinction between knowledge of the
structure and knowledge of  the nature.  That  is  because first  order  properties  whose
relations constitute the structure are possessed by entities (which can or cannot manifest
such properties at a given time) independently of any other circumstance. Knowledge of
the structure entails  knowledge of properties and their  relations  and therefore,  since
properties are first order properties of entities, it is also knowledge of entities. In such a
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way, we overcome the question of the distinction between the relation and the relata in
structural realism. It is not true that structural realism must necessarily affirm that we
cannot say anything about the existence and the nature of the elements of the structure.
On the contrary, if we assume that structures are concrete structures, we will commit
ourselves to the existence of some entities. But, to clarify in what way scientific entities
exist, I will analyze another kind of selective realism, apparently opposite to structural
realism: entity realism.
3. From entity realism to structural realism
Entity realism is a kind of selective realism since it aims to establish the conditions
under which we can believe that the entities described by scientific theories exist in the
world. It links existence to the causal contact with entities in experimental contexts.
Basically,  scientific  experiments  consist  in  the  manipulation  of  something  and  the
intervention in other things and therefore, since such things demonstrate to have causal
power in our practices, we are forced to believe that they exist.  Hacking states that
“when we use entities as tools, as instruments of inquiry, we are entitled to regard them
as  real”  (Hacking  1989:  578).  He  describes  (Hacking  1983)  the  experiment  that
demonstrated the existence of electrons through the detection of fractional charges. In
such  an  experiment  electrons  (and  protons)  are  “sprayed”  onto  a  metal  sphere  to
neutralize  the  surplus  charges  present  on  the  sphere.  Scientists  succeed  in  using
electrons to achieve this  neutralization and therefore we can conclude that  they use
electrons to manipulate the behavior of the sphere. These considerations lead Hacking
to his famous slogan “if you can spray them, then they are real”. This is vague, but tries
to  save science  against  the issues  related to  theory change.  In  fact,  if  we associate
ontological commitment with the theoretical statements of scientific theories, we should
modify our commitment for every theoretical change. On the contrary, entity realism
maintains only that we are expected to believe in the entities involved in experimental
causal  chains,  without  any  requirement  about  the  theoretical  background  of  such
experiments. Our beliefs about the existence of scientific entities are justified without
recurring to theories. We continue referring to the same entities although some theories
about them may be false (or have been falsified). Structural realism and entity realism
apparently contradict  each  other.  This  is  because  structural  realism is  skeptic  about
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entities and realist  about theories,  while  entity realism is  skeptic  about theories and
realist about entities; therefore, they might appear very different. But in the last section I
have argued that structural realism can be emended by means of a certain kind of entity
realism; now I will argue that entity realism entails a kind of structuralism.
3.1 Objections against entity realism
Entity  realism  has  been  harshly  criticized  by  several  philosophers8.  The  first
objection is that it is very vague. It does not provide a clear criterion to figure out which
things exist, among those we find in experimental practice; and, above all, what does it
mean that such entities exist? It states that existence consists in having a role in causal
experimental chains, but how can we define the concept of causal chain? Does every
experiment entail a causal chain? Are there degrees of causality that allow us to believe
more  faithfully  in  specific  entities?  Moreover,  entity  realism distinguishes  between
ontological (or existential) claims about entities and theoretical claims. This distinction
may be  right,  but  it  does  not  make  sense  to  speak  about  knowledge  of  individual
isolated  entities  (Chakravartty  2007:  31).  Knowledge  of  entities  necessarily  implies
knowledge of at least some relations that such entities maintain with other things: for
example, the relations with the other entities emerging in the same experiments and the
relevant properties; or the relations with the instruments of measurement, manipulation
and detection that scientists use to achieve the results of the experiments. Entity realism
needs  structures,  because  structures  are  indispensable  in  order  to  identify  the  very
entities to which entity realism is committed. Structures require entities since structures
consist in relations between first order properties; but, at the same time, entities require
structures since structures allow us to detect  the entities whose properties constitute
structures. But this is not sufficiently clear yet, because it does not reply to the first
objection to entity realism: in what sense should we believe in the existence of entities?
3.2 Detection properties and auxiliary properties
Chakravartty tries to answer to such a question introducing a distinction between
detection and auxiliary properties. Detection properties are supposed to be responsible
8 For example Shapere 1993 and Resnick 1994. I will address the questions concerning reference in the
next section (Gelfert 2003).   
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for the causal regularities detected by experimental operations: regularities are such in
virtue  of  detection  properties.  On the  other  hand,  auxiliary properties  are  the  other
properties that theories attribute to their entities. Selective realism is committed only to
detection properties (and their causal powers) and remains agnostic as regards auxiliary
properties: they may be recognized as detection properties at some time in the future, or
be mere fictions, or be discarded in the development of science without major problems.
The distinction is epistemic (Chakravartty 2007: 47), since it depends on the conditions
under which properties are detected: we believe in detection properties because we have
sufficient experimental evidence for considering them real. The epistemic nature of the
distinction implies also that the boundary between detection properties and auxiliary
properties is a “moving boundary”.  It depends both on the entities that populate the
world and our ways of detecting them, i.e., on the status of scientific inquiry at the time
of the detection. Therefore, I am not posing a qualitative (or “real”) distinction, but a
quantitative distinction based on the degree of causal power required by properties to
achieve the results of measurements, detections and experimental operations. 
Thus, this distinction can provide a new interpretation of the Fresnel-Maxwell case
study about  the  nature  of  light  analyzed  by structural  realists.  I  have  said  that  the
structural  realist  interpretation  is  not  convincing especially  because  is  not  clear  the
relation between structure and mathematical core.  On the contrary,  by means of the
detection-auxiliary  properties  distinction,  we  can  conclude  that  structures  strictly
construed are the sets of detection properties which are preserved in the transition from
Fresnel’s to Maxwell’s theory: for example, being influences propagated rectilinearly
and made up of two components manifested at right angles to one another and to the
direction of propagation (each of which has an intensity) and so on. On the contrary, the
fact that light propagates in an elastic solid medium (ether) is an auxiliary property,
which we can eliminate without giving up the theory.
The  preservation  of  detection  properties  allows  us  to  undermine  the  ontological
ambiguity of the mathematical core of scientific theories. In fact, structures which seem
to  be  empty acquire  their  empirical  content  in  virtue  of  their  relationship  with  the
relevant applications, i.e. the experimental operations which define the identity of the
qualitative  detection  properties  whose  relations  constitute  structures.  Unlike
mathematical  structures  (for  structural  realism),  structures  of  relations  between
detection properties require a minimal interpretation. Structural realism cannot provide
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such a minimal interpretation since its structures are high-order structures without any
knowledge of the first order properties of the things in the world. As I will say in Part 3
– section 2, this problem entails also some unpleasant consequences about the use of the
concept of truth in scientific contexts.
Thus, from the historical viewpoint, the hypothesis of the existence of ether can be
seen  as  a  heuristic  tool,  which  works  in  connection  with  the  effective  detection
properties9.  These  hypotheses  can  help  scientists  to  describe  phenomena  and  to
elaborate  successful  experiments,  but  no way they take  part  in  the  ontology of  the
theory. Moreover, the distinction between detection and auxiliary properties can provide
a criterion to individuate in a straightforward way the radical breaks in the history of
science, or, in Kuhn’s words, to distinguish between normal science and revolutionary
science. Actually, scientific progress consists in more or less conspicuous changes in the
theoretical apparatus of well-confirmed theories. Some changes in the history of science
are radical (for example the chemical revolution and the rejection of the phlogiston
theory),  while  we can  interpret  the  other  changes  as  minor  or  major  adjustment  of
accepted theories. Now we can state that the ordinary adjustments of scientific theories
deal with auxiliary properties. This does not mean that such changes are not important,
but only that they do not affect the minimal interpretation of the core of the current
theory (its interpreted structure). For example f = ma is part of the structure of Newton’s
physics and we can say that it entails ontological commitment to the entities that (under
specific  experimental  circumstances)  manifest  the  property  of  mass  and  the  related
properties. Therefore, a realist interpretation of the second law of motion has to consider
mass  a  detection  property  of  entities.  But  Newton  presents  his  theory  with  many
auxiliary hypotheses, for example the existence of absolute space and time. Although
they are very important, these hypotheses are not part of the structure of the theory. In
fact, in his criticism of the bucket argument about the existence of absolute space, Mach
demonstrated that we can reject the hypothesis of the absolute space and, at the same
time,  maintain  the  structural  core  of  Newton’s  physics  (Jammer  1954:  139-141).
Therefore,  the hypothesis  of absolute  space is  an auxiliary property.  Again,  it  is  an
important concept and it could be very useful, but it is not indispensable to minimally
interpret the laws of motion.
I  have  referred  to  Kuhn’s  distinction  between  normal  and  revolutionary  science
9 Obviously, we can easily reach such a conclusion only with hindsight. Scientists are not necessarily
supposed to be able to distinguish “in real time” between detection and auxiliary properties.
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because I think that the distinction between detection and auxiliary properties (and their
relations with the concept of structure) gibes well with the ideas about scientific lexical
structures and their role in the identification of normal and revolutionary changes in the
history of science that I have presented in section 1. Kuhn is concerned with the issues
in the distinction between the core and the extended core of scientific theories and with
their constitutive elements. In section 1, I have stated that, by constitutive elements of
scientific  theories,  Kuhn refers  to  their  mathematical  core (for example the laws of
motion and the concepts of force, mass, acceleration). But Kuhn, too, is dealing with the
concrete core of theories, since he states that mathematical structures are meaningful
only  if  connected  with  their  paradigmatic  applications,  which  consist  in  the
experimental situations associated with the terms involved in the fundamental equations
of the theory (for example the experiments, measurements, detections the terms mass is
introduced by).  For  Kuhn,  “mass” can  be considered  a  detection  property since  the
experimental detection of the property of mass (by means of the application of the term
in experiments)  is  indispensable for  the interpretation of  the theory.  Aside from the
changes involving such detection properties, every change is normal and does not raise
doubts  about  cumulative  scientific  progress.  In  the  next  sections  I  will  use  such  a
comparison between Chakravartty’s concept of structure and Kuhn’s one to propose a
structuralist (and Kuhnian) correction to Chakravartty’s theory of reference. But, first of
all, let me present some last clarifications and summarize the results of my analysis.
3.3 Final clarifications and semirealism
The kind of selective realism defended by Chakravartty (semirealism), emphasizes
the importance of first order properties in the determination of scientific structures. But
he does not provide an explicit definition of “property”. This is not a weak point since
he  says  that  his  theory is  consistent  with  any theory about  properties  (transcendent
universal,  immanent  universals,  tropes,  resemblance  nominalism  and  so  on)
(Chakravartty 2007:  40 fn.  4).  Anyway,  I  will  drop the metaphysical content of the
concept of property and assume a “deflationary” perspective.  Thus, by “property”,  I
mean a coherent set of accepted applications of a concept. For example, by “property of
mass”  (according  to  Newton’s  mechanics),  I  refer  to  the  set  of  applications  of  the
concept  of  mass  in  experimental  situations  accepted  by  the  relevant  scientific
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community. Obviously, this implies that properties are “open-textured”, since the set of
applications is open and I will focus on this point in sections 3-4; anyway, it is worthy
that it  is  an open set,  since it  means that  more and more problems may be solved.
Furthermore,  the applications  of the property of mass  are unavoidably linked to  the
applications of the other properties involved in the structure of the theory, since, for
example, the application of the property of mass engages the application of the concept
of force. 
This  is  consistent  with  Chakravartty’s  description  of  properties  as  capacities  or
dispositions “to behave in a certain way in the presence or absence of other particulars
and their properties” (Chakravartty 2007: 41). For example, the fact that a body has a
mass justifies the expectation that such a body will be accelerated under applied forces
and will resist acceleration. The causal power of properties (i.e. the possibility to use
them to manipulate some phenomena) depends on the way dispositional properties are
mutually linked: it depends on the way sets of causal properties are disposed to act in
connection with others. Clearly, with regard to my previous definition of property, this
fixes some constraints to open-textured properties, since each property is compelled: 1)
by  the  coherence  with  its  previous  applications;  2)  by  its  relations  with  the  other
properties of the structure; 3) by the experimental success of its future applications. 
Kuhn  does  not  use  the  expression  “disposition”;  rather,  he  appeals  to  the
“projectibility” of scientific terms (Kuhn 2000: 75, 230); but I think that “dispositions”
and “projectible” mean the same thing in this context. Kuhn says that the concepts that
constitute the structure (detection properties) support induction, i.e. they must satisfy the
symbolic generalizations in which they appear (the mathematical core).  This applies
only to causal or detection properties, because they are linked to the most fundamental
equations of the theory and therefore their generalizations do not admit exceptions. On
the contrary, the other concepts of the theory admit exceptions, revisions and may be
rejected without major problems: they do not take part in the ontology of the theory.
Moreover,  I  shall  precise that  my conception  of  properties  is  also methodologically
construed.  In  fact,  I  have  already  said  that  the  distinction  between  detection  and
auxiliary properties is epistemic, since it depends on our methods of detection (and on
the  current  state  of  scientific  inquiry).  We need  detection  properties  to  realistically
interpret  structures,  which  are  made of  relations  between first  order  properties.  But
“detection property” is an epistemic concept linked to the current capacities of detection
40
of scientific  instruments.  Therefore,  we can say that  the ontological  commitment  of
semirealism is method-dependent; I will discuss the methodological nature of scientific
laws in Part 2 – section 1.
The  fact  that  entities  manifest  their  properties  only  when  subjected  to  specific
“stimuli” does not undermine scientific realism; it implies only that entities should be
considered from a structural viewpoint, since the possibility to individuate the relevant
entities depends on their relational dispositions. Before returning to this idea, let me
summarize the features of semirealism I agree with:
1) Structural  realism  and  entity  realism  are  incomplete  and  imply  each  other.
Structural realism implies entity realism because interpreted structures require
the  existence  of  the  entities  whose  properties  constitute  the  structure.  Entity
realism  implies  structural  realism  because  the  experimental  recognition  of
entities  requires  structural  relations  with  the  instruments  of  detection  and
measurement and with the properties of other entities involved in the detection.
2) The distinction between abstract structure and concrete structure allows us to
provide  a  clear  and  intuitive  definition  of  scientific  structure  as  concrete
structure and to reject the objections concerning the ambiguity of this concept. 
3) The distinction between detection properties and auxiliary properties allows us
to answer to the selective realist question: which entities should we faithfully
consider existing? It states that detection properties are required to provide a
minimal  interpretation  of  the  structural  core  of  scientific  theories,  which  is
indispensable for its applicability.
4. Theories of reference
In the last section I have said that semirealism is different from structural realism,
since it is not skeptical about the entities that scientific theories describe; entities are
involved in the detection process through which structures are constituted. Therefore,
unlike  structural  realism,  semirealism  (as  well  as  entity  realism)  should  justify  its
criterion for the identification of objects and the fact that some entities participate in
normal scientific  changes  without  substantial  breaks.  We have already seen that  the
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distinction between detection properties and auxiliary properties can help, because it
states that only detection properties are supposed to “survive” against scientific changes.
But this answer is not entirely convincing as far as it does not tell us how detection
properties  contribute to the identification of  entities.  An interpreted structure should
associate  to  relations  specific  physical  objects  and  represent  part  of  the  actual  (or
possible) physical world (Ainsworth 2010: 50). Therefore, a realist model that takes into
account  the  role  of  entities  has  to  furnish  persuasive  replies  about  the  referential
function of scientific structures10.
From this viewpoint, entity realism seems to be even worse than semirealism. In fact,
it has been criticized just because of its ambiguous notion of reference, which is at the
same time too narrow and too permissive (Gelfert 2003). It is too narrow since there are
many entities which do not fit in with entity realism’s criterion (and therefore we should
consider them non-existing), but at the same time, we have good reason to believe in
their existence: for example entities that cannot be part of manipulative processes, such
as theoretical entities in astronomy. At the same time, it is too permissive since (as I
have said before introducing the detection-auxiliary properties distinction) it does not
provide a norm to distinguish between existing and non-existing entities. For example,
quasi-particles fall within existing entities (according to Hacking), but their existence is,
at best, in question.  
The problem with entity realism is that it  accepts a causal theory of reference in
which  entities  are  “direct”  instances  of  manipulations  and  operations.  Since
semirealism,  too,  endorses  the  causal  theory  of  reference  (although  they do this  in
different ways), I will address the problem of reference from this standpoint.
4.1 Entity realism and the causal theory of reference
The connection between entity realism and the causal theory of reference is very easy
to explain. Entity realism is skeptical about theories and tries to link realism to the direct
experience of causal manipulations in experiments. Thus, theoretical changes are not a
problem for entity realism, since the cumulative nature of science is guaranteed by the
stability of interventions (not by the stability of representations). The causal theory of
reference  addresses  the  same  problem,  since  it  preserves  the  stability  of  reference
10  In Part 3 I will analyze how this idea is related to the theories of truth.
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against theory change by means of the idea that reference is fixed by an initial act of
direct “baptism” (a dubbing event) and that no description contributes to the definition
of reference (Kripke 1980). Therefore, our beliefs about objects may change, but this
does  not  undermine  realism,  since  the  causal  relation  between  name  and  object  is
independent  of our beliefs and descriptions.  The causal theory allows us to commit
ourselves  to  the  existence  of  entities  without  being  committed  to  the  respective
theoretical claims; but rather, merely by picking an entity out. I will discuss in depth the
causal theory in the next chapter; so this will suffice for now.
Hacking himself acknowledges his “debt to Hilary Putnam” (Hacking 1984: 157) and
states that  Putnam saved us  from the problem of  meaning change in  the history of
science (and from the idea that the meaning of a word consists in the theoretical laws it
occurs  in)  (Hacking 1984:  157-158)11.  But,  I  think,  Hacking’s  debt  to  Putnam ends
there. Hacking is only struggling to avoid the problems concerning the relation between
observation  and  theory  and  to  make  observation  as  independent  of  theoretical
statements as he can. His acceptance of the causal theory of reference is not justified by
a strong theoretical conviction, but only by their common “enemy”: theory and meaning
change  (Sankey  2012:  37).  And  besides,  Hacking  is  very  clear;  he  compares  his
approach  to  Putnam’s  theory  with  the  relationship  between  theory  and  experiment
according to his entity realism: “I do not literally believe to Putnam, but I am happy to
employ his account as an alternative to the unpalatable account in fashion some time
ago” (Hacking 1984: 159). But, in the previous sections, we have seen that Hacking’s
claim about the existence of entities independent of any theoretical structure should be
downsized. Therefore, since it is the only reason provided by Hacking to embrace the
causal theory of reference, the connection between entity realism and causal theory is
deeply undermined.                 
4.2 Semirealism and the causal theory of reference
A possible  solution  to  such  a  problem  is  to  keep  holding  the  causal  theory  of
reference  and  apply  some  descriptivist  corrections.  This  is  the  way  followed  by
Chakravartty’s  semirealism (2007)12.  The  main  problem of  the  causal  theory is  that
11 Note that  Hacking does not distinguish between the meaning of a term and its  reference. Unlike
Hacking (and Kripke-Putnam), here I am speaking only about the reference of scientific terms. 
12 And also by Sankey (1994, 2012) and Psillos (1999).
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ostension and direct application will not suffice to fix the reference of scientific terms.
Therefore, something other has to contribute to the process of reference-fixing and the
causal-descriptivist theories propose that we should acknowledge that some descriptions
play a role in this process, which is causal due to the descriptions of the properties that
are responsible for the causal process of baptism. Chakravartty (using his concept of
“detection property”) improves the causal theory to avoid some paradoxes, which apply
to Hacking’s theory (and to purely causal theories).
I have said that the difficulties with “direct reference” deal with non-existing entities
and referential  failure.  For example,  the causal theories may be right  in saying that
water is the same entity even if our beliefs about it change. But what about entities such
as phlogiston? The phlogiston theory successfully explains phenomena like combustion
and rusting  posing a  colorless,  tasteless  and odorless  substance  (phlogiston),  whose
removal under certain circumstances is responsible for such processes. Contemporary
chemistry affirms that phlogiston does not exist and that the same phenomena can be
better explained by oxygen. But the point is that phlogiston was used in causal chains
and therefore, according to entity realism (as well as the causal theory or reference) we
should be allowed to believe in the existence of phlogiston. Radical realists might reply
that “dephlogisticated air” (air after the removal of phlogiston) is nothing but oxygen
and that referential  stability is  saved by the recognition of co-referential  terms. The
causal theory distinguishes between truth and reference: a word can occur in a false
statement and, at the same time, be referential. Referential terms are not supposed to be
part of true statements.
But, as Chakravartty notes, this counter-objection is a trivialization of the concept of
reference (Chakravartty 2007: 55), which violates our basic intuitions about it; actually,
reference  would  be  a  very  trivial  concept  if  very  different  things  (such  as
dephlogisticated air and oxygen) were the same entity: we cannot consider an accidental
or  minor  question  the  fact  that  oxygen  has  a  definite  chemical  structure  (while
phlogiston does not). When we talk about oxygen and phlogiston we are dealing with
very  different  sets  of  detection  properties  and  therefore  semirealism  (unlike  entity
realism) can admit that oxygen and dephlogisticated air do not refer to the same entity.
According to Chakravartty the price to pay for avoiding such a trivialization is only the
introduction  of  descriptivist  elements  in  the  causal  theory  of  reference.  In  fact,
descriptions  allow us  to  understand how entities  play a  causal  role  in  experimental
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practices and to figure out in what sense they are existing.
4.3 Semirealism, essentialism and descriptions
On the  contrary,  I  think  that,  even  if  descriptions  play a  very important  role  in
scientific theories, the descriptivist correction to the causal theory of reference arises
other problems. I will focus on: 1) essentialism; 2) the introduction of descriptions.
Essentialism. In order to save reference against theory change, the causal theory has
to  specify how the  identity of  entities  is  determined.  It  states  that,  just  like  proper
names,  kind  terms  are  rigid  designators.  In  order  for  a  kind  terms  to  be  a  rigid
designator, it  must have specific essential properties fixed in the course of scientific
investigation  (Ellis  2001:  54-55).  For  example,  according  to  Kripke,  the  chemical
structure  H2O  is  the  essential  property  of  water.  My question  is  the  following:  is
essentialism consistent  with  the  concept  of  detection  property?  Thanks  to  detection
properties,  we  can  identify existing  objects,  but  they  are  not  essences,  because  the
distinction is based on epistemic arguments and may change with the time. They are
linked to the manifestations of the entities (by means of experimental detection) and are
not supposed to represent their essence, but, rather, their relations to specific forms of
detection. But the followers of the causal theory may disagree about this distinction.
Referring to the example of biological species (infra-species variations and overlaps
with other species), Chakravartty admits that, strictly speaking, many natural kinds have
no  essence  and  therefore  we  cannot  individuate  the  property  responsible  for  their
rigidity  (assuming  that  physical  and  biological  kinds  work  in  the  same  way).  He
suggests that semirealism has to accept both essence and cluster kinds, i.e. kinds without
essence, which do not essentially result from a (necessary and sufficient) property or set
of  properties  (Chakravartty  2007:  161).  In  the  end,  he  says  only that  properties  of
scientific  entities  are  causal-dispositional,  that  is,  they  generate  inductive  (fallible)
generalizations; but we can infer successful inductive generalizations that are not related
to the essence of the objects (involved in the generalizations). For example, inductive
generalizations  about  the  dangers  of  fast-moving  automobiles  are  trustworthy,  but
“automobile”  is  not  a  rigid  designator  or  an  essence  kind  (Sankey  1997a  and
Chakravartty 2007). Basically, I agree with Chakravartty, but the essentialist claims that
the discovery of a property is a necessary and sufficient condition for membership in the
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kind (Soames 2002: 15). Therefore, it seems that semirealism is not consistent with the
concept of rigidity.
Causal  descriptivism.  Causal  descriptivism  accepts  the  basic  idea  of  the  causal
theory of reference, but admits that ostension and direct exposition are not enough to fix
reference.  Consequently,  reference  fixing  includes  also  descriptive  statements  about
properties  and  the  relevant  theoretical  hypotheses.  Obviously,  this  correction  is  not
unproblematic, because it puts theory and meaning change back on the table. In fact,
causal descriptivism should clarify how descriptions contribute to determine reference
and answer to the question: “what does it happen if theoretical statements and properties
are rejected?”. Moreover, it has to clarify the relationship between reference and beliefs
and mental states of the speakers (a problem that the causal theory of reference can
easily give up)13.  There are  many possible  answers  to  these questions  and I  cannot
discuss them here. However, I think that the most compelling objection is the first one,
since admitting the existence of non-essential predicates in science is a sufficient reason
to acknowledge that we are dealing with a theory very different from the causal theory;
and the introduction of descriptivist elements moves along the same line. I will go into
the details of the causal theory in section 3. Anyway, now the point is that I do not want
to reject the causal theory of reference to endorse a traditional descriptivist viewpoint.
On  the  contrary,  I  will  use  the  structuralist  features  of  semirealism  to  present  a
structuralist viewpoint on reference (see also Part 1 – section 4).
5. Structures and reference
Analyzing the descriptivist corrections to the causal theory of reference, I mean that
they aim to specify the “theoretical environment” (Psillos 1999: 275) in which the word
is embedded. Pointing to something is not sufficient to single out a natural kind, because
we need to recognize non-superficial  properties  that  require theoretical  assumptions.
The  theoretical  environment  of  a  word  is,  to  some  extent,  “constitutive”  of  the
possibility  of  reference:  it  is  a  precondition  to  identify kinds  and  objects.  Such an
environment consists, for example, of the theoretical generalizations in which the term
occurs, the other concepts of the generalizations, the relations between the properties we
are dealing with and the instruments of detection. Briefly, I think that the theoretical
13 For a discussion of causal descriptivism see (Soames 2002) and (Devitt, Sterenly 1999).
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environment that makes reference possible consists in the “concrete structure” the word
is  part  of.  This  is  why I  use  the  word  “constitutive”:  structural  realism is  strongly
Kantian  (Massimi  2010)  and,  as  in  section  1,  I  recognize  two  Kantian-structuralist
theses: 
1) Scientific  structures  delimit  objective reality (not  the other  way round).  This
thesis means that an entity is a potential object of scientific knowledge as far as
we can individuate it through its detection properties.
2) Reference is  an “internalist” concept:  asking for the identity of something is
meaningful only within a “theoretical environment”. This thesis states that the
referential  function  of  scientific  languages  is  related  to  their  structural
organization.
5.1 “Internalist” reference
I think that the main problem with the causal theory of reference is the idea of a
“direct” linkage between words and entities. This problem makes it actually impossible
for  the  realist  to  distinguish  between  existing  entities  and  entities  that  take  part  in
experiments, but may be non-existing. Semirealism overcomes the problem by means of
the  distinction  between  detection  and  auxiliary  properties.  The  relations  between
detection properties constitute scientific structures, the things that we have to defend
over  the  course  of  scientific  progress  in  order  to  preserve  our  realist  commitment.
Moreover, I have said that detection properties are dispositional, i.e. they give rise to
inductive  expectations  about  how entities  will  behave in  specific  situations.  Sets  of
causal (dispositional) properties act in connection: for example, the fact that a body has
a  given  mass  provides  us  with  information  about  the  presence  or  the  absence  of
impressed forces or about the value of acceleration (in other words, it provides us with
information about other dispositions). The detection of a property is a “relational” act: it
necessarily involves the presence (or the absence) of other properties (of the same entity
and  properties  of  other  entities),  as  well  as  the  contact  with  detection  instruments.
Causation and dispositions deal with relations, that is to say, they deal with structures
that are indispensable for the recognition of the entities to which properties pertain.
What  I  mean  is  that  the  idea  of  “direct”  reference  is  misleading:  the  relationship
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between  words  and  things  in  the  world  (and  their  properties)  is  not  an  isolated
phenomena.  It  involves  the  “theoretical  environment”  that  makes  the  referential  act
possible, and consequently, it is a structural event. 
Therefore,  by external reference,  I  mean the direct connection that gives its  own
referent to a word. On the contrary, by internal reference, I do not mean an idealist or
“ontologically relativist” position. I mean that the possibility to single out the referents
of scientific theories depends on the structures of such theories. As I have anticipated in
section 1, the objects (or entities, the referents of scientific theories) exist and possess
their properties that we detect through scientific experimentation. But reference (i.e. the
connection  between theories  and things  in  the  world)  depends on  the  possibility  to
single certain properties  out and therefore on the structural  apparatus of  the theory.
Referents are outside language, but reference is necessarily language-dependent. 
My point is that one cannot be able to recognize an object without, at the same time,
being able to distinguish it from other objects of the same “theoretical environment”; or
one cannot correctly apply a concept without knowing situations in which the same
concept does not apply. The identification of an object requires many properties (both
detection and auxiliary);  this is consistent with semirealism, since Chakravartty says
that we can consider objects to be “cohering sets of detection properties” (Chakravarrty
2007: 65). But I add that we require knowledge of properties that the object does not
possess as well. The identity of objects is important as well as their differences with the
other objects of the structure. This is an advantage of structure toward direct reference:
direct  reference  poses  a  “direct”  relation  between  name  and  thing,  while  internal
reference states that the relation between name and thing is not a one-to-one relation; it
is partially determined by the relations between properties that constitute the structure.
As we have seen in section 1 for Newton’s mechanics, no term of the core of the theory
(i.e. no detection property) is available independently of the other terms of the core and
the theoretical statements by which they are introduced. 
Kuhn concludes  that  the  core  of  scientific  theories  constitute  a  “locally  holistic”
structure (Kuhn 2000: 2). Here “structure” has the same meaning of “concrete structure”
(or  interpreted  structure).  “Locally”  means  that  scientific  theories  are  not  globally
holistic:  we  can  distinguish  between  detection  and  auxiliary  properties  and  only
detection  properties  compose  the  structure.  And  “holistic”  means  that  the  detection
properties are a network of interrelated properties, which are not available for detection
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and definition independently of each other and of the mathematical equations in which
they appear. Local holism includes the structuralist claim that I have just presented. A
structure (that Kuhn calls “lexical structure”) includes, at the same time, similarities and
differences between objects, properties, contexts of application. Kuhn provides also an
example from natural languages:
Let me take “doux” to be a node in a multidimensional lexical network where its
position is specified by its distance from such other nodes as “mou”, “sucré”, etc.;
[…] the meaning of “doux”' consists simply of  its structural relation to other terms
of the network. Since “doux” is itself reciprocally implicated in the meanings of
these other terms, none of them, taken by itself, has an independently specifiable
meaning. (Kuhn 2000: 55)
Two structures  are  exactly co-referential  if  and only if  the relations  between the
detection properties of the structure are the same. Note that we are dealing with concrete
structures, since the structural position of each node (the relative distance from the other
nodes) is determined by the applications of the same node in experimental practices.
In my internalist view on reference, object are isolated in experience by means of a
set of properties (some of them are essential, but only from an epistemic viewpoint),
which  determines  identities  and  differences  with  the  other  objects  of  the  same
“theoretical  environment”.  Henceforth,  this  is  not  a  descriptivist  theory,  but  a
structuralist one. The advantage of such a view is that it rules out explicit theoretical
statements (which are vulnerable to theory change) by means of the relations between
detection  properties  epistemically  construed.  If  you  consider  a  property  the  “set  of
legitimate applications”, then the experimental spirit of the causal theory of reference
and entity realism is  safe.  From this  viewpoint,  properties are functional properties:
what  is  important  is  their  functional  role  in  the structure,  i.e.,  the set  of  successful
experiments which are possible thanks to such properties. The network of identities and
differences  is  generated  by  means  of  the  exposition  to  such  cases  of  application:
descriptive statements are part of the constitution of the structure (even if the conditions
may change case by case), but they are not a sufficient condition.
Finally let me summarize my results:
1) Hacking’s entity realism is linked to the causal theory of reference, but he does
not provide any good reason to accept the causal theory, except the necessity to
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make  entities  independent  of  theories.  But  I  have  argued  that  this  claim  is
untenable.
2) Semirealism, too, is linked to the causal theory of reference, but the epistemic
distinction between detection properties and auxiliary properties is inconsistent
with the essentialist nature of the causal theory. 
3) Finally,  I  suggest  to  adopt  structuralism to avoid the problems of the causal
theory of reference.  From this  viewpoint,  reference is  language-dependent:  it
depends on the structure of the current theory and on the network of relations
that allows us to identify the referents of scientific theories. Reference is not
something  that  requires  only  a  relation  between  a  name  and  something:  it
requires  sets  of  relations  with  the  other  “inhabitants”  of  the  “theoretical
environment” we deal with.
6. Conclusions
My conclusion, that I will further specify in Part 1 – sections 3-4, is that reference is
not  merely  a  connection  between  world  and  language.  We  cannot  think  that
dephlogisticated  air  exists  because  we  use  the  word  “phlogiston”  in  successful
experiments: the success of scientific theories is not a one-to-one referential relation
between words  and objects.  The referential  function  of  theories  involves  the  whole
structure and therefore is  plausible  that  a  theory is  referentially successful  although
some entities that the theory postulates do not exist. Phlogiston does not exists; but what
is  important  is  that  the  structural  relations  between  phlogiston  and  other  detection
properties (recognized by experiments) that characterize the phlogiston theory are not
preserved  in  contemporary  chemistry.  And  this  remark  allows  us  to  say  that  the
phlogiston theory and contemporary chemistry are not co-referential. Therefore, by the
expression  “internal  reference”,  I  do  not  want  to  suggest  that  scientific  theories
idealistically determine the existence and the individuality of their referents. Existence
and  individuality  are  presupposed  by the  operations  of  detection  and  measurement,
which enable us to speak about detection properties and structures. Finally, by “singling
out  a  scientific  entity”,  I  mean  isolating  it  in  its  spatio-temporal  coordinates  and
distinguish it from similar and dissimilar things in its context or environment.    
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Section 3: A Kuhnian Perspective on the Meaning of Scientific Terms
1. Introduction
After introducing the concepts of reference and meaning change, now it is time to
specify what I  mean by these notions: in order  to do so,  I  will  continue discussing
Kuhn's ideas. Actually, everyone knows the thesis of semantic incommensurability: the
meaning of scientific terms changes over the course of scientific revolutions. This thesis
has  been  widely  discussed,  but  sometimes  the  focus  of  the  discussion  is  not  clear
because different  philosophers  defend rival  theories  of  meaning.  Additionally,  Kuhn
never  explicitly clarified which is  the kind of meaning theory he endorsed and this
undermines  the  very foundation  of  his  argument.  In  fact,  if  what  we mean by “the
meaning of scientific terms” is not pointed out, then nobody will understand what kind
of things change over the course of scientific revolutions. In this chapter I will answer to
this  question  and  try  to  outline  the  coordinates  of  the  theory  of  meaning  that  is
consistent  with Kuhn’s  claims.  To achieve  this  aim,  I  will  criticize  two theories  of
meaning  which  have  often  been  associated  with  the  incommensurability  thesis:  the
intensionalist theory and the causal theory of reference. My aim is not to reject these
theories  by  general  arguments:  I  will  acknowledge  that,  in  some  cases,  Kuhn’s
arguments against them (especially against the causal theory) are not, by any means,
conclusive.  Nevertheless,  his  objections are  useful to figure out his  approach to  the
problem of the meaning of scientific terms. 
2. The Intensionalist view on referential change
The  first  referential  answer  to  Kuhn’s  semantic  incommensurability  (Hoyningen-
Huene, Sankey 2001b: x) was proposed by Scheffler (1967), which includes a detailed
attack to  The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. As regards the question of meaning
change,  he  tries  to  reject  it  by employing  Frege’s  distinction  between  sense  (Sinn,
intension) and reference (Bedeutong, extension). In fact Kuhn says that 
The physical referents of these Einsteinian concepts [space, mass, time] are by no
means identical with those of the Newtonian concepts that bear the same name.
(Newtonian mass is conserved; Einsteinian is convertible with energy. Only at low
relative velocities may the two be measured in the same way, and even then they
51
must not be conceived to be the same). (Kuhn 1970: 101-102)
From the Fregean viewpoint, the reference of scientific terms (their  Bedeutong) is
determined by their sense (Sinn), that is to say the descriptive content which is satisfied
by the  reference  and that  the  speakers  who understand the  term associate  with  the
respective reference.
From these premises, Scheffler argues that two or more terms may have different
senses, but the same reference. For example, Frege said that the expressions “Venus”,
“the morning star”,  “the evening star”,  “Hesperus”,  “Phosphorus” refer  to  the same
object  (the same planet)  although they have different  senses.  Therefore,  even if  the
senses  of  terms  such  as  “mass”  or  “time”  changed  over  the  course  of  Einstein’s
revolution,  this does not mean that their  reference changed as well.  The core of the
argument is that co-referential terms from different theories may differ in sense; and this
is supposed to provide a solution to the problem of incommensurability.
However, Scheffler’s analysis employs a concept of “reference” which is inconsistent
with Kuhn’s perspective (Sankey 1994: 36-43). In the above passage, Kuhn’s “referent”
is not identical with Frege’s Bedeutong, since Kuhn uses a concept of reference that is
partially language-dependent: as I have said in the previous sections, a sort of “internal
reference”.  I  will  return  on  this  point  in  the  following  sections,  but  at  first  I  will
challenge  the  intensionalist  interpretation  in  the  exposition  of  Alexander  Bird  (Bird
2000: 163-168). In fact, Bird acknowledges that Frege’s distinction between sense and
reference is a strictly realist idea that is not consistent with Kuhn’s theses (Bird 2004:
46).  But he presents an intensionalist  interpretation of Kuhn’s theory of meaning as
well: he says that the changes in the extension of scientific terms depend on a change in
their  intensional  meaning;  and  that  in  the  same way,  the  change  in  the  intensional
meaning determines referential discontinuity (Bird 2000: 168)14. Bird’s interpretation is
based on the following premises:
1. Scientific terms have an intension, which depends on the theoretical claims of
their theory;
2. Such dependence  is  thick,  because  the  intension  perhaps  depends  on  all  the
14 He claims also that, for Kuhn, although there is a shift in extension, neither the earlier extension nor
the later extension is empty (Bird 2000: 168); and this is also the case regarding reference, because it
is successful both before and after the change. 
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theoretical  claims  of  the  theory.  Every  theoretical  claim plays  some  part  in
meaning fixing;
3. Such dependence is also strict, because a property can satisfy the reference of a
scientific term if and only if such property is truly described by all the relevant
laws and other descriptions contained in the intension of the term.
My view is that these premises are not compatible with some of Kuhn’s claims and
that therefore the intensionalist interpretation of Kuhn’s theory of meaning should be
rejected. 
The first  premise.  The first  premise states that scientific terms have a descriptive
content, which is determined by the theoretical claims of the theory they are involved in.
However,  Kuhn denies  that  scientific  terms  have  intensions  or  descriptive  contents,
definitions and explicit rules of application. When we ask for the meaning of a term, it
is useless to look for a set of necessary and sufficient properties to identify such term.
Just like Wittgenstein’s games, we do not need “a definition, a list of characteristics
shared by games and only games, or of the features common to both men and wolves
and to them alone” (Kuhn 2000: 201). This is because no list of that sort exists (for
example not all games have a winner), but it is not an effective trouble for scientific
language (or for ordinary language). Kuhn suggests to consider the example of a child,
Johnny, who learns to identify different species of bird: ducks, geese and swans. This
process does not require anything like definitions: one might use universal statements
such as  “all  swans are  white”,  but  they are not  necessary and sufficient.  Under  the
supervision of his father (who validates the correct identifications and fixes the wrong
ones), Johnny will succeed in identifying birds only by means of the direct perception of
similarities  and  differences;  kind  terms  are  very  similar  to  Wittgenstein’s  family
resemblances,  since  scientific  terms  have  no  necessary  and  sufficient  conditions  of
identification  and  application  and  “in  matching  terms  to  their  referents  one  may
legitimately make use of anything one knows or believes about those referents” (Kuhn
2000: 50). The intensionalist view assumes that the reference of a term should satisfy a
certain description, which is retained by any speaker who understands the application.
On the  contrary,  Kuhn denies  that  the  understanding and the  application  of  a  term
depends on descriptions and speakers’ beliefs. 
This is the first point of my analysis: Kuhn’s perspective on the meaning of scientific
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terms is  a  Wittgensteinian perspective:  the meaning of  a  term consists  in  its  use in
scientific practice: “first,  knowing what a word means is knowing how to use it for
communication  with  other  members  of  the  language  community  within  which  it  is
current” (Kuhn 2000: 62). Kuhn explicitly relates this statement just to the idea I have
sketched: that a theory of meaning does not require descriptions or conditions for the
application.  People may (correctly)  use the same terms,  but employ different  set  of
coordinates  in  doing  this  (just  like  the  United  States  can  be  mapped  in  different
equivalent coordinate systems). Kuhn’s theory of meaning depends on “talking about
the way words are actually used, the situations in which they apply” (Kuhn 2000: 77 fn.
25). In this respect, scientific learning plays a constitutive role: the meaning of scientific
terms is their use in scientific practice because they are learned in use; that is, someone
who  can  properly  use  such  terms  provides  the  student  with  accepted  examples  of
application.
The second premise. The second premise states that (all) the theoretical claims of the
relevant theory fix the meaning of its terms. This is true in so far as scientific terms are
defined by the universal laws in which they occur; and Kuhn does say that the most
important function of symbolic generalizations is to define their terms: “they function in
part as laws but also in part as definitions of some of the symbols they deploy” (Kuhn
1970: 183). But this is not the whole story, since we have seen that scientific terms do
not  allow  us  to  define  them  explicitly,  especially  because  their  meanings  are  not
embodiable in definitions. Therefore we shall reconsider Kuhn’s claim. He says that the
meaning of scientific terms depends on the theoretical claims of the theory; for example,
on the universal laws that constitute its hard-core. But he says also that such universal
laws are meaningless in  so far  as they are not  associated with their  exemplary and
paradigmatic applications. Referring to the difficulties that physics students use to face
to solve the end-of-chapter exercises of their textbooks, Kuhn says that the meaning of
scientific laws is fixed by their application to the concrete practice of puzzle-solving.
For example, so long as they are not learned by means of exemplary cases of classical
physics such as the inclined plane or the simple pendulum, Newton’s laws of motion are
meaningless. From this viewpoint, exercises and applications are not useful to check
whether  the  student  has  understood  the  lesson;  rather,  they  allow  the  student  to
understand it. Thus, the relationship between laws and applications is the opposite of the
commonsensical interpretation, but I will focus on this point in Part 2 – section 2 (see
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also Andersen 2000b, Barnes 1982, Warwick, Kaiser 2005). Now, what is important for
my purpose is that the meaning of scientific terms depends on the laws in which they
occur,  but  the  meaning  of  the  laws  depends  on  their  applications  to  the  empirical
context. Ultimately, this is basically the same problem of the first premise: the direct
attachment of scientific terms to their context of use. 
Therefore, let me come back to the example of the child who learns to use the words
‘duck’, ‘goose’, ‘swan’. Johnny is exposed to many paradigmatic applications of those
terms and learns to group objects into similarity-dissimilarity classes (without rules or
explicit  definitions).  In  this  context,  as  I  have  sketched  in  the  previous  section,
dissimilarities are as important as similarities. The meaning of a term is not positively
fixed by means of a simple act of ostension; rather it is determined by contrast through
the exposition to different terms which belong to the same semantic network (like swan,
duck  and  goose).  Words  have  no  meaning  individually:  they  are  meaningful  only
through connections with other words of their semantic field. Such a group of terms
generates  networks  of  inter-defined  terms  that  Kuhn  calls  “lexical  structures”.  For
example, as I have said in section 1, the terms ‘mass’, ‘force’ and ‘acceleration’ are
acquired together through the second law of motion and then their meanings cannot be
separated.  I  think  this  explains  the  role  played  by  universal  laws.  Universal  laws
introduce set of inter-defined terms, which are acquired in use: “‘force’ must be learned
with terms like ‘mass’ and ‘weight’. And they are learned from situations in which they
occur together, situations exemplifying laws of nature” (Kuhn 2000: 231). The meaning
of such terms is still their use in scientific practice, but Kuhn highlights the fact that the
use, for example, of the term ‘mass’ (in classical mechanics) is not understandable as far
as we do not grasp the whole semantic field by which the term ‘mass’ is introduced.
The  third  premise.  The  third  premise  states  that  “for  some  property  to  be  the
reference of ‘mass’ that property must be truly described by all the relevant laws and
other descriptions contained in the intension of mass” (Bird 2000: 167). On this specific
point, I will be quite brief because I partially agree. But it is useful to clarify a question
that may arise from my discussion of the other premises. In fact terms such as ‘swan’,
‘goose’ and  ‘duck’ seem  to  be  different  from  terms  such  as  ‘mass’,  ‘force’ and
‘acceleration’. As regards the former group, it is very easy to point out the network of
similarities and differences the learning of such terms is grounded in. But, as regards the
latter  group, the question is not so clear.  That is  why Kuhn introduces a distinction
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between normic and nomic concepts. Normic concepts are exemplified by words such
as  ‘duck’,  ‘swan’,  ‘goose’,  or,  in  scientific  context,  ‘liquid’,  ‘gas’,  ‘solid’;  they are
acquired by means of the process of direct inspection and application summarized in the
example of Johnny’s training. Instead, nomic concepts are introduced by universal laws,
such as ‘force’, ‘mass’ and ‘acceleration’. The main difference between these kinds of
concepts is that normic concepts admit exceptions to the generalizations satisfied by
their referents (Kuhn 2000: 230). For example “liquids expand when heated” fails for
water  between 0 and 4 degrees centigrade.  On the contrary nomic concepts  involve
exceptionless laws of nature. Therefore the third premise is correct for nomic terms, but
does not apply to normic terms. Anyway, this is the least important point because the
distinction between normic and nomic concept is not a qualitative distinction. As we
have seen in the discussion of the first two premises, although nomic concepts are not
introduced  by direct  inspection,  they  are  learned  by problem situations  to  which  a
certain law applies (for example Newton’s laws and the free fall). In this way, problem
situations generate classes of similarity and dissimilarity in the same way as normic
concepts do. Finally, we cannot consider the difference between normic and nomic a
distinction between similarity-dissimilarity classes concepts and concepts that can be
explicitly  defined;  on  the  contrary,  the  significant  point  is  the  level  at  which  the
similarities come in (Andersen, Barker, Chen 2006: 32).
Following the discussion of the premises of the intensionalist interpretation, this is
the time to summarize the results of this section.
1. The meaning of scientific terms consists  in  their  use in the relevant field of
scientific practice. They have no intension or, if they have any, it is not sufficient
for the application of such terms to experimental contexts.
2. The meaning of a term is not isolated; rather, it is determined by contrast and in
relation  to  other  terms  of  the  same  semantic  field,  which  apply  to  similar
situations. Differences are as important as similarities to identify the meaning of
a word.
3. These remarks apply both to terms introduced by direct application and to terms
introduced  by  seemingly  descriptive  statements.  Universal  laws  cannot  be
considered definitions because they are meaningless without their paradigmatic
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applications.
These results lead to the last point of this section. Since meaning is use and use
depends on the learning process experienced by scientists during their student years,
obviously the correct application of scientific terms is a social thing: a term is properly
used in so far as it is unequivocally used within a scientific community. Scientists do not
necessarily share definitions, descriptions, criteria, necessary and sufficient conditions,
rules of application and so on; rather, they should share the network of relationships
between concepts, the structure of the lexicon. The determination of the meaning of
scientific terms is based on scientific learning and learning is a social process, since it
requires  the existence  of  a  community,  which  introduces  the student  to  its  practice.
Kuhn  distinguishes  between  the  lexicon  as  a  shared  property,  linked  to  a  specific
community and the lexicon as something possessed by each scientist  (or individual)
member of the relevant scientific community. Therefore, speaking about the meaning of
scientific  terms  is  appropriate  only  if  we  consider  scientific  communities  (and  not
individual scientists) as the main actors of scientific progress. 
3. Are scientific terms rigid designators?
The claim that the concept of meaning is accountable only from a social viewpoint
and  Kuhn’s  interest  in  the  direct  attachment  of  words  to  nature  seem to  provide  a
connection between this theory of meaning and Kripke and Putnam’s causal theory of
reference. For example Kuhn says that
The distinction between a theoretical  and a basic vocabulary will  not  do in its
present form because many theoretical terms can be shown to attach to nature in
the same way, whatever it may be, as basic terms. But I am in addition concerned
to inquire how “direct attachment” may work, whether of a theoretical or basic
vocabulary. In the process I attack the often implicit assumption that anyone who
knows how to use a basic terms correctly has access, conscious or unconscious, to
a  set  of  criteria  which  define  that  term  or  provide  necessary  and  sufficient
conditions governing is application. (Kuhn 1977: 302 fn. 11)
Bird recalls this passage and rightly states that Kuhn is rejecting Frege’s descriptivist
approach to the problem of reference. But he adds that here Kuhn endorses Kripke’s
theory of reference; thus, he tries to account for Kuhn’s later objections to the causal
theory affirming that,  in  the meanwhile,  Kuhn changed his mind.  In  fact  the above
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passage is  from a 1974 paper  and Kuhn’s main papers against  the causal  theory of
reference have been published in 1989/1990. On the contrary, I do not think that Kuhn’s
view changed on this  matter.  Although Kuhn agrees with some theses of the causal
theory (just like in the quoted passage), it is not consistent with many basic claims of his
theory of meaning and, moreover, in 1979 (when he published the paper “Metaphor in
Science”) he was already skeptical toward Kripke’s theory. Perhaps Kuhn’s arguments
have become stronger in recent years, but I think that he has never been a follower of
the causal theory of reference.    
Basically, both Kuhn and Kripke-Putnam deny that the meaning of a term t is given
by a description or a conjunction of descriptions or a cluster of descriptions that the
speaker  associates  with  t;  and that  the substitution of  t  for its  description preserves
meaning and proposition (and vice versa). On the contrary, according to Kripke (1980)
(whose theory originally applies to proper names), singular terms are rigid designators:
with regard to an object O, the term t is a rigid designator if and only if it designates O
in all  possible  worlds in  which O exists;  and,  with respect  to any possible world,  t
designates only O. For example the name “Stephen Curry” and the description “the
2015 NBA MVP” designate the same object, but the first is a rigid designator, while the
second is not, because we can imagine a possible world in which LeBron James is the
2015 NBA MVP. Referring to the meaning of scientific terms, the basic point is that the
rigid designator keeps unchanged its reference although our beliefs about it are false.
For example, one might wrongly believe that LeBron James won the 2015 NBA MVP,
but my belief (and its revision) does not change the reference of the name “Stephen
Curry”. Reference is fixed by an act of naming called “baptism” or “dubbing” and then
the correctness of the later uses is guaranteed by a causal chain, which links them to the
original use.
Putnam applies Kripke’s theory to natural kind terms by means of his famous thought
experiment of the Twin Earth (Putnam 1975: 223 ff.). His primary aim is to demonstrate
that a set of beliefs (Frege’s descriptive content) is not sufficient to fix the reference of a
term:  because,  given  two speakers  (S1 and  S2)  and  a  term T,  T can  have  different
referents when it is used by S1 and S2, even though they share all their beliefs about T.
Putnam asks us to imagine two worlds (E and TE) which are exactly alike, except that E
has  our  familiar  water  (H2O),  while  TE has  a  substance  superficially identical  with
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water,  but  with  a  different  chemical  structure  (XYZ)15.  S1 and  S2 are  in  the  same
psychological state (because they are not experienced in contemporary chemistry and
individuate water only by its superficial properties) when they use the term water, but S1
(who is an inhabitant of E) refers to H2O, while S2 (who is an inhabitant of TE) refers to
XYZ. This experiment points out that it is impossible to fix reference in a Fregean way,
by means of a set  of beliefs “in the head” of the speaker.  Putnam accepts Kripke’s
theory and claims that reference is established by a causal connection: watere  refers to
H2O because it is causally connected with H2O, but not with XYZ (by means of the act
of baptism and the causal chain);  while waterte refers to XYZ because it  is causally
connected with XYZ. The causal theory of reference is an objection to Kuhn because it
states  that  our  beliefs  about  objects  may well  change  over  the  course  of  scientific
revolutions,  but the causal connection that  involves scientists,  their  use of scientific
terms and the world does not change. Roughly, beliefs change, but reference was fixed
independently of those beliefs and then does not change.
Kuhn criticizes the causal theory of reference. Although Sharrock and Read try to
defend his viewpoint (Sharrock, Read 2002), Bird demonstrates (Bird 2004: 56-61) that
Kuhn’s objections cannot be considered a compelling rejection of the causal theory and
I agree with Bird. Therefore, I will analyze Kuhn’s argument against Kripke-Putnam,
but my aim is not to defend Kuhn and argue against the causal theory of reference (as I
have done in the previous chapter). Rather, I think that, although Kuhn’s criticisms do
not sound quite convincing, they can help us to understand his approach to the problem
of meaning.
 
3.1 The problem of reference
Therefore, let me present Kuhn’s first argument:
The terms ‘XYZ’ and ‘H2O’ are  drawn from modern chemical  theory,  and that
theory is incompatible with the existence of a substance with properties very nearly
the  same  as  water  but  described  by  an  elaborate  chemical  formula.  Such  a
substance  would,  among  other  things,  be  too  heavy  to  evaporate  at  normal
terrestrial  temperatures.  Its  discovery would  present  the  same  problems  as  the
simultaneous violation of Newton’s second law and the law of gravity described in
the last section. It would, that is, demonstrate the presence of fundamental errors in
the chemical theory which gives meanings to compound names like H2O and the
15 Actually I am taking for granted the distinction between superficial and essential properties. I will
return later on this question. 
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unabbreviated form of ‘XYZ’. Within the lexicon of modern chemistry, a world
containing both our earth and Putnam's Twin Earth is lexically possible, but the
composite statement that describes it is necessarily false. Only with a differently
structured lexicon, one shaped to describe a very different sort of world, could one,
without  contradiction,  describe the behavior of XYZ at  all,  and in that  lexicon
‘H2O’ might no longer refer to what we call ‘water’. (Kuhn 2000: 80-81).
According to Kuhn, the only conclusion that we can draw from Putnam’s Twin Earth
experiment should be something like “back to the drawing board! Something is badly
wrong in our chemical theory” (Kuhn 2000: 80). The existence of a substance which, at
the  same  time,  shares  with  watere all  its  superficial  properties  (tasteless,  colorless
substance which boils at 100 grades centigrade and so on) and has a chemical structure
different from H2O is impossible. Consequently, the existence of XYZ is impossible or
inconsistent with contemporary chemistry. Merely, this argument is not good because it
does not attack the theory, but the fictional aspects of an invented story; and Putnam
never claimed that his experiment was realistic (nevertheless, Bird describes a scenario
in which Putnam’s thought experiment is scientifically plausible in Bird 2004).
Rather, I think that the most intriguing point of Kuhn's argument is that he was not
interested  the  problem  of  reference  and  the  stability  of  reference;  rather,  he  was
interested in the consequences of the introduction of new concepts (water te  or XYZ) in
the lexical structure of modern chemistry16. This lack of interest results from Kuhn’s
rejection of the concept of reference as a neutral connection between words and objects;
basically,  he  rejects  the  very  possibility  of  an  access  to  the  world  that  is  (totally)
independent of the lexical structure we are using. This is not antirealist (rather, as I have
said  in  section  1,  it  is  Kantian);  but  it  entails  that  reference  is  partially  language-
dependent,  or  internal  to  a  lexicon.  Consequently,  it  is  not  useful  to  ask  whether
Newtonian mass and Einsteinian mass (or H2O and XYZ) refer to the same “object”.
The point is that there is  no way of sensibly posing the question of “extralinguistic
reference”  (Hoyningen-Huene,  Oberheim,  Andersen  1996:  135).  From  Kuhn’s
viewpoint, meaning and reference are very different things. On this point he follows
Wittgenstein’s  famous  starting-point  of  the  Philosophical  Investigations,  where  he
criticizes  the  “Augustinian  picture  of  language”  (Wittgenstein  1958:  2  ff),  which
suggests  that  individual  words  have meaning,  that  words  stand for  objects,  that  the
16 Sharrock and Read also notice Kuhn’s lack of interest in the referential question: “Putnam suggests
that ‘water’ referred to the same substance (H2O) in 1750 as today, and that’s an end of the matter.
Kuhn, by contrast, is interested in the structure of (any given) chemistry”. (Sharrock, Read 2002:
185-186).
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meaning of a word is the object it stands for and that the connection between word and
object is established by ostensive definition. Wittgenstein rejects this model for many
reasons (Glock 1996a: 41-45), but the distinction between meaning and reference is
illustrated by an example: “when Mr. N.N. dies one says that the bearer of the name
dies, not that the meaning dies” (Wittgenstein 1958: 20); the death of Mr. N.N. does not
make the sentence “Mr. N.N died” meaningless17. According to Kuhn, meaning is not
reference,  but  scientific  revolutions  entail  meaning  changes  which,  in  turn,  entail
referential changes. The physical referents of Einsteinian concepts are not identical with
those of Newtonian concepts because (for Kuhn) the relativity revolution makes the
lexical structures of the theories incommensurable. Referential change exists, but it is a
collateral problem; this does not mean that it is not important, but that it is a by-product
of meaning change. Therefore, Putnam directly faces the problem of referential change,
while Kuhn thinks that it depends on meaning change and therefore, according to Kuhn,
the Twin Earth experiment does not offer any potential solution to his problems. These
remarks should justify Kuhn’s lack of interest in Putnam’s purpose. 
From this perspective,  Kuhn’s observations about the introduction of XYZ in the
lexical structure of modern chemistry are noteworthy. He says that such an introduction
gives rise to internal contradictions within scientific knowledge and therefore it requires
a revolution in our beliefs about the chemical world. From his perspective, the causal
theory of reference cannot account for a basic feature of meaning that I have stressed in
the second conclusion of the last section of this chapter:
- The meaning of a term is not isolated; rather, it is determined by contrast and in
relation  to  other  terms  of  the  same  semantic  field,  which  apply  to  similar
situations. Differences are as important as similarities to identify the meaning of
a word.
In  his  argument,  Kuhn fails  to  provide  a  network  of  similarities  and differences
which includes both H2O and XYZ in the language of modern chemistry.  As I have
sketched in section 1 (and 2), the existence of such a structure is a precondition for the
possibility of successful reference (as well  as referential  failure), since it provides a
framework for meaningful scientific sentences. Without such a framework, the problem
17 Probably, another source of Kuhn’s distinction between meaning and reference is Quine’s distinction
between meaning and naming (Quine 1953: 9, 21, 47)
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of referential change and stability is misleading, because reference is a function of a
lexical structure. For example, take the sentence
• The gold mountain is in California
   This sentence has no referent if we understand it as a sentence about geography; but it
may refer if we find it in a novel or any fictional context and, to that extent, it can be
verified or falsified. The lexical structure to which the sentence belongs pre-exists to
referential  success or failure.  For example,  phlogiston theory and modern chemistry
categorize the world in different ways and therefore we cannot charge the phlogiston
theory with referential failure just because dephlogisticated air does not exist. As I have
said in Section 2, the problem with the phlogiston theory is not that phlogiston is non-
existing,  but  that  it  is  associated  with  false  theoretical  descriptions  and  different
problem  situations.  Kuhn  makes  a  similar  point  saying  that,  if  translation  meant
“reference determination” (and therefore a translator of the phlogiston theory should
leave space blanks when he encounters the non-referential word “phlogiston”), then no
work of fiction could be translated (Kuhn 2000: 41).  So this  explains why,  as Bird
notices (Bird 2000: 168), Kuhn implicitly says that, although the meaning of a term
changes, reference is successful both before and after the change. This would not be
possible if reference were independent from the lexical structure of the theory; roughly,
according to the causal theory of reference the term “phlogiston” does not refer, while,
according to Kuhn, it refers within its theory. In the end, reference is a function of the
shared lexical structure and depends on meaning. Thus, the meaning of a term is not its
reference, but “its structural relation to other terms of the network” (Kuhn 2000: 55).
3.2 Family resemblances and polysemy
Now let me turn to the second argument provided by Kuhn against the causal theory
of reference:
'H2O' picks out samples not only of water but also of ice and steam. H2O can exist
in all three states of aggregation-solid, liquid, and gaseous-and it is therefore not
the same as water,  at  least  not  as picked out by the term ‘water’ in 1750.  The
difference in items referred to is, furthermore, by no means marginal, like that due
to impurities for example. Whole categories of substance are involved, and their
involvement is by no means accidental. In 1750 the primary differences between
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chemical species were the states of aggregation or modeled upon them. Water, in
particular, was an elementary body of which liquidity was an essential property.
For some chemists the term 'water' referred to the generic liquid, and it had done so
for many more only a few generations before. Not until the 1780s, in an episode
long  known  as  “The  Chemical  Revolution”,  was  the  taxonomy  of  chemistry
transformed so that a chemical species might exist in all three states of aggregation.
Thereafter, the distinction between solids, liquids, and gases became physical, not
chemical.  The  discovery  that  liquid  water  was  a  compound  of  two  gaseous
substances, hydrogen and oxygen, was an integral part of that larger transformation
and could not have been made without it. (Kuhn 2000: 81-82)
The  second  argument  (as  well  as  the  first  one)  attacks  the  fictional  aspects  of
Putnam’s experiment and not its philosophical content. Moreover, Bird states also that it
is not historically accurate, since the idea that solid, liquid and gaseous water are the
same substance is older than the chemical revolution, although some scientists did not
agree.  However,  just  like  for  the  first  argument,  I  do  not  want  to  defend  Kuhn’s
objection; rather I will focus on its consequences on Kuhn’s theory of meaning.  
In fact, leaving aside the historical question about the chemical revolution, Kuhn’s
point is that, after the revolution, the term ‘water’ is applied by scientists in a different
way than it was before the revolution. Before 1780, the term ‘water’ applied only to
liquid water, because the distinctions between chemical substances were based on their
states of aggregation; instead, after the chemical revolution scientists discovered that the
same substance can exist in different states. The extension of the application-range of
the  term ‘water’ is  important  because  it  is  a  good  example  of  the  development  of
science. Assuming that science consists in the application of attested concepts to solve
new problems, then, according to Kuhn, scientific concepts should be as elastic as we
can  apply  them  in  more  and  more  problem  situations.  Kuhn’s  exemplary  problem
solutions work just like this. For example Galileo Galilei used his model of the inclined
plane to solve the problem of the free fall. The connection between inclined plane and
free fall is not deductive or “algorithmic”: it requires the recognition of the analogies
between  those  problem  situations  and  the  ability  to  individuate  new  patterns  of
similarities and differences (see Hesse 1966). Roughly, extending the meaning of the
term ‘water’ to solid and gaseous water requires the same process. It  is not easy to
realize  that  things  that  manifest  different  states  of  aggregation  are  really  the  same
substance:  one  has  to  discover  new similarities  among  the  objects  of  the  chemical
world. Specifically, he should replace the network of similarities and differences that he
uses  to  identify  and  apply  chemical  terms  with  a  new  model  that  requires  new
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similarities and differences. Before the chemical revolution, such a model was based on
the state of aggregation of the substances; after the chemical revolution, new analogies
have  been  recognized.  Therefore,  Kuhn’s  question  is  the  following:  can  the  rigid
designator account for the analogical application of a term to new contexts? Kuhn’s
answer is that it cannot. 
The rigid designator was originally applied to proper names. Kuhn does not object to
that theory: the problem derives from natural kind terms as rigid designators. The first
difference  is  linked to  the  problem I  have  faced in  the  section  about  meaning  and
reference (3.1). Kuhn says that pointing to an individual can tell you how to properly
use the relevant name; but, as far as ostension is supposed to fix the reference of natural
kinds, a single act of ostension is no longer sufficient. This does not mean that pointing
to LeBron James is easy, while pointing to swans is difficult. Rather, as I stated before,
the meaning of natural kinds involves their  structural relations to other terms of the
network: ostension can help us to understand the meaning of a term, but it cannot, by
any means, fix the meaning18. Even more so, this remark applies to scientific terms such
as “mass” or “electric charge”, which are introduced by physical laws as well (nomic
concepts) and should be used in different contexts. Fox example, if someone exhibits to
you the needle of a galvanometer and says that its deflection is caused by “electric
charge”,  how can you guess how to apply the term “electric  charge” correctly in  a
thunderstorm? Therefore, isolated words have no meaning; I have already discussed this
point, but the application of old terms to new problem situations is strictly related to this
question.
The problem is that, while, obviously, proper names are names, sometimes natural
kinds  behave as names,  but  usually they are predicates.  Like predicates,  and unlike
proper names, they can be quantified over: for example, all men are mortal; moreover,
they occur in predicative position: for example, this substance is gold. Consequently, the
application of the rigid designator to these terms should be justified (see for example
Soames 2002 and Devitt 2005). Here I cannot analyze extensively this question; rather, I
would like to draw the attention to a problem that is connected to my question about the
“analogical” use of kind terms. According to Soames (Soames 2002), the best strategy
to clarify what is for a natural kind predicate to be rigid is the following: 
18 See Kuhn’s distinction between ‘ostension’ and ‘ostensive’ (Kuhn 2000: 67 fn. 13); I will discuss it in
Part 2 – section 2.
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• Define  a  concept  of  rigidity for  predicates  that  is  a  natural  extension  of  the
concept  that  has  been  defined  for  singular  terms.  Then  determine  whether
natural kind predicates are rigid in this sense, and whether so-called theoretical
identities involving them are necessary if true. (Soames 2002: 249)
But  this  strategy  has  at  least  two  weak  points.  The  first  is  precisely  about  the
application of  old terms to new cases.  In fact,  a  term is  a rigid designator  when it
designates  the  same object  in  all  possible  worlds  in  which  such  object  exists.  For
example, at the actual world the extension of the predicate ‘mammal’ is the set of all
objects that are mammals at that world. But this does not turn the term ‘mammal’ to be a
rigid designator, because such claim entails that the term has the same extension in all
possible worlds. Basically, we can imagine a possible world in which there could have
been different mammals; or we can think to the fact that some mammals that exist could
have  failed  to  exists  and  the  other  way  round.  Moreover,  we  can  analyze  the
taxonomical case of the ‘platypus’ (Kuhn 2000: 92), which forced scientists to revise
their  concept  of  ‘mammal’,  since  platypus  is  a  mammal  which  lays  its  eggs.  The
application of the world ‘mammal’ to the platypus entails an analogical process, which
modifies the relations of similarity through which scientists used to classify the animals;
as a consequence, the properties they used to attribute to mammals changed. 
Thus,  we  can  turn  to  the  second  problem:  the  theory  of  the  rigid  designator  is
committed  to  an  essentialist  approach that  states  that  there  is  a  genuine  distinction
between essential  and non-essential  properties (that I  have criticized in the previous
chapter  referring  to  the  epistemic  nature  of  detection  and  auxiliary properties).  For
example, water is supposed be a rigid designator because the chemical expression H2O
refers only to water (there is only one compound of hydrogen and oxygen in the ratio
2:1). The statement “water is H2O” is necessarily true and this constitutes evidence for
the  idea  that  water  has  an  essence:  H2O.  On  the  contrary,  properties  like  “being
tasteless” or “being colorless” are accidental properties. But the case of the platypus
seems  to  challenge  this  distinction.  In  fact,  assuming  that  “mammal”  is  a  rigid
designator, the proposition “mammals do not lie eggs” should be necessarily true. This
is  not  an  insurmountable  problem,  since  the  most  plausible  theories  about  the
metaphysics of biological kind tries to defend essentialism by replacing the concept of
metaphysical essence with the concept of “historical essence”, defined by the clade or
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ancestor group the organism belongs to. Anyway, the main point that emerges from this
objection, and involves the distinction between essential and superficial properties, is
about the boundaries of biological taxa. In fact, it is quite common that the extension of
well-established kinds expands beyond its most representative paradigms. For example
we know that  Tyrannosaurus  or Stegosaurus are paradigmatic examples of dinosaur;
but,  according  to  modern  science  birds  evolved  from dinosaurs  and  therefore  they
should be supposed to be dinosaurs.
The effective weak point of the causal theory is that, holding that there is a direct
relation  between words  and objects,  it  assumes the  individuality of  the  objects  that
should constitute the domain of scientific knowledge (Stachel 2005: 203-204). Both the
objections (structure-dependence of reference and no distinction between essential and
superficial properties) are structuralist and contextualist. At first, as regards physics, the
causal theory fails to recognize that the individuation of physical entities deals with
their  distinguishability,  rather  than with their  identity.  As we have seen referring to
selective  realism,  it  is  plausible  to  treat  objects  as  clusters  of  descriptive properties
(French, Krause 2006: 210); and, additionally, the notion of causal chain is problematic
for quantum mechanics, since it will not allow to differentially name two photons in the
same state. And, secondly, also in biological sciences it is sometimes difficult to figure
out the identity conditions for the relevant entities; for example, as we will see in the
next chapter, the concept of gene. So, let us see how we can face these problems.
The  process  of  puzzle  solving  that  characterizes  normal  science  consists  in  the
recognition of reasonable analogies to apply old problem solutions (paradigms) to new
problems. Therefore, the meaning of scientific terms cannot be rigid: it should change
relative  to  the  problem  situations  it  is  applied  to.  Kuhn  compares  this  feature  of
scientific  terms  to  metaphor:  both  kind  terms  and  metaphors  do  not  satisfy  the
traditional  conditions  to  consider  an  expression  meaningful  (such  as  necessary  and
sufficient  conditions,  definitions  or  reference).  The  meaning  of  scientific  terms  is
determined by the juxtaposition of series of exemplary cases, which makes the speaker
aware of the network of similarities and differences to  which the term belongs and
highlights the features that permit the term to be applied. And, obviously, the addiction
of new exemplary cases can modify the meaning of the term: meaning is not the sort of
thing that can be established once and for all. Kuhn has always preferred the flexibility
of paradigms to unadaptable rules of application: exemplars are essentially flexible and
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their  usefulness  depends  just  on  their  flexibility.  As  Wray  points  out:  “A concrete
scientific achievement can only function as an exemplar if it can be altered or modified
in  ways  that  enable  scientists  to  solve  other  problems”  (Wray  2011:  61).  And  the
metaphorical  juxtaposition of  exemplary solutions which determines  the meaning of
scientific terms cannot be justified from the viewpoint of the rigid designator.
In  Section  4,  I  will  specifically  explain  how  exemplary  cases  contribute  to  the
process of meaning fixing and change. But,  actually,  it  should be clear  that Kuhn’s
model is Wittgenstein’s concept of family resemblances. Wittgenstein says that when we
try to figure out whether all games have something in common, we realize that they do
not share a common nature, but a network of criss-crossing similarities and differences.
His claim is that there is no set of necessary and sufficient conditions that all games
satisfy (and which is  satisfied only by games).  From Kuhn’s  perspective,  the fuzzy
boundaries  of  Wittgenstein’s  family  resemblances  are  more  useful  to  explain  the
possibility to extend the meaning of a term to cover new problem situations. Moreover,
of course, he agrees with Wittgenstein’s attack to essentialism: he rejects the distinction
between essential and accidental properties. Grouping objects in similarity-difference
classes, there are no restrictions about which features we can use19. And, according to
Kuhn, this is not a failure; rather, it has a positive effect on scientific progress: “one
should here withhold phrases like ‘vagueness of meaning’ or ‘open texture of concepts’.
Both imply an imperfection, something lacking that may later be supplied” (Kuhn 1977:
316 fn. 21). On the contrary, Kuhn says that essential and non-essential properties are
not  different  from  a  metaphysical  standpoint.  Therefore  such  a  distinction  cannot
account  for  the  recognition  of  the  meaning  of  a  term:  superficial  properties  are  as
important as essential properties. Let us come back to the second argument against the
causal theory of reference: the chemical structure H2O is not sufficient to identify water,
because it possesses further properties, such as “being liquid”. And usually we need to
recognize several properties that an object should possess to categorize it in a certain
set: again, the similarity-dissimilarity relations are used to fix the meaning, that is to say
the relevant positions of the terms in the lexical network. So, water should be H2O and
liquid to distinguish it from solid and gaseous H2O. 
One might think that it  is  a problem of conventions and that we can solve it  by
recognizing different meanings of the same term. For example, if the term water is a
19 For a discussion of Kuhn’s concept of family resemblance and its application to the problem of the
wide-open texture see Andersen 2000a. I will focus on it in Section 4.
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flexible term that applies to different situations (without essential properties), we should
introduce two or more different terms to express the different meanings of the term
water: water1, water2 and so on; a term for each concept of water. This solution implies
that the differences between the uses of the term “water” are only semantic and that they
can  be  ruled  out  by  a  conventionalist  approach.  But  Kuhn  does  not  agree:  the
polysemous  nature  of  scientific  terms  is  not  an  imperfection  that  we  can  put  right
through conventionalist solutions. It is an intrinsic quality of natural kind terms and it is
useful  for  science;  it  is  a  question  about  things  and not  only about  words.  In  fact,
although we can try to isolate the features related to water1 from the ones related to
water2, both water1 and water2 are kind terms which generate expectations about the
behavior of the objects they refer to. And since scientific concepts have the structure of
family resemblances, such expectations criss-cross and overlap each other: the question
should  be  solved  by means  of  empirical  evidence  and  facts,  and  not  by  linguistic
conventions.  Indeed,  since  terms  are  polysemous,  they  can  arrange  their  flexible
boundaries to attach to new situations. The example of liquid, gaseous and solid water
can appear trivial, but it is more realistic if we think to things such as heavy water: is it
really  water?  Or  is  deuterium  hydrogen?  The  problem  is  that  sometimes  the
expectations related to rival scientific terms are problematic for the relevant symbolic
generalizations; this is the case of Newton’s mass and Einstein’s mass (as well as the
phlogiston theory and modern chemistry) and it entails referential discontinuity.   
So, at this point, it is time to sum up the results of the second section:
1. Meaning  and  reference  are  different  things.  Meaning  is  determined  by  the
structural relations between the terms of the lexical network. Over the course of
scientific  revolutions,  such  structural  relations  deeply  change  and  therefore
meaning changes occur. Referential change is not a primary problem: it is a by-
product of meaning change, since reference is language-dependent.
2. Scientific  terms  are  basically  polysemous  and  their  meaning  is  structured
according to family resemblances. This is not a problem that we can solve and it
is not a problem at all: the vague boundaries of meaning allow scientists to apply
attested concepts to more and more significant problem situations; and this is the
essence of both normal and revolutionary science. 
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4. Conclusions
My conclusion  is  that  Kuhn  rejects  the  referential  approach  to  meaning  change
because  it  is  not  consistent  with  his  theory  of  meaning.  Above  all,  the  referential
approach does not take into account the fact that, as far as there are no necessary and
sufficient  conditions  to  identify  a  term,  meaning  is  determined  by  the  respective
positions of the terms in a lexical structure. And such a structure depends on the use of
scientific  terms  in  experimental  situations,  established  by  means  of  paradigmatic
examples of correct applications. From this viewpoint, isolated words have no distinct
meaning  (which  can  be  individuated  by  their  reference);  rather  words  differently
actualize their meaning relative to the context they are applied to. This has a positive
effect on science, because the application of old concepts to new situations is not an
“algorithmic” process. The flexibility of scientific terms is, to that extent, a constitutive
condition for scientific progress. Approaching the questions of incommensurability and
meaning from a referential viewpoint, therefore, is not useful, since referential change is
a function of meaning change. Reference is not a neutral connection between words and
reality:  it  depends  on  the  lexical  structure  from which  it  is  inferred;  it  is  partially
internal and language-dependent.  In the next section,  I  will  focus on the concept of
lexical structure, explaining what it means for natural kind terms to be part of semantic
networks;  and,  above all,  I  will  analyze  the  role  played  by exemplary cases  in  the
determination of meaning, the main open question of this chapter.
Section 4: Lexical Structures and the Open-texture
1. Introduction
In the last section, I have discussed Kuhn's view about natural kinds. Natural kinds
are a basic element of any scientific theory, since, in order to organize the scientific
experience  of  nature  and to  predict  new phenomena,  scientists  use  natural  kinds  to
categorize the  objects  of  their  inquiry,  allowing us  to  have  expectations  about  their
behavior and the properties related to  such objects.  The theory of natural kinds has
many metaphysical implications, since it deals with the idea that natural kinds are not
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only “words”, but, rather, they correspond to some essential aspects of the world (and
then the categorization provided by natural kinds mirrors a categorization that is “really
there”, in the objective world). But I will not discuss these problems here. Rather I will
develop other aspects of the meaning of natural kind terms that I have not discussed in
the last section. Here, I will go into the details of Kuhn’s theory of “scientific lexical
structures”,  that  is  to  say  taxonomic  structures  of  kind  terms  and  their  mutual
relationships,  which  supply  a  categorization  of  experience  and  the  boundaries  of
possible experience. The main problem, as I have said in section 3, is that the meaning
of natural kind terms is at the same time stable and flexible, since they can be applied to
new problem situations in unexpected ways (and therefore there are meaning shifts), but
there are some constraints to such meaning shifts (otherwise every kind term would be
consistent with any state of affairs).
The aim of this chapter is to analyze the consequences of a theory of the meaning of
scientific kind terms which takes into account the constitutive open-texture of concepts
(including scientific concepts). The premise of this chapter, that I have spelled out in
Section 3, is that, from the viewpoint of the dynamic of scientific theories (a historical
viewpoint  interested  in  the  relations  between  successive  theories),  open-textured
concepts are useful because they are as flexible as we can apply them to more and more
problem situations. Obviously, this does not mean that scientific theories cannot be fully
formalized a posteriori. The open-texture perspective refers to the dynamic of scientific
discovery during “normal science” and the related activity of puzzle-solving.  In this
context,  scientists  have  to  adapt  the  boxes  of  their  theory  to  accommodate  the
experimental data and meaning shifts are acceptable. The concept of open-texture was
introduced in the philosophy of science by Friedrich Waismann, referring to the debate
about the principle of verifiability. I will start with this concept, but I use a notion of
open-texture which is different from Waismann’s one and therefore, in the rest of the
chapter, I will use Kuhn’s theory of concepts and paradigms as an example of open-
texture of scientific concepts and apply the results to the theory of meaning that I have
introduced in section 3. My conclusion is that the theory of meaning related to the open-
texture of concepts should have the following features:
 
1. meaning eliminativism: words have no core meaning, since the open-texture
does not allow us to  associate  words with abstract descriptions or rules of
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application; 
2. contextualism: words have meanings only in so far as they are related to their
“environment”, i.e. their context of application and the relative semantic field;
3. structuralism: since meaning depends on the context of application, it depends
on the structural relations between the terms that belong to a given semantic
network.
Moreover, I will also conclude that the concept of open-texture is misleading because
it suggests the idea that there are no limits to the extension of concepts and that every
object can be included in any kind. Since I do not agree, I will propose a hypothesis
about the epistemic boundaries of the polisemy of scientific terms.
2. Kind terms and taxonomic structures
As I have said in section 1, for Kuhn, one of the most important functions of kind
terms is to provide the taxonomic structure that enables scientists to gain access to a
given section of the “world of science”. In his latest works, he develops a taxonomic
version  of  his  incommensurability thesis  (Bird 2000:  191-202,  Chen 1997,  Hacking
1993, Sankey 1998, Massimi 2015),  according to which,  since taxonomies supply a
principle  for  the  categorization  of  experience  (and,  in  a  Kantian  way,  they  are
constitutive conditions for the possibility of experience in a given experimental field)
and  scientific  revolutions  involve  changes  in  the  taxonomies  (for  example  the
categorization of the objects related to the kind terms “planet” and “star” changed over
the course of the Copernican revolution; or the chemical categories “compound” and
“mixture”  referring  to  the  chemical  revolution),  incommensurability depends on the
meaning shift of the most important terms of the taxonomy:
What  characterizes  revolutions  is,  thus,  change  in  several  of  the  taxonomic
categories prerequisite to scientific descriptions and generalizations. That change,
furthermore, is an adjustment not only of criteria relevant to categorization, but
also  of  the  way  in  which  given  objects  and  situations  are  distributed  among
preexisting categories. (Kuhn 2000: 30)
As I have already sketched, a taxonomic structure consists in a “lexicon”, a network
of interrelated terms, which are introduced together by means of the same scientific
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laws and examples of application. Each term is a node in such a lexical structure and the
essence  of  the  structure  is  the  relation  between  its  nodes.  They are  locally  holistic
structures,  since  the  term  mass  cannot  be  explained  without  referring  to  the  term
“force”, but this does not mean that all the relations between the terms of the network
are  essential  (but,  rather,  only  those  associated  with  detection  properties).  “Local”
means that usually the hard-core of the lexicon consists in a small set of terms (for
example, the terms of the second law of motion) and that incommensurability is linked
only to these sections of the lexicons20.
A lexical structure is made of natural kind terms, a specific set of taxonomic terms; it
is an organized vocabulary of kind terms, which constitute the taxonomy of the theory.
According to Kuhn, kind terms have at least three features (Kuhn 2000: 230-231):
1. They are learned in use, i.e. they are introduced by means of the juxtaposition of
a  sufficient  amount  of  accepted  examples  of  application.  Successful
communication  does  not  require  necessary  and  sufficient  conditions  for  the
application  of  kind  terms;  it  requires  only that  the  members  of  the  relevant
scientific community operate with homologous lexical structures.
2. They  are  projectible.  This  is  the  reason  why  kind  terms  are  particularly
important  for scientific  taxonomies and may entail  incommensurability.  Kind
terms give rise to expectations about the behavior of the entities they refer to and
their  properties,  since knowing the meaning of a  kind term implies knowing
some generalizations satisfied by their referents.
3. In  order  to  save  the  co-referentiality  of  kind  terms  and  the  communication
between  the  specialists,  the  expectations  and  the  predictions  related  to  such
terms should be compatible.  If  the expectations  are  not  consistent  with each
other,  the  taxonomic  structure  collapses  and  the  communication  between
scientific communities that accept different predictions about the same kind term
is problematic.
This is one of the most important points of the theory of the lexical structures: the so-
called “no overlap principle”:      
20 See  Kuhn  2000:  36.  The  thesis  of  local  incommensurability  is  a  modest  version  of  the
incommensurability thesis. In The Structure of Scientific Revolutions the meaning of scientific terms
was considered dependent on the theoretical claims of the theory in a more thick way.
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No two kind terms, no two terms with the kind label, may overlap in their referents
unless they are related as species to genus. There are no dogs that are also cats, no
gold rings that are also silver rings, and so on: that's what makes dogs, cats, silver,
and  gold  each  a  kind.  Therefore,  if  the  members  of  a  language  community
encounter a dog that's also a cat (or, more realistically, a creature like the duck-
billed platypus), they cannot just enrich the set of category terms but must instead
redesign a part of the taxonomy. (Kuhn 2000: 92).
The  principle  states  that  taxonomies  are  organized  according  to  a  hierarchical
structure: the categories should not have occurrences in common, unless one of them
includes the other; or, in other words, a natural kind can include another kind, but if and
only if it is a high-order kind which subsumes the other in the same gender. According
to Hacking’s interpretation, taxonomies are structured by the relation K or “kind of”
relation, which is transitive and asymmetric. It is transitive since, if horse is a kind of
mammal and mammal is a kind of animal, then horse is a kind of animal. And it is
asymmetric since, if horse is a kind of mammal, then mammal is not a kind of horse.
Given K, the head of each kind that belongs to the domain of K is a category. Hacking
accepts the projectibility of kind terms, since it is a logical consequence of the concept
of  natural  kind.  Science  does  not  deal  only  with  the  organization  of  the  actual
experience or with what is  the case,  but also with what would be the case in other
conditions. Every natural kind and the respective laws have unexpected implications,
which have to be tested by means of empirical investigation. Obviously, this does not
mean  that  all  the  predictions  related  to  such  terms  and  generalizations  will  be
experimentally confirmed. The projectibility of natural kind terms does not imply that
all  the  expectations  and  lawlike  generalizations  are  right;  it  defines  “the  class  of
possibilities  envisioned or  capable of being taken seriously by a  science at  a  time”
(Hacking 1993: 296). 
Unlike  the  principle  of  projectibility,  the  no-overlap  principle  is  controversial.  I
cannot discuss it in depth now, but in the history of science (especially in the history of
biology and the history of chemistry) there are many examples of mature theories that
accept cross-classification; the isotopes are a classic example, but also the distinction
between  metals  and  non-metals  presents  some  exceptions  concerning  the  allotropic
forms  of  the  elements21.  For  example,  Wiggins  states  that  cross-classification  is
indispensable  to  many  scientific  disciplines  such  as  ethology,  linguistics  and  many
21 See Bird 2000: 200-201 and Wiggins 2001: 67 fn.7 for some examples and references about the
question of cross-classification. See also Tobin 2010.
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others (Wiggins 2001: 67). Therefore, the use of different overlapping natural kinds to
categorize experience and make prediction about future states of affairs does not seem
to be a great problem for science; and thus, it is arguable that the no-overlap principle
should be rejected. 
Moreover, at first sight, the no-overlap principle seems to be inconsistent with some
claims that  I  have  presented  in  the  previous  sections  (especially section  3).  One of
Kuhn's basic claims is that the boundaries of scientific concepts are as flexible as they
can be modified to be applied to new problem situations. Since scientific concepts look
like family resemblances (and then, as I will  explain in the next sections, they are open-
textured concepts), they have no “core” or privileged semantic area which cannot be, in
principle, modified over the history of science. On the contrary, the no-overlap principle
suggests a limit to the open-texture of natural kinds (although it refers only to those
small groups of natural kinds which constitute the lexical structure of the theory), since
it states that the meaning of kind terms cannot change in such a way to overlap the
expectations related to another term of the same semantic network; if it is the case, we
will  turn  into  a  scientific  revolution  and  therefore  the  relevant  theories  are
incommensurable. In the following sections I will discuss the open-texture of scientific
concepts,  in order  to  justify the application of some restrictions  to  meaning change
(different from the no-overlap principle) without rejecting the idea that the vagueness of
meaning and the open-texture of concepts are not faults to be corrected, but, rather, a
condition for the possibility of new applications of old concepts. My perspective takes
into account both the importance of meaning changes in the history of science and the
stability of meaning referring to the most basic kind terms of the current theory.         
     
3. Open-texture and paradigms
Waismann introduces the concept of open-texture to reject the verificationist program
which states that the meaning of scientific statements consists in the conditions for their
verification (see Shapiro 2006: 210 and ff). According to Waismann, every statement is
linked to an infinite amount of possible verifications and therefore there is a connection
between the fact that in many cases there is no conclusive verification and the fact that
our concepts are not entirely delimited (Waismann 1968: 120). He means that, when one
uses a concept,  she cannot be aware of any possible situation to which the concept
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applies or may apply; and he tries to extend these results to a theory of the meaning of
natural kinds. One of his examples is the notion of “gold”:
The  notion  of  gold  seems  to  be  defined  with  absolute  precision,  say  by  the
spectrum of  gold  with  its  characteristic  lines.  Now  what  would  you  say  if  a
substance was discovered that looked like gold, satisfied all the chemical tests for
gold, whilst it emitted a new sort of radiation? ‘But such things do not happen.’
Quite so; but they might happen, and that is enough to show that we can never
exclude altogether the possibility of some unforeseen situation arising in which we
shall have to modify our definition. Try as we may, no concept is limited in such a
way that there is no room for any doubt. We introduce a concept and limit it in
some directions; for instance, we define gold in contrast to some other metals such
as alloys. This suffices for our present needs, and we do not probe any farther. We
tend to overlook the fact that there are always other directions in which the concept
has not been defined. And if we did, we could easily imagine conditions which
would necessitate new limitations. In short, it is not possible to define a concept
like gold with absolute precision, i.e. in such a way that every nook and cranny is
blocked against  entry of doubt.  That is what is meant  by the open texture of a
concept. (Waismann 1968: 120)
Waismann’s point is that a term is ultimately defined when the situations to which it
applies are completely described, i.e., when we have a complete list of all circumstances
in which we can use the term. This would be a complete definition, which anticipates
once and for all every question about the use and the application of such a term. But,
according to Waismann, this is not possible, since every situation is characterized by an
infinite amount of features and therefore we should accept the open-texture of empirical
concepts. 
Even if Waismann has the merit of being the originator the concept of open-texture, I
think that his theory has a big weakness. In this model the open-texture depends on the
world, since the world often manifests unexpected behaviors and we cannot arrange our
concepts in order to predict any unpredicted circumstance. But this remark deals with
the nature of the world (and the troubles with induction), while the open-texture deals
with the nature of concepts and not with the surprising behavior of the world (Kindi
2012:  41).  The  paradigm  of  the  open-texture  is  Wittgenstein’s  theory  of  family
resemblances, the idea that the words cannot be defined by means of a set of necessary
and sufficient  conditions,  because,  for  example,  there  is  no  property that  all  games
share. As I have said in the last chapter, Kuhn, too, uses Wittgenstein’s theory to explain
how  scientific  concepts  are  learned  and  how  they  attach  to  reality  by  means  of
paradigmatic examples of applications. In his model the open-texture does not depend
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on how the world behaves, but on the premise that scientists need the open texture to
apply old terms (and paradigms) to new problem situations by means of an analogical
process,  i.e.  the  recognition  of  patterns  of  similarities  and  differences  between
perceptions,  objects  and  problems.  Kuhn  does  endorse  the  open-texture  because
paradigms  (accepted  scientific  achievements)  are  such  if  and  only  if  they  can  be
modified  to  solve  new  problems.  According  to  this  model,  during  their  scientific
training,  scientists learn at the same time something about the world and something
about the words, i.e.,  the meanings of the words and the behavior of the “pieces of
world” associated with such words. Kuhn's theory of meaning is part of a more complex
question  about  the  nature  of  concepts  and the  organization  and the  transmission  of
scientific knowledge. But here I will focus on the theory of meaning linked to the open-
texture  of  concepts.  For  this  purpose,  I  think  that  such  a  theory should  have  three
features: meaning eliminativism, contextualism, structuralism.
4. Meaning eliminativism, contextualism, structuralism
a) Meaning Eliminativism. According to meaning eliminativism, words have no core
meaning and are not associated with abstract conditions or rules of applications. This
idea fits  well  with Kuhn’s paradigms, since they are not comparable to explicit  and
compulsory rules. No theory of meaning can exhaust the concept of meaning (both in
ordinary and in scientific languages) and therefore here the slogan “meaning is use”
(Kuhn 2000: 62) means that one can use everything he wants to identify the meaning of
a word22. Since eliminativism rejects the very concept of meaning (intended as isolated
or conventional meaning), it is misleading to continue using the word “meaning”. On
that matter, Récanati introduces the expression “semantic potential” to describe the new
role played by “meaning” according to his perspective. The semantic potential of the
word P is a collection of the legitimate situations of application of P (Récanati 2004:
148). Obviously, this is an open collection, because one can imagine new situations of
applications,  which  are  consistent  with  the  semantic  potential  of  P.  The  legitimate
situations of application are paradigmatic examples of application of the theory (for
example the inclined plane in classical mechanics) and they are learned by students
during their scientific training. Training consists in the exposition to a sufficient amount
22 Thus, this model  does not  deny that  intensions and descriptions are important  to  understand the
meaning of a word or a statements; rather, it denies that they are necessary and sufficient conditions.
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of  situations  to  which  P applies  and to  which  P does  not  apply.  Récanati  calls  the
collection of legitimate applications of P “source situations” and the intended future
applications  “target  situations”.  In  order  to  apply  P to  new  problems,  one  has  to
recognize some similarities between the “source situations” and the “target situations”.
b)  Contextualism.  According  to  meaning eliminativism,  conventional  and  isolated
meanings do not exist. Words are meaningless in so far as they are not associated with
their  specific  context  of  application.  This  remark  implies  that,  since  there  are  no
necessary and sufficient  conditions  to  apply a  word,  only concrete  applications  are
meaningful.  In  the  received view about  meaning,  context  is  an  “accidental”  feature
which modifies the conventional meaning of the words. For example, coming back to
Waismann’s thought experiment,  the conventional meaning of the word gold is  “the
element with chemical number 79” or “a dense, malleable and ductile yellow metal”.
But, depending on the context of application, the meaning of the word “gold” changes
and it may refer to some kind of coin or money. However, the conventional meaning is
the  most  important  and  the  others  are  mere  by-products  of  the  combination  of
conventional meaning and context. On the contrary, the contextualist viewpoint states
that the context of application is not a variable, which influences the meaning from the
outside: it is a constitutive element of meaning. The meaning of a word (its application
to the target situation) is determined by the combined action of accepted applications
and the new context. Applying a term to the relevant target situation entails identifying
some similarities between the source situations and the target situation, but the relation
of similarity is based on the accepted uses of the term and therefore similarity relations
are contextually determined as well. Since two perceptions, objects or problems may be
similar  according  to  a  great  amount  of  features,  the  similarity  between  different
applications of the same term deals with the open-texture as well. As I have pointed out
in section 3, Kuhn applies this argument to the different meanings of the term “water”
(solid,  liquid  and gaseous),  since  the  application  of  the  term “water”  to  substances
which present different states of aggregation is just this sort of analogical process. The
same remarks concern borderline cases such as heavy water or the isotopes (LaPorte
2004: 107-110).   
c)  Structuralism.  The  model  based  on  the  similarity  between  different  problem
situations is necessarily a structuralist model. That is at first because, since the meaning
of a term depends on the accepted applications and each application involves several
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terms, no meaning is available independently of the meaning of other words applied to
the same empirical situations and puzzles.  For example,  the basic terms of classical
mechanics are introduced together by means of the laws of motions and their exemplary
applications  and therefore,  for  example,  the  meaning of  the term “mass” cannot  be
separated  from  the  meaning  of  the  term  “force”.  Moreover,  the  determination  of
meaning  is  a  “structural”  process  because  it  deals  with  similarities  and  differences
between problem situations. In order to fix the meaning of a term, one has to master the
relevant “contrast set” (Tversky 1977)23, i.e. the set of objects referring to which we are
going to  establish the relations  of  similarity.  Learning how to  use  a  word does  not
merely mean knowing the situations to which it applies; on the contrary, one should also
know similar situations to which it does not apply and you have to apply another word
of the same network. A contrast set gives rise to a lexical structure of interrelated terms,
characterized by relations of similarities and differences. The relations of similarity can
be introduced both by direct perception (for example by ostension) and by descriptive
statements associated with examples of application. What is important is that learning
requires the exposition to sets of differences and not only a single act of ostension or a
theoretical description. Each term is a node of the lexical structure and its meaning is
the relative position in the structure; the position is determined by the past applications
referring to the other terms of the network. Kuhn’s example is the following:
Let me take “doux” to be a node in a multidimensional lexical network where its
position is specified by its distance from such other nodes as “mou”, “sucré”, etc.;
[…] the meaning of “doux”' consists simply of  its structural relation to other terms
of the network. Since “doux” is itself reciprocally implicated in the meanings of
these other terms, none of them, taken by itself, has an independently specifiable
meaning. (Kuhn 2000: 55)
In  this  kind  of  network,  the  use  (the  relative  position)  of  each  word  tells  us
something about the use of the other words, since they are learned together by means of
the same set of exemplary applications and laws, determining the circumstances under
which each term applies (or does not apply). And, as I have said referring to normic and
nomic concepts, this applies both to groups of ordinary term such as “doux”, “mou” and
23 Kuhn describes the importance of the contrast set as follows: “Most kind terms must be learned as
members  of  one or another  contrast  set.  To learn the term 'liquid',  for  example,  as  it  is  used in
contemporary nontechnical English, one must also master the terms 'solid' and 'gas'. The ability to
pick out referents for any of these terms depends critically upon the characteristics that differentiate
its referents from those of the other terms in the set, which is why the terms involved must be learned
together and why they collectively constitute a contrast set.” (Kuhn 2000: 230).
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“sucré” or “goose”, “swan” and “duck” and to highly theoretical terms such as “mass”,
“force” and “acceleration” with some minor differences that I have exposed in section 3.
Finally,  in  the  eliminativist,  contextualist  and  structuralist  model,  since  scientific
terms  are  not  characterized  by abstract  conditions  of  application  or  definitions,  the
meaning of such terms is contextually determined by means of the exposition to their
accepted applications (and to examples of mistaken applications) and the relations with
the other terms that applies to similar situations. Isolated words have no meaning, but,
rather,  a  semantic  potential  (the  set  of  the  source  situations  or  the  paradigmatic
examples  of  application),  which  manifests  itself  in  different  ways  according  to  the
empirical context to which the term applies. This allows us to save the advantages of the
open-texture of concepts and, at the same time, to introduce some constraints to the
open-texture of scientific terms. I will face this problem in the following sections.
5. The structuralist framework
Now, let me try to express this concept in more rigorous terms. A good way to present
Kuhn's ideas in formal terms is to appeal to the structuralist program in the philosophy
of physics, which was originally born just as an interpretation and improvement of this
model  of  scientific  knowledge  (for  example  Stegmuller  1976).  There  are  several
variants of the structuralist program, but here I use the terminology and the formalism
of  Sneed  and  Stegmuller's  program (see  Andreas,  Zenker  2014).  According  to  this
program, basically, a scientific theory consists of the following elements: 
(1) Mp is the class of potential models of the theory, that is its theoretical apparatus,
including  theoretical  components.  For  example,  referring  to  Hooke's  law,  a  set  of
particles, a set of springs and the relevant constants,  the mass of the particles,  their
positions and the mutual forces at a time t.
(2) M is the class of the actual models of the theory, that is the empirical laws related
to the theory or, in other words, the set of potential models that are not excluded by its
fundamental laws (or the potential models satisfying the system's equations).
(3) Mpp is the class of partial potential models of the theory, that is its non-theoretical
basis, or the corresponding non-theoretical models. For, example, in the case of classical
mechanics, if we consider masses and forces to be theoretical, it will contain only the
positions of the particles as functions of time.
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Moreover, (4) C are the constraints, that is to say, the conditions connecting different
models to the  same theory, (5) L is the class of links connecting models of different
theories and (6) A is the class of admissible blurs.
The mathematical core of a Kuhnian theory can be represented as K = {Mp, M, Mpp,
C, L, A}, that is the formal-theoretical part of the theory. But, as I have said, scientific
theories  are  not  merely  mathematical  structures,  but  also  concrete  (paradigmatic)
applications. So, there is another element:
(7) I is the domain of intended applications of the theory, that is the pieces of the
world that constitute its concrete domain or the particular phenomena to which its core
applies or is  thought  to be applicable;  for example,  the solar  system belongs to  the
domain of intended applications of Newton's laws. So that, a theory element can be
defined as an ordered pair T = {K, I}, where, of course, some applications of the theory
are sufficiently confirmed by the relevant community, while others are not.
The most important point of I, corresponding to Kuhn's paradigms, is that I is an
open set. The structuralist program asks us to give up the concept of  one domain of
individuals to which the theory applies and recommends to use the concept of several
intended applications.  And the domain I  cannot  be extensionally given, but  only by
means of a set of paradigmatic examples (nor it cannot be intensionally given, since
there are no shared properties to define the class). 
In order to make this clear, let us come back to Wittgenstein's example of games
(Stegmuller 1976: 171-172). Recall that, according to Wittgenstein, there is no property
which is common to all those things falling under the concept of game, but, rather, only
occasional overlapping resemblances. So, to identify the concept of game, we use to
start by trying to list typical cases of game and, of course, this list can be modified by
addictions and subtractions: some activities classified as games may be dropped at some
time or the other way round. In the end, anyway, we should arrive at a minimal list:
from now on, new games can be added on the basis of our attested knowledge, but the
list must not be reduced. This does not mean that the minimal list constitutes the (core)
meaning of the term “game”, but that, for epistemic reasons, it is indispensable to apply
the term; or, in the terms of scientific theories, it provides the minimal interpretation of
the core K. So, assuming that G is the concept of game, we should determine the list G0,
that  is  the  list  of  paradigms  for  game,  by  using  the  method  of  the  paradigmatic
examples. Given G and G0, the following requirements should be fulfilled:
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• G0 should be extensionally given, that is to say, we should provide an effective
list of the elements of that set; 
• None of the element of G0 can be removed without changing the concept of G
(or, in the case of scientific theories, giving up the whole theory);
• The  elements  of  G0 can  have  some properties  in  common (for  example,  all
games  share  the  property  of  being  human  activities),  but  those  properties,
although may be necessary conditions, cannot be sufficient conditions for being
members of G0. No matter how many pertinent examples we may provide, we
cannot derive any sufficient condition for membership.
• The conditions for membership in G are necessarily vague and fuzzy. Given an
individual x that actually does not belong to G0,  it  should share a significant
amount of features with the members of G0, in order to be considered a member
of G.
• Given an individual x that actually does not belong to G0, there is no finite list of
properties such that, if x is proven to posses all the properties enumerated in the
relevant list, the membership in G is guaranteed for x.
Basing on these concepts, it should be clear how Kuhnian meanings work. The set I
of  intended  applications  of  a  theory  is  defined  by  means  of  a  fundamental  set  of
paradigms. I0 corresponds to G0, or, in other words, the set of legitimate applications of
the relevant theoretical concept: the source situations. Therefore, physics students are
introduced  to  I0 by  a  list  of  paradigmatic  examples  of  application,  accepting  the
vagueness of the concept. This model has two major advantages: at first, as I have said,
the fact that I is an open set allows scientists to apply the theory to more and more
empirical questions; at  second, if  the theory fails  in applying to some element of I,
scientists may merely drop the application, without rejecting the theory. In such a way,
as I have said in section 1, the mathematical core of the theory is immunized against
falsification.  But,  at  the  same time,  this  immunity does  not  extend  to  the  concrete
applications. If, at a given time, an element of I0 resits explanation by its theory, we
should abandon the theory. This is just the concept of concrete structure that I have
outlined in section 2, since the set of applications provide the minimal interpretation of
the mathematical formalism. I will come back to the concept of interpreted structure and
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its relation with the concept of truth in Part 3. But, now, I shall distinguish this model
from others that, at first sight, may appear similar.
6. Similarities and differences with other models: prototypes
The model I have sketched in the previous sections presents some similarities and
differences with other semantic models, especially with the semantic of prototypes and
with the finitist theory of meaning.
The notion of family resemblance has already been applied to the nature of scientific
concepts as well as to Kuhn’s theory of empirical concepts (Andersen, Barker, Chen
2006).  The  idea  is  that  we  can  explain  meaning  shifts  admitting  that  the  different
meanings of the same term are not independent from one another, but, rather, overlap
each  other  (like  family  resemblances).  But,  according  to  the  standard  theory  of
prototypes, each concept has a “prototype”, which is considered the typical example of
that concept, that we can infer from its actual applications24. Then, once we have been
exposed to a sufficient amount of prototypes for an efficient categorization of the world,
we can classify the other objects by means of the evaluation of their degree of similarity
to the relevant prototype. In other words, the different meanings crosscut to generate
intermediate meanings (and intermediate degrees of meaning), which are a mixture of
the  different  meanings  (and,  of  course,  their  boundaries  may  change  with  time).
Obviously,  this  theory  maintains  that  concepts  are  open-textured,  since  the  set  of
possible future applications of the concept does not require necessary and sufficient
conditions for the applicability, but, rather, the perception and the recognition of the
similarity with a prototype or a set of prototypical applications.
This  interpretation  is  convincing  and  it  fits  well  with  many  theses  that  I  have
presented.  Kuhn  himself  says  that  a  necessary  condition  for  the  analogical  (or
“metaphorical”) application of a term to new cases is the knowledge of the primary
meaning of such term (its literal meaning), which, according to this interpretation, we
can identify by means of the prototypical application (Kuhn 2000: 62). The analogy
between different problem situations is the linkage between the literal use of the term
and the new accepted application. But this theory has a weak point. In fact, it uses the
24 Some contemporary theories of prototypes reject the existence of a single prototype for each concept
(established once and for all). But here I refer to the classic theory of prototypes because it directly
addresses the question of the stability of reference. 
82
concept of family resemblance to say that every network of similarities and differences
presents a main area, a section of the network that is the most representative of the
different meanings of the terms (and that we identify such area with the prototype, i.e.
with the primary use of the term); and, finally, we can infer the analogical uses of the
term from the prototype.  But  Wittgenstein’s  family resemblances  do not  require  the
existence  of  a  distinction  between  “center”  and  “periphery”  of  a  network.  For
Wittgenstein,  all  the  nodes  of  the  lexical  network  have  the  same  importance  and
therefore, we cannot identify the prototype of a family resemblance. 
For  example,  take  the  concept  of  gene,  a  “concept  in  tension”  (Falk  2000)  that
evolved during the history of biology. At first, it was introduced by Wilhelm Johannsen,
basing  on  Mendel’s  hypotheses;  a  gene  was  thought  to  be  the  “special  conditions,
foundations and determiners which are present [in the gametes] in unique, separate and
thereby  independent  ways  [by  which]  many  characteristics  of  the  organism  are
specified” (Johannsen 1909: 124). But the meaning of the term “gene” changes over the
course  of  scientific  progress  and  many  historians  suggest  that  it  is  a  term that  is
meaningful only in some contexts in which it is used. For example Griffiths and Stotz
(2006) individuate three different meanings of the concept of gene and state that the
identification of the right meaning depends on the relevant context in which biologists
work. 
The first meaning is the instrumental gene. It is the traditional gene: it is identified by
means of its phenotypic effects and is employed to predict the phenotypic effects of
experiments  of  hybridization  between  organisms.  Therefore,  it  is  important  in  the
context of the interpretation of experiments that involve the relation between genotype
and phenotype by means of hybridizations, since the visible and heritable characters of
the organism should be interpreted in such a way to permit their genetic analysis.
The second meaning is the nominal gene. It is a practical tool which does not imply
that the relevant scientific community has a clear idea about what is a gene, but only
that it is linked to the use of databases containing nucleotides sequences and that genes
are sequences which have been codified as genes and have been confirmed by scientific
communities. This is something like a description of the gene discovery method, since a
gene is  such if  it  is  similar  to  other  genes.  It  is  useful  for communication between
scientists.
Finally,  the post-genomic  gene  is  the gene used  in  molecular  biology.  It  plays  a
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functional role in contemporary biology, since it represents the project concerning the
relation  between  genome  structure  and  genome  function,  but  “with  a  deflationary
picture of the gene as a structural unit” (Griffith, Stotz 2006: 99-100). According to this
perspective, the gene is the set of things that you can do with the genome and, although
it is still considered a representation in the DNA of the molecule we are studying, it can
be distorted and fragmented and this is a problem for the traditional interpretation of the
relationship between genotype and phenotype.
Although, with a pragmatic approach, many biologists think that the gene is only an
operational concept, all these meanings are grounded in the experimental practice of
biology.  Therefore,  we may think  that,  rather,  the  concept  of  gene  is  a  multi-level
concept whose meaning depends on the context in which it is used. This rules out the
conventionalist solutions, i.e., a real distinction between the different meanings of the
term “gene”: gene1, gene2 and gene3. According to the projectibility of kind terms, every
term generates expectations, which sometimes overlap each other. This is a matter of
facts and not a matter of words, since the problem is that overlapping meanings might
lead  to  different  anticipations  about  certain  kinds  of  phenomena  (for  example  the
relation  between  genotype  and  phenotype).  But,  at  the  same  time,  referring  to  the
multiple and different uses of the concept of gene, it is hard to find something like a
prototype, or a literal meaning, of the concept of gene. Therefore, I will try to reconsider
the  role  of  the  primary meaning of  scientific  terms.  My idea  is  that  the  thesis  that
scientific  terms  have  meanings,  which  cannot  withstand  a  major  revision  over  the
history of science is, to some extent, correct, but it does not depends on the meanings of
the words or  their  reference.  It  is  neither  a  metaphysical  nor  a linguistic  argument;
rather it is an epistemic point about the organization of scientific knowledge and the
testing  process  of  scientific  theories.  I  think  that  Kuhn  was  interested  in  keeping
unchanged the literal  meaning of scientific  terms because,  if  words  had no primary
meaning, then (according to Kuhn) we would be allowed to accept any meaning change
without major problems, and therefore incommensurability would not exist. But Kuhn
could not accept the rejection of the incommensurability thesis (Kindi 2012: 41). I do
not agree with this point and I will provide a different interpretation in the following
section, where I will distinguish my perspective from meaning finitism. 
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7. Similarities and differences with other models: finitism
The finitist model is Wittgensteinian as well, since it results from an interpretation of
Wittgenstein’s theses about rule following and family resemblances. According to the
finitist,  when we introduce a concept  P (showing exemplary applications of P),  any
possible  use of P can be interpreted in such a way to be consistent  with the initial
introduction of the concept. From a logical viewpoint, the relation of similarity between
the source situation and the target situation does not pose any limit to the acceptable
interpretation by the speakers (for example, a sample of black can be interpreted in such
a way to include gray in the concept of black and so on) This view accepts the open-
texture since it states that empirical concepts are not limited in any possible direction.
Finally  the  correctness  of  later  interpretations  depends  only  on  the  community
agreement (or disagreement) about that interpretation. This theory is not consistent with
Kuhn’s perspective for two reasons.
At first, we need some constraints to the concept of open-texture. It is not true that
every  application  is  consistent  with  any  other  application;  otherwise,  it  would  be
meaningless to speak about scientific revolutions, because we could always arrange our
concept to save attested knowledge against the introduction of new concepts. Therefore,
the concept of open-texture is perhaps misleading, since it might suggest the idea that
empirical concepts can be applied without restrictions. As I did in the last chapter, it
may be  better  to  use  the  term “polysemy”,  to  mean that  scientific  terms  may have
different  meanings  (and  there  may  be  meaning  shifts),  but  the  boundaries  of  the
“degrees of meaning” are not completely flexible25. I will explain further below what I
mean.
Secondly, both Kuhn’s view and finitism are sociological perspctives and take into
account the role played by scientific communities in the history of science. But Kuhn
does not say that the consensus within a scientific community fixes the correct use of
the term (Bird 2000: 223-224). According to Kuhn, as we have seen, the meaning of
natural kind terms is not the conventional result of public agreement; in his theory of
meaning, world and language are interwoven. Kind terms are projectible and therefore
their meanings and correct applications cannot depend on the actual beliefs of some
scientific community. The sociological perspective is important because it explains (by
25 Waissman was aware of this problem and he tried to address it by means of the distinction between
vagueness and open-texture (Waismann 1968: 120). 
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means of  the  description  of  scientific  training)  how scientists  are  introduced to  the
patterns of similarities and differences, which allow them to react in the same way if
they  share  the  same  stimuli.  Therefore,  the  operation  of  categorization  of  the
experimental data that characterizes science does not deal with the consensus within a
scientific community. My point is that the question of “family resemblances” and the
question of “following a rule” are two different problems, although they share some
features. And that from my viewpoint the former is the relevant problem, while I am not
discussing the latter.
Finally, I have to clarify what kind of epistemic constraints determines the primary
use of scientific terms. Meaning changes characterize both normal and revolutionary
science.  The  difference  is  that  revolutionary  meaning  changes  involve  the  terms
introduced by means of the most important laws of the theory; since, according to Kuhn,
the elements of the lexical structures are the terms that scientific laws deploy. These
equations constitute the mathematical core of the theory and therefore we can say that
two theories (T1 and T2) are commensurable if they have the same lexical structure, or if
the  lexical  structure  of  T1  is  preserved  in  the  term  of  T2.  This  means  that  the
categorization of the world (the patterns of similarities and differences) provided by T1
can be mapped into the categorization of T2 without important meaning changes. But
this idea is still consistent with finitism, because abstract physical laws do not specify
how  they  should  be  applied  to  the  empirical  context  and  therefore  they  can  be
interpreted in such a way to be consistent with any possible state of affairs (for example
the first law of motion cannot be directly falsified, since you can always postulate the
existence of invisible forces). But, as I have said in section 2, lexical structures are not
the kind of structure (like Russell’s structures) such that any collection of objects can be
arranged to correspond to  that  structure.  Kuhn’s  structures  are  always  connected  to
exemplary applications, which provide a minimal interpretation of them. The meaning
of the terms involved in the lexical structure consists in the interaction between laws
and sets of intended applications. Therefore, it is not true that every future application is
consistent  with any past application.  Each application should be consistent  with the
minimal interpretation of the theory, which is connected to the properties of scientific
“objects” that are considered significant for the empirical application and testing of the
current  theory  (detection  properties);  for  example,  mass  and  force  are  this  sort  of
property in classical mechanics. Obviously, following the distinction between detection
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and auxiliary properties, this is not a metaphysical distinction, but, rather, an epistemic
distinction, since it depends on the organization of scientific theories. Specifically, it
depends on the parts of the theory that scientists consider empirically testable (or the
parts of the theory that are easier to test according to the current status and method of
scientific  inquiry).  But  what  is  important  is  that,  if  scientific  terms  have  a  “literal
meaning” (which cannot be modified), it is not a consequence of our theory of meaning,
but,  rather,  a  consequence  of  the  empirical  nature  of  scientific  investigation,  which
forces scientists to select the sections of the theories to apply to the empirical context.
Therefore,  the theory of meaning that I  have presented can account for normal and
revolutionary meaning changes by means of the notion of open-texture (or polysemy)
without turning into fintism.        
8. Conclusions
According to the perspective that I have outlined, the scientific experience of the
world depends on the existence of natural kind terms shared by a scientific community,
which constitute the lexical structure, or the lexicon, of the theory. The function of such
a structure is to organize the experimental data according to a given taxonomy and,
thanks to such a taxonomy, to allow scientists to make predictions about the behavior of
the  objects  postulated  by  the  lexical  structure  and  their  properties.  Since  scientific
progress consists in the application of attested models to solve new problems, lexical
structures present a dual nature. From the one hand, their constituents (natural kinds)
should be flexible in such a way that scientists can arrange their boundaries to apply
them in new contexts. But, on the other hand, there must be some restrictions to the
possible applications of these terms; otherwise, we could not explain theory changes.
My hypothesis is that the stability-instability of the lexical structures can be explained
on the basis of a theory of the meaning of natural kinds, which accepts three theses:
meaning eliminativism (isolated words have no meaning); contextualism (the meaning
of the words is “actualized” by their context of application); structuralism (the meaning
of a word consists in the relations of similarity and difference with the other words of its
semantic field). In such a way, we can accept the open-texture of concepts and, at the
same time, some limits to the open-texture. In my model, unlike Kuhn, the no-overlap
principle  is  not  one  of  these  limits.  Rather,  I  introduce  a  constraint  related  to  the
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minimal interpretation of the structure, i.e., the coherence with the universal laws of the
theory  on  the  light  of  its  interpretation  provided  by  paradigmatic  examples  of
applications.    
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Part 2: Against Correspondence Truth
In the first part, basing on Kuhn's ideas, I have defended a view on the meaning and
the reference of scientific terms, which rests on the idea that the main part of scientific
theories (the part that we cannot reject without giving rise to a referential change) is
constituted by the combination of mathematical structures (illustrated by physical laws)
and  exemplary  applications.  One  of  the  main  conclusions  I  have  drawn  is  that
mathematical structures should be learned by examples and related to concrete problem
situations in order to be applicable in everyday scientific practice. Unlike pure structural
realism, I think that we need interpreted and concrete structure to fruitfully talk about
the world science describes. Now, in this second part, I will turn my focus from the
relation between meaning and reference to the question of scientific truth and show
why, according to Kuhn, this view leads to the rejection of the correspondence theory.
But,  while the first  part  is  intended as a reconstruction and improvement  of Kuhn's
ideas, the second part aims to be critical.  After presenting Kuhn's arguments against
correspondence truth, I will conclude that they are wrong and merely fails. I will focus
on the elaboration of an acceptable theory of truth in the last part, but, actually I will
claim that appealing to the nature of exemplary cases and the language-dependence of
reference  (the  main  theses  of  Part  1)  does  not  entail  that  we  should  believe  that
scientific  paradigms  are  neither  true  nor  false  (in  any  proper  empirical  sense).  To
achieve this aim, in sections 1-2, I will carry on the ideas that I have presented in Part 1
(especially sections 1-2) as regards the relation between physical laws and exemplary
cases. So, these parts should be read in parallel: they both deal with how the structure of
scientific  theories  is  related  to  theoretical  change,  to  pick  out  those  parts  that  are
essential  to  their  empirical  success  (and,  therefore,  the  rejection  of  which  causes  a
theoretical  change).  I  will  focus  especially  on  the  role  played  by  physical  laws
according to Kuhn (section 1) and how the process of scientific training is constitutive
of scientific practice (section 2). On the contrary, in the next sections, I will directly
focus on truth, explaining why, for Kuhn, basing on these claims, we should reject the
correspondence theory of truth (section 3); and, finally (section 4), I will conclude that a
weak correspondence theory can overcome the challenge  of  the incommensurability
thesis and, in the end, there is no reason to give up truth if we follow the approach that I
have defended in Part 1 and 2. This will suffice for the pars destruens of my work. In
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fact, in the last part, as pars construens, I will defend the weak correspondence theory
against  other  objections  and I  will  conclude  that  it  is  able  to  account  for  scientific
knowledge.  
Section  1:  Normativity  and  Necessity:  Kuhn,  Wittgenstein  and  the
Physical Laws
1. Introduction
In the first part of my work (Part 1 – sections 1-2) I have introduced the problem of
the selection of those parts of scientific theories that cannot be rejected without turning
into a radical theoretical (and referential)  change; according to the perspective I am
developing, those parts are physical laws in connection with exemplary applications, i.e.
interpreted mathematical structures. This part (and the following one, that is Part 2 –
sections 1-2) should be read in parallel with it. In fact, in this chapter I will discuss the
structure and the role played by physical laws in scientific practice according to Kuhn.
One of his most original claims, that I have presented in Part 1 – section 1, is that the
physical  laws  are  analytic  propositions  (or  quasi-analytic  or  synthetic  a  priori).  By
analytic,  he  means  propositions  which  describe  situations  that  could  not  have  been
otherwise.  For  example,  the state  of  affairs  described by the  first  law of  motion is
consistent with any conceivable empirical situation, since one can always postulate the
existence of invisible forces; the conclusion is that such propositions look like necessary
proposition, or propositions dealing with the “real” essence of the world. But this idea
seems to be inconsistent with another famous claim defended by Kuhn: the claim that
the relation between scientific theories and reality is neither a metaphysical nor a purely
empirical relation. Since the same set of empirical data may well be accommodated by
different  paradigms  (and  none  of  them  is  “grounded”  in  the  objective  reality),
paradigms are, to some extent, arbitrary, or, in Kuhn's words, they are not the sort of
things which can be true or false; their justification is a pragmatic matter. Therefore, my
question is the following. Scientific paradigms have two features:
• (TA) Thesis of Arbitrariness: scientific paradigms do not deal with the essence
of reality and cannot be true or false in any empirical or philosophical way. This
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is a thesis against the idea that scientific language mirrors the real nature of the
world.
• (TN) Thesis of Necessity:  physical laws are necessary propositions, since the
states of affairs that they describe could not conceivably have been otherwise. 
If one thinks to the necessity of scientific laws from a metaphysical viewpoint (they
are necessary propositions because they reflect the essence of the world), arbitrariness
and necessity are inconsistent. But I think that Kuhn does not refer to the metaphysical
necessity of scientific laws. I cannot discuss the necessitarian view on the laws of nature
here (see for example Armstrong 1983) and the question about the distinction between
necessary and contingent truths in the empirical sciences. Rather, following what I have
said in Part 1 – section 1 – I will analyze the kind of necessity that Kuhn attributes to
the laws of nature and I will return on the comparison between the nature of physical
laws according to Kuhn and the nature of grammatical rules according to Wittgenstein.
My conclusion will be that, just like the necessity of grammatical rules comes from the
normative role that they play in language games, (according to Kuhn) the necessity of
physical  laws  is  language-dependent  and depend on their  normative-methodological
role. 
2. Are scientific laws analytic propositions?
The arbitrariness of scientific paradigms is a famous topic and therefore I will be
very brief about that and I will focus on the concept of necessity. Anyway, in many
passages of his works, Kuhn seems to suggest that scientific laws are arbitrary in some
way. Roughly, this depends on two arguments: a) the same set of experimental data can
be explained and justified by means of many different paradigms, since more than one
theory can be pointed out to interpret the same collection of empirical data (Kuhn 1970:
76); b) none of these paradigms can be said “grounded in or justified by experience”
(Kuhn  1970:  146-148),  since  the  empirical  justification  of  scientific  theories  is  a
problem that cannot be solved through the mere instruments of logic and experience.
The conclusion is that no experiment can force the process of theory choice, since the
relation between theory and data involves elements that the logic of verification (or
falsification) cannot justify; this is why Kuhn says that anomalies are not falsifications.
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Thus, the correspondence theory of truth is not applicable to scientific paradigms. They
are neither true nor false, because they are antecedent to any such correspondence (see
Kuhn 2000: 90-104 for his rejection of the correspondence theory of truth). This is an
anti-foundationalist viewpoint and has often been interpreted as a kind of conceptual
scheme relativism such that, from (TA) it follows that:
• CSR  (Conceptual  Scheme  Relativism):  since  no  paradigm  is  grounded  in
experience,  each  paradigm  is  a  conceptual  scheme  (at  least  partially)
untranslatable  from  the  lexicons of  the  other  schemes.  The  truth-value  of
scientific propositions is not a matter of relation between theory and reality, but,
rather, a question about the internal coherence of our system of beliefs. 
I think that (CSR) is false, but I will demonstrate that it is not what Kuhn meant. In
fact,  I  think  that  (TA) and (TN) can  be better  understood analyzing the  concept  of
necessity  that  Kuhn  attributes  to  physical  laws  and  clarifying  what  he  means  by
“necessary” and on what it depends. 
In Part 1 – section 1 – I have explained how, since his “Postscript-1969”, Kuhn has
clarified the concept of paradigm, individuating its elements; so I will not repeat this
point. I have already said that, for Kuhn, basically symbolic generalizations are one of
the most important elements: they are the fundamental equations of the theory, usually
expressed  in  formalized  language  and  considered  laws  of  nature  by  the  relevant
scientific community. But, as Kuhn says, symbolic generalizations do not specify how
they  should  be  applied  to  the  empirical  context.  He  distinguishes  symbolic
generalizations from exemplary problem solutions (for example F= ma and the inclined
plane) and moves the empirical content of scientific laws to their applications: they are
applicable  only  thanks  to  exemplary  cases;  an  isolated  symbolic  generalization  is
something empty of empirical meaning and application. 
2.1 Distinction: analyticity and necessity
As I have said in Part 1 – section 1, Kuhn has tried to explain this feature of scientific
laws many times. As I have just affirmed, Kuhn realized that these laws appear to be
analytic and synthetic at the same time and uses different terms to express this property
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in tension: “analytic” (or tautologies or purely logical statements) or “quasi-analytic” or
“synthetic a priori”. From Kuhn’s viewpoint, their most interesting feature is the ability
to resist empirical falsifications, which makes them look like necessary propositions;
but, obviously, if we have a more serious look at the nature of physical laws, this is
really problematic,  since physical  laws have a  strong empirical  import  as well.  The
factual or empirical aspect of symbolic generalizations cannot be ignored, since they
work together with their empirical examples of applications (otherwise they would be
meaningless) and consequently they are not the mere result of conventional stipulations
and  arbitrary  definitions.  The  main  point  of  his  puzzlement  is  that,  even  though
symbolic  generalizations  seem  to  be  analytic,  the  meaning  of  their  terms  is  not
embodiable in definitions, while those of the terms deployed by analytic propositions
usually is. I think that the origin of Kuhn’s trouble is quite clear: analytic does not mean
necessary. There are at least three reasons which suggest us to reject the identification
between analytic propositions and scientific laws according to Kuhn.
At first, The distinction between analytic and synthetic propositions consists in their
logical form, while Kuhn’s distinction is grounded in the role played by a proposition in
its  own  context.  Kuhn’s  analysis  of  the  process  by  which  physics  students  are
introduced to the second law of motion (see Part 1 – section 1) shows that this law can
be considered empirical or necessary depending on the role that we assign to it in the
context  of  scientific  training  (in  classical  mechanics).  Physics  students  can  be
introduced to the principles of classical mechanics in two different but equivalent ways:
a) presenting the second law as a stipulation and the law of gravitation as empirical; b)
reversing their epistemic status. From this point, Kuhn’s confusion between the notion
of analyticity and the notion of necessity is clear. In fact, from this remark about the
laws of classical mechanics, he concludes that “in each case one, but only one, of the
laws is, so to speak, built into the lexicon. I do not quite want to call such laws analytic,
for experience with nature was essential for their initial formulation. Yet they do have
something of the necessity that the label ‘analytic’ implies” (Kuhn 2000: 71). Kuhn
treats “necessary” and “analytic” as equivalent,  but the second law of motion keeps
unchanged its logical form independently of the way we are introduced to it. Therefore,
physical  laws  are  not  analytic  in  the  same  way  as  ordinary  analytic  propositions:
symbolic generalizations are not necessary thanks to their internal properties (such as
meaning), but thanks to the role they play in scientific practice (during normal science);
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this is not a problem about the logical form, but, rather, about the use of propositions.
Moreover, the necessity of analytic propositions depends on their internal properties
and in particular  on the  meaning of  their  terms.  The proposition  “all  bachelors  are
unmarried” is true because of the meaning of the terms involved, since “bachelor” and
“unmarried  man”  mean  the  same  thing  (leaving  aside  Quine's  remarks).  But  Kuhn
clearly says that this is not the kind of necessity that concerns scientific laws: “but it is
not  –  unlike  the  statement  ‘Some  bachelors  are  married’ –  false  by  virtue  of  the
definition of  those  terms.  The  meaning  of  force  and  mass  are  not  embodiable  in
definitions” (Kuhn 2000: 73–74 n. 19). The truth-value of an analytic proposition is a
linguistic question which depends on the meaning of the words, but this is not the case
of  scientific  laws.  On  the  contrary,  Kuhn says  that  the  most  important  function  of
symbolic generalizations is to define the words they deploy. Kuhn’s problem is exactly
the opposite of the analyticity problem. Symbolic generalizations cannot be necessary
propositions  in  virtue  of  the  meaning  of  their  terms,  because,  rather,  they  are
constitutive of the meaning of those terms.
Finally,  nobody  would  classify  a  proposition  such  as  “f=ma”  within  the  set  of
analytic propositions. Just like the other symbolic generalizations, the second law of
motion does  not  look like  analytic  propositions  (according to  the ordinary sense of
analytic proposition, such as “all bachelors are unmarried” or “2 + 2 = 4” or “A = A”).
Kuhn is aware of this problem and affirms again that the necessity of scientific universal
laws does not depend on their form but on their use in scientific practice. While analytic
propositions  cannot  be tested at  all,  symbolic  generalizations  can be tested to  some
extent. We can measure forces and masses and complete the form of the second law of
motion by means of our results; in such a way we could falsify Newton’s law. But laws,
unlike definitions and tautologies, are often corrigible piecemeal. Again, the problem
lies in the use of symbolic generalizations in the context of scientific practice.
In this  section I  have explained why Kuhn’s description of the universal laws of
science as analytic propositions is confused and unclear. He assumes that analytic and
necessary  propositions  are  equivalent,  but  this  is  controversial  (take,  for  example,
Kripke’s  notion  of  necessary  a  posteriori).  The  main  difference  between  analytic
propositions and symbolic generalizations is that analytic propositions are “necessarily”
true in virtue of the meaning of their terms, while symbolic generalizations are true in
virtue of the role they play in the empirical context and, unlike analytic propositions,
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they define the terms they deploy.        
3. A grammar for scientific practice
We have seen that symbolic generalizations used by scientists seem to be necessary
because,  according  to  Kuhn,  they  are  not  falsifiable  through  normal  experience.
Moreover, once we have accepted that this necessity does not depend on their internal
logical and linguistic structure (i.e. they are not analytic propositions strictly construed),
we have to face two main problems: a) what is the relation between the necessity of
scientific laws and their arbitrariness? b) assuming that their necessity does not depend
on the logical structure, what does it mean that symbolic generalizations are necessary?
I think that the answer to these questions is the same. Moreover, I anticipate that it is
summarized by Wittgenstein’s claim that: “the only correlate in language to an intrinsic
necessity is an arbitrary rule. It is the only thing which one can milk out of this intrinsic
necessity  into  a  proposition”  (Wittgenstein  1958:  116);  from  this  viewpoint,
arbitrariness and necessity do not  contradict  each other  by means of the concept  of
“rule”. Roughly speaking, symbolic generalizations are necessary (and therefore non-
falsifiable),  because  they  are  not  empirical  propositions,  but  rather,  norms  which
regulate  scientific  practice:  in  Wittgenstein’s  words,  the  universal  laws  of  science
constitute  the  grammar  of  science  (together  with  their  exemplary  applications).
Universal laws are arbitrary (or conventions) in the same sense as rules are conventions.
According to this “conventionalist” position, the members of a (scientific) community
deal with necessary truths in a similar way they deal with accepted rules. Both rules and
necessary  truths  have  a  normative  function:  they  are  not  exposed  to  experimental
falsifications  and  alleged  falsifications  are  considered  mistakes  of  the  individual
scientist. Moreover, both necessary truth and rules are constitutive of human practices,
social  activities  and institutions  (including scientific  communities  and institutions)26.
But I will return further below on this concept. Now I will explain the parallel between
the concept of paradigm and the concept of grammar.   
26 For the relation between norms and conventions see Ben-Menahem 2006.
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3.1 Comparison between paradigms and grammars
As I  have  said in  Part  1,  some scholars  have noticed  that  Kuhn’s  description of
paradigms looks like Wittgenstein’s account of grammatical propositions (Malone 1993,
Glock 1996: 215, Sharrock, Read 2002: 162-163, Baltas 2004). Anyway, Kuhn himself
quotes Wittgenstein when he speaks about whether Newtonian mechanics can withstand
a revision of the second law of motion or the third law or Hooke’s law or the law of
gravity.  The  main  point  is  that  an  answer  to  those  questions  is  not  required  or
anticipated by the structure of the lexicon and therefore they individually cannot have
yes  or  no  answers  (just  like  it  is  meaningless  to  ask  whether  we could  play chess
without the queen).
Both  Kuhn’s  scientific  laws  and  Wittgenstein’s  grammatical  rules  are  norms  of
representation,  i.e.  the  normative  and  constitutive  backbone  which  makes  normal
experience possible. Since they are constitutive conditions, they are not falsifiable: they
do not directly describe the world, but, rather, constitute models of verification (models
of  reasoning,  acting,  experimenting  and  so  on).  They  are  not  true  or  false  in  any
ordinary sense,  because  such models  are  prior  to  the  possibility  of  any truth-value
attribution. On the other hand, Wittgenstein himself has said that the laws of kinematics
work like norms of representation (Wittgenstein 1978: 85-87). Therefore my first point
is  that,  according  to  the  Kuhn-Wittgenstein  model,  physical  laws  are  norms  of
representation: they are not descriptions of the world, but, rather, rules for describing
the  world.  Thanks  to  the  constitutive  structure  provided  by  scientific  paradigms
(universal laws and concrete examples of application), scientist are allowed to express
meaningful  scientific  propositions which are verifiable  or  falsifiable  through normal
experience (and therefore are true-or-false in the ordinary sense); but the structure in
itself, as constitutive condition, is not empirically true-or-false.  
Now  I  will  briefly  compare  Wittgenstein’s  grammatical  proposition  and  Kuhn’s
paradigms point by point.  They share many features and I will  briefly focus on the
characteristics that I have exposed referring to paradigms. At first, a grammar is in a
certain sense arbitrary (see Forster 2004: 21-65): “the rules of grammar may be called
‘arbitrary’, if that is to mean that the aim of the grammar is nothing but that of the
language”  (Wittgenstein  1958:  138).  That  is  because  a)  we  can  imagine  different
grammars (see for example Wittgenstein 1969: 80-81); b) grammars cannot be justified
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by means of their alleged agreement with the facts. To that extent, they cannot be tested
by experience,  but,  rather,  like  units  of  measurement,  they are  a  formal  matrix  for
experimental testing and truth-value attributions (Wittgenstein 1974: 135). Both Kuhn
and Wittgenstein compare paradigms and grammars with systems of measurement. In
both cases, it is an anti-foundationalist viewpoint, which maintains the impossibility of
an external  standpoint  to  evaluate  the truthlikeness of  any metric  system. Since the
evaluation of the truth-values is an activity which requires a system of measurement (or
a coordinates system), the evaluation of the truth-value of the system itself turns into an
infinite regress, since we would need another metric system. Finally, the justification of
a paradigm or a grammar is a pragmatic matter.
Moreover,  grammatical  propositions  can  be  considered  necessary  propositions27:
after all, propositions such as “the standard meter in Paris is a meter long” or “this is
black” are propositions that we cannot conceive to be false. But at the same time, just
like  Kuhn’s  symbolic  generalizations,  they  are  not  analytic  propositions  strictly
construed and the reasons are approximately the same that we have seen referring to
Kuhn’s symbolic generalizations.
Firstly,  empirical  and  grammatical  propositions  are  not  two  different  types  of
propositions;  the  same  proposition  can  be  descriptive  or  grammatical  in  different
contexts and relative to its role in ordinary speaking. This is very similar to Kuhn’s
analysis of the dual nature of the laws of motions. The second law can be considered
empirical or conventional depending on the training process in classical mechanics and,
referring  to  scientific  laws,  Wittgenstein  talks  about  the  fluctuation  of  scientific
definitions:  something  that  today  counts  as  an  observable  part  of  a  phenomenon
tomorrow may be be used to explain it; or, in other words, that sometimes the same
proposition can be used as something to test by experience (empirical proposition) and
sometimes  as  a  rule  of  testing  (norm of  description)  (Wittgenstein  1969:  15).  The
distinction between empirical and normative propositions is not a distinction between
two kinds of propositions; rather, it is a distinction between two uses and it is relative to
the relevant language game.
Secondly, just like symbolic generalizations define the terms they deploy, the necessity
of  grammatical  propositions  does  not  depend  on  the  meaning  of  their  components
27 The use of the word “necessity” in Wittgenstein’s works is controversial as well. For an analysis of the
relationship between grammar and necessity see Baker, Hacker 2005: 241-370. 
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because,  on  the  contrary,  grammatical  propositions  determine  the  meaning  of  such
terms:  “it  is  grammatical  rules  that  determine  meaning  (constitute  it)  and  so  they
themselves  are  not  answerable  to  any  meaning  and  to  that  extend  are  arbitrary”
(Wittgenstein 1974: 184). And like, according to Kuhn, a structure change turns into a
meaning change of the terms that occur in the theory (for example the meaning of the
term mass changes over the course of Einstein’s revolution, since the laws of motion,
which define the term “mass”, do not work in the theory of relativity), if we change the
grammatical rules, meaning will change as well.  
In the end, grammatical propositions are not analytic strictly speaking, since it  is
obvious that “this is black” or “this is the standard meter” are not analytic propositions
and their truth-values do not depend on the meaning of words like ‘black’ or ‘meter’.
The point is that such propositions include both empirical and conventional features, for
example by means of the use of ostension. Anyway, they entail a connection between
pieces of world and pieces of languages which cannot be analyzed through the concept
of “analyticity”. Paradigms and grammatical propositions are grounded in language and
reality at the same time: this is a different kind of conventionality, that I will discuss in
the following sections, focusing on the relation between normativity and necessity.
But, at first, it is useful to introduce another clarification, which applies both to Kuhn
and  Wittgenstein.  We  have  seen  that  the  distinction  between  grammatical  and
descriptive  propositions  is  not  an  ultimate  distinction:  sometimes  a  proposition  can
correspond to the former use and sometimes to the latter. But this does not mean that,
like Quine, Kuhn and Wittgenstein reject the distinction between empirical propositions
and necessary propositions. Although they both aim to avoid the traditional analytic-
synthetic  dichotomy,  they think that  grammatical  and empirical  propositions  are  too
dissimilar to reject such a distinction. We need to distinguish between what is empirical
and what is grammatical, but in order to do this in the right way, we have to take in
mind that, as we have seen, we do not look for different types of proposition, but for
different uses. We may well categorize grammatical and descriptive uses; the fact that
some propositions sometimes behave as belonging to the former group and sometimes
as belonging to the latter one does not rule out the distinction. Given a proposition, it
may sometimes get treated as something to test by experience and at another time as a
rule of testing; but the same proposition cannot test experience and be a rule of testing at
the same time. In the same way, Kuhn does introduce his analysis of synthetic a priori
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propositions  to  distinguish  between  normal  and  revolutionary  science  (see  Part  1).
Grammatical propositions enable us to recognize scientific revolutions. In fact, while
normal science allows significant meaning changes as well, scientific revolutions can be
identified through the synthetic a priori criterion. A scientific revolution (a scientific
change which gives rise to incommensurable scientific traditions) involves a change in
the grammatical  propositions.  But  we have seen that  the meaning of  the terms that
symbolic generalizations/grammatical propositions deploy is determined or constituted
by the grammar itself. Therefore, a change in the grammatical propositions entails also a
meaning change of the terms defined by means of the relevant propositions (semantic
incommensurability).
Once we have established this connection between Kuhn and Wittgenstein, now we
can  analyze  the  origin  of  the  notion  of  necessity  that  Kuhn  attributes  to  symbolic
generalizations. My thesis is that it is the same origin of the necessity of grammatical
propositions according to Wittgenstein: normativity.
4. Necessity and normativity 
In  the  last  section  I  have  recognized  a  parallel  between  Kuhn’s  paradigms  and
Wittgenstein’s  grammars.  They  are  arbitrary  in  a  very  similar  sense  and  they  are
necessary  in  a  sense  which  is  not  consistent  with  the  identification  of  necessary
propositions with analytic propositions. In this section I will argue that the notions of
necessity and arbitrariness are consistent relative to scientific paradigms in the same
way as they are consistent referring to grammars. That is because both paradigms and
grammars are necessary in so far as they are normative systems of representation, which
constitute the field of possible “normal” experience. 
Wittgenstein states that a proposition showing a rule is different from an empirical
proposition since the latter can be said “true” if it succeeds in the relevant empirical
testing process:  the proposition “the desk is  one meter  long” is  empirically testable
referring to the standard metric system. But it does not make sense to ask for the length
of  the  standard  meter.  We  are  inclined  to  think  that  grammatical  propositions  are
statements which express the real structure of the world, because it always seems to
confirm propositions like “the standard meter is one meter long” or “black is darker than
white”;  so  that  some  philosophers  (belonging  to  the  metaphysical  or  empiricist
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traditions about the status of the laws of nature) consider necessary propositions the
universal truth about reality (although there are many different interpretations). 
4.1 The “internalist” view on the concept of necessity
 
Roughly, both Kuhn and Wittgenstein disagree with this interpretation of the laws of
nature. Kuhn says that paradigms are not the sort of things that can be true or false; the
attribution of truth-values to empirical sentences is possible only by means of a matrix,
which makes possible the attributions themselves, that is to say a paradigm or a system
of measurement28. Wittgenstein solves the problem saying that grammatical propositions
(as well as physical laws) do not provide a representation of the structure of the world,
but  rather  a  representation  of  the  structure  of  the  grammar  itself.  Grammatical
propositions are not descriptions of reality, but norms that we use to describe reality.
Thus, being norms of representation which delimit the meaningful description of the
world,  obviously reality seems to confirm them: the contradictory of  a  grammatical
proposition is not falseness, but nonsense. Correctness does not mean agreement with
reality but with a conventional norm or use (Wittgenstein 1978: 41).
However,  although  this  kind  of  remarks  should  justify  the  necessity  of  rules,
arbitrariness  seems  to  creep  through  the  back  door.  Wittgenstein  is  aware  of  this
possible objection:
What is necessary is determined by the rules.—We might then ask, "Was it necessary
or arbitrary to give these rules?" And here we might say that a rule was arbitrary if we
made it just for fun and necessary if having this particular rule were a matter of life and
death. We must distinguish between a necessity in the system and a necessity of the
whole system. (Wittgenstein 1976: 241)
The  results  of  a  calculus  are  necessary  from  the  “internalist”  viewpoint  of  the
calculus system itself and depend on the rules of the system. We are dealing with two
different kinds of necessity:  in re necessity and grammatical necessity. These kinds of
necessity should not be confused. Necessity in re is grounded in the essential structure
of the world, while grammatical necessity in the acceptance of our conventions, norms
of  representation,  methods  of  description.  Kuhn,  too,  is  aware  of  this  distinction:
28 For the comparison between paradigms and metric systems see Kuhn 2000: 63. I will focus on this
point  in Part  2 – section 3,  speaking about the incommensurability thesis. See for example Ben-
Manhaem 2006: 265-266 for a comparison between Wittgenstein and the conventionalist tradition
and the question of the correspondence between grammar and reality.
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symbolic  generalizations  look  like  propositions  concerning situations  that  could  not
have been otherwise (i.e. necessary propositions), but only from within a new scientific
theory.  This  is  still  a  question  about  the  use  of  physical  laws:  they  are  necessary
propositions, but only from the perspective of the “normal scientist”. Again, necessity is
internal to a given system of norms and depends on the adherence to a structure of
“conventions”. But this adherence is related to the nature of normal science and the
situation may change during scientific revolutions. Thus, Kuhn rejects the concept of
truth as correspondence (intended as the aim of science), saying that concepts such as
‘truth’ or ‘proof’ are meaningful only in the context of a shared scientific practice:
The semantic conception of truth is regularly epitomized in the example: ‘Snow is
white’ is  true  if  and  only  if  snow  is  white.  To  apply  that  conception  in  the
comparison of two theories, one must therefore suppose that their proponents agree
about technical equivalents of such matters of fact as whether snow is white. If that
supposition  were  exclusively  about  objective  observation  of  nature,  it  would
present no insuperable problems, but it involves as well the assumption that the
objective  observers  in  question understand ‘snow is  white’ in  the  same  way,  a
matter  which  may not  be  obvious  if  the  sentence  reads  ‘elements  combine  in
constant proportion by weight’. Sir Karl takes it for granted that the proponents of
competing theories do share a neutral language adequate to the comparison of such
observation reports. I am about to argue that they do not. If I am right, then ‘truth’
may,  like  ‘proof’,  be  a  term with  only intra-theoretical  applications.  Until  this
problem of  a  neutral  observation  language  is  resolved,  confusion  will  only be
perpetuated  by those  who  point  out  (as  Watkins  does  when responding  to  my
closely parallel remarks about ‘mistakes’) that the term is regularly used as though
the transfer  from infra-  to  inter-theoretical  contexts  made  no difference.  (Kuhn
2000: 161-162)
The  achievement  of  infra-theoretical  truth  or  proof  (the  reasonable  agreement
between theory and data, according to the current standards accepted by the relevant
scientific  community)  is  relative  to  the  norms  of  representation  provided  by  the
paradigm itself.  The function of Kuhn’s paradigms is not descriptive, but normative:
“when engaged with  a  normal  research  problem,  the  scientist  must  premise current
theory as the rules of his game” (Kuhn 1977: 270). They do not (directly) represent the
world or the facts and cannot be evaluated through their agreement with the facts (in the
sense that they do not mirror the entities that are in the world). Rather, they are norms of
representation which determine a shared (by a scientific community) way of describing
the facts. This normative framework is a precondition which allows scientists to work
on the agreement between paradigm and reality, i.e., to select the relevant core of the
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theory  they  are  working  with  (interpreted  structures  and  detection  properties
methodologically construed); Kuhn calls this work normal science. 
4.2 Methodological necessity
According to Kuhn, scientific laws have a methodological nature. Or, perhaps better,
the methodological nature of scientific laws cannot be easily distinguished from their
metaphysical nature. That is because the distinction between descriptive and normative
propositions cannot be sharply outlined (see the example of the second law of motion).
Therefore  the  metaphysical  role  of  symbolic  generalizations  (providing  a  reliable
representation of the world) and their methodological role (providing a shared structure
for describing the world, directing the “arrow of the falsification” toward the extended
core of the theory, and not toward its basic laws) are closely connected. The normative
structure of scientific theories is useful because it supplies a stable basis for articulating
the work of normal science and the empirical testing of the theory, without questioning
the core. Physical laws play a major role in this process, because they “define” the most
basic terms of the theory and therefore every modification in the theory (to explain new
facts) should take into account the meaning of such terms and preserve the (interpreted)
mathematical core of the theory. As we have seen in Part 1 – sections 2 and 4 – this is an
epistemic or methodological question, since it depends on the parts of the theory that
scientists consider empirical or testable and, as we have seen, this choice may change
with time. But it is a metaphysical question as well, in so far as, referring to scientific
knowledge, the questions about “the world” require methodological standards: from the
viewpoint of scientific knowledge, every metaphysical problem has a methodological
framework. Therefore, the normative nature of scientific laws does not imply a purely
conventionalist perspective, since the empirical success of our theories depends on the
world.  The empirical statements articulated by means of the normative structure are
true-or-false according to the ordinary tools of experience, evidence, logic and so on.
But the normative structure is not directly testable, as far as it is a constitutive condition
for the possibility of such empirical statements. I think that this will suffice to say that
Kuhn’s position is inconsistent with (CSR). This is not a kind of coherentism, since the
facts  play a  fundamental  role  in  the  evaluation  of  scientific  theories;  rather,  it  is  a
perspective which considers physical laws as a normative-constitutive condition for the
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possibility of scientific practice.
4.3 Constitutive rules
Kuhn says that normal scientific practice is possible if and only if the members of
some scientific community share a paradigm. From this viewpoint, it should be clear
that we are not dealing with regulative rules but with constitutive rules. Kuhn has often
repeated  that  the  “constrictive”  nature  of  paradigms  is  not  related  to  explicit  and
mandatory  rules.  Moreover,  paradigms  do  not  require  that  scientists  agree  about  a
common conceptualization or that they share common criteria for the determination of
the  meanings  and  the  referents  of  scientific  terms,  because  the  juxtaposition  of
exemplary cases will  suffice.  On the contrary,  as the expression “synthetic a priori”
suggests, Kuhn accepts the thesis that paradigms are constitutive of their experience
fields.  A shared  paradigm  provides  the  conditions  for  the  possibility  of  scientific
experience and communication.  I  have already argued that grammatical propositions
determine the meaning of their terms. For example, the rule “the chess king moves one
square at a time” is partially constitutive of what the chess king is, since it is essential to
the chess king to move one square at time; it is not a question of agreement with reality
or behavioral regularity. 
Scientific laws are constitutive of concrete scientific practice just like the rules of
chess are constitutive of playing chess: both are norms of representation and describe
the language-dependent essence of their  respective fields;  they create constraints for
experience and exclude possibilities. This interpretation fits well with Kuhn’s analysis
of  scientific  discovery.  Analyzing  the  difficulties  related  to  this  notion  (from  the
metaphysical realist viewpoint), Kuhn discusses the role played by Dalton’s work in the
development of chemistry. After summarizing the problems relative to the agreement
between “theory” and “facts”, Kuhn concludes that from Dalton’s law (atoms can only
combine one-to-one or in some other simple whole number ratio) we can infer that:
[It did] enable him to determine the sizes and weights of elementary particles, but it
also made the law of constant proportion a tautology. For Dalton, any reaction in
which the ingredients did not enter in fixed proportion was ipso facto not a purely
chemical process. A law that experiment could not have established before Dalton's
work, became, once that work was accepted, a constitutive principle that no single
set of chemical measurements could have upset. (Kuhn 1970: 133)
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The law of definite proportions is not merely a true statement about the facts: it is a
constraint,  which  determines  what  can  be  considered  a  meaningful  proposition  in
chemistry; it fixes the boundaries of its own field. For Kuhn, this law is not the result of
empirical generalizations, since scientists could not accept it on the evidence, because
much of that was still  negative. Rather, scientifically significant experience can take
place  only in  virtue  of  the  framework of  the  paradigm.  Obviously,  the  experience-
determination  exercised  by  paradigms  does  not  have  to  be  interpreted  from  a
constructivist perspective, but, as I have said in Part 1 – section 1, from a Kantian one.
Paradigms are conditions for the possibility of experience, but they do not determine
actual experience. Now, according to the Wittgensteinian model that I have outlined, we
can  say  that  the  constructivist  interpretation  of  Kuhn  depends  on  the  mistaken
identification  of  the  essence  of  grammar  with  the  essence  of  reality:  the  former  is
language-dependent, the latter is “really there”.
5. What kind of rules? Regulism and regularism
In the  previous  sections  I  have  argued that,  according to  Kuhn,  the  necessity  of
scientific laws does not depend on their agreement with the essential structure of the
world, but, rather, on their normative use in scientific practice. Symbolic generalizations
are oriented on the one hand to the experimental work of scientific communities and, on
the  other  hand,  to  the  facts.  Scientists  can  improve  the  correspondence  between
paradigm and data (i.e., practice normal science) only in so far as they share a paradigm.
The  necessity  of  symbolic  generalizations  is  not  world-dependent,  but  language-
dependent. 
However, a questions arises about this interpretation and I will face it in this last
section.  I  have  already  outlined  that,  according  to  Kuhn,  the  normative  view  on
scientific laws does not imply the explicit formulation of compulsory rules; and, at the
same  time,  he  says  that  symbolic  generalization  should  be  connected  to  concrete
applications to be meaningful. The question is about how to interpret a rule. 
In his discussion about normativity, Wittgenstein rejects two traditional conceptions
of rules: a) “regulism” and b) “regularism" (Brandom 1994: 18-30). Regulism states that
norms should be considered explicit rules or principles. Against this claim, Wittgenstein
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affirms  that  the  application  of  a  rule  is  not  univocally  determined  by  its  explicit
formulation:  a  rule  can  be  satisfied  by  very  different  ranges  of  applications
(Wittgenstein 1958: 80). Kuhn faces this problem too. We have seen that he rejects the
claim  that  scientific  practice  is  based  on  explicit  rules  and  shared  interpretations.
Moreover, he notes that the problem of the application of symbolic generalizations is an
everyday problem in scientific training: physics students usually face it when they try to
solve  the  end-of-chapter  exercises  of  their  textbooks.  Sometimes  abstract  symbolic
generalization are very difficult to apply. 
As we have seen in Part 1, Kuhn’s answer to this problem is that physics students are
not  introduced  to  symbolic  generalization  in  abstract  terms,  but  through  exemplary
problem solutions: a paradigm includes both a theory and some exemplary applications.
Exemplars are the basis of scientific practice and they are more universal than symbolic
generalizations,  since  all  physics  students  start  learning  by  problems  such  as  the
inclined plane, the conical pendulum and Keplerian orbits; or with instruments such as
the vernier, the calorimeter, and the Wheatstone bridge; furthermore, they are also prior
to, more binding, and more complete than any set of rules abstracted from them. Thanks
to  exemplary  solutions,  physics  students  learn  to  recognize  similarities  between
different problem situations and to use symbolic generalizations as law-sketches or law-
schemes.
Just like Wittgenstein, Kuhn does not resolve this problem, but, rather, he deflates it:
normativity does not have any effective foundation. A grammar regulates the practice of
a community, but the “foundation” of the grammar depends on nothing but the concrete
practice itself (see Wittgenstein 1958: 85); the conditions for the possibility of scientific
practice are immanent to such a practice. And, for Kuhn, concrete scientific practice
consists in the shared exemplary problem solutions. So that the relationship between
symbolic generalizations and exemplars is circular:
The pendulum, the inclined plane, and the rest are examples of  f = ma, and it is
being examples of f = ma that makes them similar, like each other. Without having
been exposed to them or some equivalents as examples of f = ma, students could
not learn to see either the similarities between them or what it was to be a force or a
mass; they could not, that is, acquire the concepts of force and mass or the meaning
of the terms that name them. Kuhn (2000: 247-248) 
The necessity-normativity of the relation between law and application enables us to
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overtake the difficulties linked to the alleged arbitrariness of the universal laws. But
how can we break the circle of rules and applications? I will sketch an answer to this
question  referring  to  the  second  conception  of  rules  criticized  by  Wittgenstein:
regularism. This interpretation of norms considers rules to be behavioral regularities.
Wittgenstein says that this kind of regularity cannot determine rules, since grammatical
rules  govern  our  activities  in  a  substantial  way  and  not  by  means  of  accidental
regularities.  The  question  is  very complex  and  here  I  cannot  analyze  it  as  regards
Wittgenstein29; I will sketch a brief solution for Kuhn’s problem, that I will develop in
the next section.
According to Kuhn, the foundation of the normative structure of scientific practice
ultimately depends on the training process. The normativity of scientific rules is not a
mere  behavioral  regularity  since  it  rests  on  the  institutionalized  (i.e.  also  social)
authority  of  scientific  instructors  and  scientific  textbooks:  “science  students  accept
theories on the authority of teacher and text, not because of evidence. What alternatives
have they, or what competence? The applications given in texts are not there as evidence
but  because  learning  them is  part  of  learning  the  paradigm at  the  base  of  current
practice” (Kuhn 1970: 80). Of course this is not a metaphysical or causal foundation,
but a pragmatic one. If this insight is right, it will be possible to save Kuhn’s comments
on the role of persuasion and pedagogy in science from a non-relativistic standpoint.
6. Conclusions
Finally,  in  this  chapter  I  have  discussed  the  relation  between  (TA)  and  (TN)  in
Kuhn’s conception of scientific laws. I have argued that the arbitrariness of scientific
laws is consistent with their necessity in so far as we interpret necessity from an infra-
theoretical and normative viewpoint, that I have analyzed by means of the comparison
between Kuhn’s paradigm and Wittgenstein’s grammar. My thesis is that, according to
Kuhn, scientific laws are necessary within a given tradition of scientific research since
they constitute the normative and methodological structure which enables scientists to
practice  normal  science,  i.e.,  to  solve  puzzles  without  questioning  the  basic
mathematical structure of the theory. Therefore, such a structure is a methodological
condition for the possibility of scientific experience in a given field. In this way, Kuhn's
29 See Williams 1999. I think that this exposition is applicable to Kuhn as well. 
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perspective can account from a methodological and epistemic perspective for the fact
that scientific communities are committed only to some parts of scientific theories (that
constitute the normative backbone of scientific practice). This position is not a kind of
(CSR) because the truth-values of the empirical propositions depend on the world, but it
is meaningless to ask for the truth-value of the mathematical structure, because it is a
normative precondition for the possibility of truth-value attributions. This is problematic
especially because it seems to entail that scientific theories are not true-or-false, literally
speaking. It seems plausible that abstract mathematical structures cannot correspond to
the world (even though this is what is claimed by some contemporary realist theories),
but the very concept of exemplary solution (and interpreted structure) seems to provide
a semantic connection between theories and reality that can justify a correspondence
theory. I will deal with this question in Part 2 – sections 3-4 and Part 3. But now, I have
to conclude my argument about normativity and exemplary applications.
Section 2: Dogmatism, learning and scientific practice
1. Introduction
I have concluded the last chapter sketching a solution about the normative origin of
the concept of physical law as rule; according to Kuhn, this is due to the role played by
exemplary  solutions  and  applications  during  the  training  experienced  by  physics
students. In this chapter I will analyze in depth this point, focusing on paradigms as
applications  and  the  use  of  exemplary  cases  and  scientific  textbooks  for  scientific
training and learning. At the same time, I  will  investigate the concept of “scientific
dogmatism”,  which  is  one  of  the  most  discussed  topics  of  Kuhn's  works.  In  fact,
philosophers of science have discussed the dichotomy between criticism and dogmatism
in scientific practice since the sixties. The core of the topic concerns the necessity to
preserve the stability of science against “permanent (scientific) revolution” whilst at the
same  time,  acknowledging  the  essential  function  played  by  doubt  and  criticism in
scientific progress. Philosophers such as Kuhn stress the constitutive role of “normal
science” in scientific practice, and affirm that criticism and doubt are appropriate only
in exceptional circumstances, that he calls “crises”, the prelude of revolutions. Popper
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and the Popperians reply that the development of science consists in the falsification of
attested  theories  and  that  the  suspension  of  doubt  has  negative  consequences  for
science.  The  “Popper-Kuhn  controversy”  is  recorded  in  (Lakatos,  Musgrave  1970),
where Kuhn says,  for example,  that  “Sir  Karl  has characterized the entire scientific
enterprise in terms that apply only to its occasional revolutionary parts” (Kuhn 1977: 6).
Popper replies that, although normal science is a real phenomenon, it is also “a danger
to science and, indeed to our civilization” (Popper 1970: 53).
As we can see, the question deals with the social structure of science, and the nature
of disagreement within scientific communities. Within what limits can scientists doubt
the methods and results of their activities? It is trivial to say that a state of permanent
doubt  is  dangerous  for  science,  since  it  causes  uncertainty,  which  can  turn  into
skepticism and undermine the trust in scientific institutions (both among the experts and
in  the  public  debate  about  science).  On  the  contrary,  it  is  important  for  scientific
communities  to  defend  the  stability  of  knowledge  against  pathological  doubt  and
skepticism, and I think Popper would have agreed on this point. However, at the same
time, we must acknowledge that the critical discussion of well-confirmed theories is an
indispensable tool for the development of science. Therefore, it is useful to propose a
model that distinguishes between useful doubt and pathological doubt about scientific
practice.        
I do not want to stir up the controversy on scientific dogmatism again, even though I
think it is less radical than it seems to be30. Nevertheless, many philosophers (including
Popper) tend to discuss dogmatism as if it were a psychological or ethical attitude of the
individual scientist, whereas I will approach the question from a different viewpoint. At
first, I will investigate the Wittgensteinian heritage of Kuhn’s concept of dogmatism, in
order to clarify its function in scientific practice; and then it should be clear that both
normal  science  and  doubt  are  useful  only  from the  social  perspective  of  scientific
communities and especially from the analysis of the social nature of scientific training.
Secondly,  I  will  argue  that  this  social  dogmatism  accounts  for  the  rejection  of
meaningless  doubts,  which  might  harm  knowledge,  and  justify  the  importance  of
criticism  for  scientific  progress  by  allowing  us  to  understand  doubt  from a  social
standpoint. 
I  use  a  definition  of  dogmatism different  to  the common sense one  and make a
30 For a recent reconstruction of the debate between Popper and Kuhn see Worrall 2003.
108
distinction between ordinary dogmatism and social dogmatism (the concept I want to
endorse),  which  reflects  the  distinction  between  ordinary  skepticism and  organized
skepticism. By organized skepticism, the sociologists of science mean that scientific
theories  should  be  tested  and  challenged  by  scientific  communities.  Organized
skepticism, regulated by the norms of scientific method, responds to the precise demand
for critical examination of knowledge: it is institutionalized skepticism (it is meaningful
only from the social viewpoint of the relevant scientific community and depends on
peer  judgment),  which  disqualifies  indiscriminate  attacks  on accepted  theories.  This
distinction  opposes  the  justified  institutional  skepticism  to  the  personal  skeptical
attitude. My idea of social dogmatism is similar to this distinction. Ordinary dogmatism
is the overconfident assertion of opinions and beliefs by an individual, regardless of
contrary evidence and argument. On the contrary, by social dogmatism (from now on
“dogmatism”),  I  mean blind  (uncritical)  adherence  of  a  community to  the  “formal”
system of norms and conventions, which constitutes its practice. It has nothing to do
with the personal beliefs and opinions of individual scientists; rather, it deals with the
self-regulation of human practices (in this case, scientific practice), since it self-imposes
the standards of correctness of such practices and, in turn, the methodological criteria of
organized skepticism. In the following sections, I will describe such a systems of norm,
the respective adherence and its foundation.
   
2. Paradigms and their normative structure
 
In the last chapter (as in Part 1 – section 1), I have analyzed the normative structure
of Kuhn's paradigms and I have introduced the concept of exemplary solution. Now, to
apply this concept to scientific training and dogmatism, I shall recall the most important
concepts  relevant  to  this  problem.  Since  paradigms  are  the  objects  of  scientific
dogmatism, we should clarify them in order to understand dogmatism in the right way.
Thus,  recall  the  relation  between physical  laws  and applications.  As  we have  seen,
symbolic  generalizations  are  universal  statements,  expressed  in  formal  language  or
which can be easily formalized and used by the members of scientific communities
without question or dissent. We can compare this element with the hard-core of Lakatos’
scientific  research  programs.  We  consider  them  natural  laws  or  the  fundamental
equation of the paradigm, such as f = ma o I = V/R, although we can express some of
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them in ordinary language (for example the first and third laws of Newton’s dynamics).
These generalizations allow scientists to deal with scientific theories as mathematical
constructions,  so  they  justify  the  application  of  logical  manipulations.  However,
symbolic generalizations do not specify how we should apply them to nature. In fact, we
express the relationship between paradigm and nature by the most appropriated meaning
of the term paradigm: exemplary case solution. As they represent the concrete part of
scientific practice, exemplary problem solutions are the elements that deeply determine
the  social  nature  of  scientific  practice,  and the  peculiar  agreement  within  scientific
communities.  For  Kuhn,  basically  the  empirical  content  of  scientific  theories  is
localized in exemplary cases. 
While  abstract  laws  have  no  meaning,  the  connection  between  symbolic
generalization  and  exemplary  cases  constitutes  the  normative  structure  of  scientific
practice. If we take for granted Kuhn’s rejection of the correspondence theory of truth
(on which I will focus in the next parts) and the comparison between Kuhn’s paradigm
and Wittgenstein’s grammars (that I have presented in the last chapter), it follows that
paradigms are not descriptive, but normative. They do not represent the world or the
facts and we cannot evaluate them through their agreement with them; rather, they are
norms of representation, which determine a shared way of describing reality. As I have
pointed out in the last chapter, a paradigm establishes the limits of meaningful scientific
discourse,  creates  constraints  for  experience,  and  excludes  possibilities.  Kuhn’s
dogmatism consists  in  the  “blind  obedience”  of  scientists  to  the  norms  dictated  by
paradigms. In the following sections, I will analyze the features of this obedience.
3. Normativity, contextuality, learning 
It is important to stress again that the normative power of paradigms is linked to
exemplary case solutions, while we can interpret symbolic generalizations in different
ways.  The  relationship  between  physical  laws  and  exemplary  cases  is  circular.
Exemplary cases are applications of universal laws, but universal laws are empirically
meaningful only if connected to exemplary cases.
The pendulum, the inclined plane, and the rest are examples of f = ma, and it is
being examples of f = ma that makes them similar, like each other. Without having
been exposed to them or some equivalents as examples of f = ma, students could
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not learn to see either the similarities between them or what it was to be a force or a
mass; they could not, that is, acquire the concepts of force and mass or the meaning
of the terms that name them (Kuhn 2000: 247-248).
Kuhn refers to the difficulties that physics students have to face when they try to
solve the end-of-chapter exercises in their textbooks, and says that universal laws apply
to scientific practice because students do not learn symbolic generalization in abstract
terms,  but  by  means  of  exemplary  problem  solutions.  Referring  to  the  training
experienced  by physics  students,  Kuhn  tries  to  break  the  circle  between  laws  and
applications: the foundation of the normativity of paradigms is pragmatic, since it rests
in scientific practice itself; it links knowledge to practice and action. 
This is another common point between Kuhn and Wittgenstein. They both adopt a
pragmatic approach and deflate the problem of the justification of norms saying that
normativity has no metaphysical foundation. A grammar, or a paradigm, regulates the
practice  of  a  community,  but  the  grammar  has  no  foundation  beyond  its  practice.
According  to  Kuhn,  concrete  scientific  practice  is  illustrated  by  exemplary  case
solutions. Kuhn enumerates some of them and affirms that almost all scientists start
their education this way (for example with the inclined plane, the conical pendulum and
Keplerian orbits).  Thanks to  these  exemplary cases  and to  others  that  students  face
during training, they learn how to apply symbolic generalizations in new situations and
problematic contexts using analogies with similar cases (as we have seen in Part 1).
Therefore,  the first  feature of scientific dogmatism is  its  contextual nature.  Since
symbolic generalizations are in themselves meaningless, their normative force is not
independent  of  the  actual  practices  of  a  scientific  community.  On the  contrary,  the
meaning of scientific laws is contextually determined if we understand it on the horizon
of  a  practice:  rules  acquire  their  normative  content  only  if  connected  to  particular
practices  of  application  (see  Medina  2002:  141-194  with  reference  to  Wittgenstein
contextualism).  This  idea  fits  well  with  Kuhn’s  interpretation  of  the  second  law of
motion as synthetic a priori: roughly, we can interpret the empirical content of Newton’s
law in different ways according to the role we want the law to play in scientific practice
and to which terms we prefer to define empirically. Dogmatism makes possible such
form of contextualism, which implies that the ability to apply symbolic generalizations
presumes  a  practical  context,  the  consensus  of  the  scientific  community.  This  is  a
consensus of action, which is possible only thanks to training, since it is what we need if
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we want to understand a scientific (or linguistic) practice.     
The  second  feature  of  scientific  dogmatism  is  that  it  is  a  social  phenomenon
grounded in the relationship of confidence between student and teacher, which allows
the  student  to  join  a  scientific  community.  For  both  Kuhn  and  Wittgenstein,  the
agreement in action depends on the training process that we experience to understand
and apply norms.  They both refer  to  the pragmatist  tradition,  which focuses on the
concepts of technique and skill to understand human practices and the structure and
acquisition of concepts (see for example Brandom 1994: 362 and ff). As we have seen
since  the  beginning  of  this  chapter,  scientists  use  symbolic  generalizations  without
question or dissent and employ them without allowing for alternatives. This attitude is
the  result  of  the  training  they receive,  which,  according  to  Kuhn,  is  as  rigid  as  in
orthodox theology (Kuhn 1970: 166). After all, the students can only accept what the
teacher and textbook present as the truth: students do not accept theories because of
evidence,  but  basing  on  the  authority  of  teacher  and  text.  Scientific  training  is
authoritarian and cannot be otherwise since students lack the competence to evaluate
and criticize what they learn. Consequently, the receptive attitude of the student (the
blind acceptance of the authority of the teacher) is a prerequisite of the training. The
process is successful if we accept the paradigm as the way we ought to do things. As
will become clear, the paradigm itself partially dictates the results of an experiment and
consequently, if an experiment goes wrong, this discredits only the scientist,  not the
theory. 
Finally, as the third preliminary feature of scientific dogmatism, I shall stress once
again its connection to the social conception of science, i.e., the idea that the subjects of
science are and must be scientific communities and not isolated scientists. For Kuhn,
history and sociology of science are not variables which influence science from outside;
rather science is  essentially a social  and historical enterprise.  This feature is  strictly
related  to  the  second  one,  since  learning  is  necessarily  social.  In  his  comparison
between scientific and linguistic training, Kuhn himself affirms that the acquisition of a
(scientific) language is part of the socialization process by which we make the scientist
(or the child) part of the community and its world. Referring to the social nature of
paradigms and dogmatism, Kuhn quotes Wittgenstein again, and specifically refers to
his rejection of the idea of “private language”: the idea of scientific theories as a private
product is problematic as well as the notion of private language; in fact, both knowledge
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and language are impossible when conceived as something that someone can possess
and  exercise  alone  (Kuhn  1977:  148).  Clearly,  scientists  compose  scientific
communities,  but  a  scientist  is  only  really  a  scientist  as  a  fellow  of  his  scientific
community. The idea is that the public nature of the relevant paradigm pre-exists to the
subjectivity  of  scientists  and  founds  it.  Moreover  the  social  nature  of  science  is
emphasized  also  by  the  comparison  between  scientific  communities  and  biological
species. If scientific progress can be compared with Darwinian evolution, then the main
characters  of  scientific  progress  are  not  individual  scientists,  but  rather  scientific
communities (Kuhn develops this idea in his Kuhn 2000: 90-104).
Thus,  in this section I have explained how scientific dogmatism is  related to the
structure  of  scientific  theories  and  their  components.  My  first  conclusion  is  that
scientists’  dogmatic  attitude  towards  the  theories  they  work  with  consists  in  the
acceptance of a social practice regulated by a paradigm. Thus, we should explain such
an agreement within scientific communities by means of the constitutive role played by
scientific training. In the following section, I focus on this pedagogical foundation of
dogmatism.
4. The foundational role of scientific training
In the  last  section,  I  have  said that  the  extraordinary agreement  within scientific
communities depends on the common scientific training that scientists  experience as
students. Kuhn provides an original interpretation of the relationship between scientific
training  and  scientific  practice  (Warwick,  Kaiser  2005)31.  First  he  notes  that  the
normative power of paradigms does not rest upon explicit, coercive and inviolable rules:
sometimes we can abstract explicit rules by scientific practice, but normal science does
not necessarily require an interpretation and rationalization of paradigms. Kuhn refers to
Polanyi’s tacit knowledge and Wittgenstein’s family resemblance and I have focused on
the latter. In fact, I have just said that, according to Kuhn, the practice of normal science
involves the mastery of similarity relationships, which allow the scientist to apply the
paradigm-model  in  new  problem  situations.  Those  similarities  and  regularities  in
application (often not expressed in  explicit  propositional  form) provide the space to
practice normal science, a space in which the actions and reactions of scientists agree.
31 For other discussions of Kuhn’s pedagogy of science see Andersen 2000b and Barnes 1982: 16-40. 
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The training process entails that the teacher shapes the student’s reactions, creating a
common  ground  of  agreement  that  we  never  question  except  in  non-normal
circumstances. The acquisition of concepts (as networks of similarities) is normative
since the mastery of correct applications (which requires a “must”) is constitutive of the
concept itself. 
Kuhn’s most extended discussion of these matters is from everyday experience of
language learning. Recall that he considers a child, Johnny, who learns to distinguish
different  kinds  of  birds  (ducks,  geese,  and swans)  under  the guidance of  his  father,
during a walk. The father (who plays the role of the authority and supervisor of the
correct usage in his community) uses ostension, and names the birds at which he points.
When the child tries to do the same and identify the birds, the father validates or rejects
the identification. Thanks to the guidance of his father, and after a certain number of
correct  identifications,  we can say that  Johnny is  competent  in  the identification of
birds, ducks, geese, and swans, and that his instruction is successful. After the training,
Johnny applies these labels to nature, but he does not use anything like definitions or
correspondence  rules;  the  child  simply  employs  perception  of  similarities  and
differences. Kuhn’s theory of the elaboration and acquisition of concepts is pragmatic,
which means that the mastery of an empirical concept entails the correct use of the
concept within the appropriate linguistic community (Hoyningen-Huene 1993: 110).  
Therefore,  we  can  constitute  the  conceptual  structure  that  scientists  share  by
similarity-difference  classes  associated  to  respective  concepts  without  explicit
definitions and without necessary and sufficient conditions of identification. They are
family resemblances, and any scientist can legitimately use different criteria to identify
a class. In order to share a language, the members of a scientific community need not
share  definitions  or  criteria  of  identification  and  application.  What  commensurable
languages must preserve is only the structure of similarities and differences, which, as
we  have  seen  in  Part  1  (especially  section  4),  Kuhn  calls  “taxonomic  or  lexical
structure”. Scientific training allows scientists to enter a scientific community whose
practice is regulated by norms implicit in the lexical structure they acquire as students,
and  which  “mirrors”  aspects  of  the  world  it  describes  (and  limits  the  phenomena
described by the same lexicon). I have faced this point in Part 1 – section 1 – so I will
not tell you anymore about that. Anyway, this observation leads to a second feature of
scientific training that relates to the role played by exemplary problem solutions in the
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acquisition of the paradigm.
In fact, together with the absence of explicit rules, there is a second important aspect
of  the  relationship  between  scientific  training  and  scientific  practice.  Kuhn  draws
attention  to  the  difficulties  faced  by  physics  students  to  apply  the  physical  laws
presented in their textbooks (whose meaning they believed they had grasped perfectly)
to solve the relative end-of-chapter exercises. Grasping the meaning of physical laws
requires not only reflection on the structure of the laws themselves, but also the use of
canonical  exemplary  solutions,  which  the  scientific  community  considers
“paradigmatic”.  A consequence  of  this  is  that  we  should  reverse  the  relationship
between  exercises  and  laws.  The  normativity  of  paradigms  lies  in  their  exemplary
nature.  Therefore  we  do  not  use  examples  just  to  illustrate  whether  the  student
understands the lesson and the meaning of the terms that recur in physical laws; rather,
examples  generate  the meaning of  the same laws.  Understanding is  not  a  matter  of
adequate  mental  representations,  it  is  the  ability  to  use  pre-existing  solutions  and
examples  to  find  a  solution  to  new  problems  by  means  of  new  applications  and
articulations of the old terms. We do not define Newtonian concepts such as “force” or
“mass” by the laws of motion, but by the experimental situation associated with such
laws (for example the inclined plane).   
A consequence of this approach is that learning by means of examples is important
not  only  to  create  common  patterns  of  perception  and  action  within  scientific
communities,  but  also  to  institute  the  connection  between  scientific  language  and
reality. Training can (pragmatically) “found” normal science because it teaches students
how to do things with language; once again, as I have pointed out in Part 1 – sections 3-
4 – Kuhn follows Wittgenstein and emphasizes that the meaning of scientific  terms
consists in their use in scientific practice. We use to learn the words that constitute a
lexical  structure  in  use,  which  implies  that  we acquire  knowledge  of  language  and
knowledge of the world together. Basically, just like in language games where there are
inextricably linked linguistic and non-linguistic features, scientific training in paradigms
is a nature-language learning, in relation to which, Kuhn explicitly speaks of learning
language and nature together (as in the analysis of the metaphor of the coinage with two
faces that I have analyzed in Part 1 – section 1). 
In the next parts I am going to analyze two features of scientific training (ostension
and the use of textbooks); but, actually, let my summarize the role of learning in the
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light of what I have said right now. This summary is based on (Williams 1999: 214-215)
about Wittgenstein’s language learning theory:
• Scientific  training  allows  physics  students  to  adhere  to  a  social  practice,
characterized  by a  set  of  normative  regularities,  although we do not  express
these regularities by explicit and coercive norms.
• Training requires  a  context  whose  background consents  to  the  norms of  the
paradigm to  be  meaningful.  The  qualified  teacher  (the  representative  of  the
authority  of  the  relevant  scientific  community)  provides  this  context:  he
approves or invalidates the behavior of the students.
• Just like every normative practice (a practice which asks for norms, standards,
rules), scientific practice is necessarily social. We cannot consider a solitary man
who does not follow a paradigm a scientist, or, as Kuhn says, the results of his
activity are something less than science. 
• The  use  of  scientific  concepts  presupposes  the  mastery  of  their  relative
techniques and skills, but we cannot formalize such techniques and skills in a set
of propositional norms, definitions, and rules of correspondence. The ultimate
foundation of paradigms is pragmatic; it rests on scientific practice itself.
• The  general  agreement  pertaining  to  scientific  communities  (the  fact  that
scientists  do  not  usually  question  the  basic  elements  of  their  discipline)
originates  from  their  adherence  to  the  common  patterns  of  behavior  and
perception  acquired during training.  Scientific  dogmatism is  grounded in the
grammatical structure of paradigms.
4.1 Ostension and ostensive learning
There  is  no  doubt  that  ostension  and  pointing  to  concrete  objects  and  problem
situations  is  an  important  part  of  scientific  training.  Both  Kuhn  and  Wittgenstein
emphasize  the  role  of  ostension  in  the  acquisition  of  a  new  (scientific)  language;
however, this idea requires clarification. Kuhn says that the exposition to examples of
ostension is indispensable to understanding some scientific terms by direct application.
It is part of the previously outlined process of contemporary acquisition of knowledge
of language and nature. The objects involved in ostensive learning are not language-
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independent: just because we capture them by scientific practice, they have become, in
Wittgenstein’s words, “part of the symbolism” or “samples”. In other words, this means
that the objects of ostensive learning begin playing a normative role to fix the meaning
of some terms in their  respective language games.  Clearly,  this  does not imply that
ostension can fix the meaning of a word or generate a standard for future applications,
or that ostensive definitions are adequate descriptions of the meaning of scientific terms.
For  Wittgenstein,  ostensive  teaching  (Wittgenstein  1958:  4-5)  plays  the  function  of
ostensive definition. That is to say, the part of the training connected to the practice and
context in which we embody the expression, helps the student to understand the use of a
word and to establish a connection between language and things32. 
Kuhn also acknowledges that ostensive definitions are not enough to fix the meaning
of the words and distinguishes between “ostension” and “ostensive”. The former implies
that we need nothing but the exhibit of a word's referent to define it; the latter that some
exhibit is required during the learning process, but that this is not sufficient to learn and
define the relevant words (Kuhn 2000: 13). Kuhn’s emphasis on ostension depends on
his concept of learning through examples. He wants to reaffirm that we do not learn
scientific  language regardless  of  the  concrete  use,  and that  ostensive  learning is  an
important part, although only a part, of scientific training. While the use of everyday
words such as “swan”, “duck” and “goose” can be misleading and induce the idea that
the meaning of these terms is  established by means of the ostensive act,  the use of
scientific  terms  immediately  clarifies  the  question.  As  I  have  said  referring  to  the
meaning of  scientific  terms (see  Part  1  – sections  3-4),  Kuhn provides  us  with the
example  of  the  needle  of  a  galvanometer;  we can  point  to  it  by affirming that  the
specific cause of its deflection is, for instance, “electric charge”, but this provides us
with the relevant information to apply “electric charge” only in this situation. While it
does not specify how to apply it to other sorts of events to which “electric charge” can
or may refer unambiguously, for example a thunderstorm.
Finally, referring to complex scientific terms, such as “electric charge”, it is evident
that Kuhn does not support the existence of ostensive definitions, but rather wants to
stress the role of ostensive learning in the determination of the network of similarities
and differences which constitutes the structure of scientific lexicon.
32 For a distinction between ostensive definition and ostensive teaching see Williams 1999: 21. 
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4.2 The authority of scientific textbooks
In parallel with the relationship between teacher and students, Kuhn often notices
that scientific textbooks represent the social authority of scientific communities in the
training process. From the first page of The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, he says
that  the  most  common  image  of  science  derives  from  textbooks  and  from  their
pedagogical  and  persuasive  power (Kuhn  1970:  1).  Just  as  in  ostensive  learning,
scientific textbooks constitute evidence for the authoritative nature of the training, since
readers of scientific textbooks endorse the theories there presented on the authority of
the author, as a member of the relevant scientific community, not because they have
experimentally tested such theories.  The experimental  evidence presented in  science
texts almost has a pedagogical function, that is to say, they are exemplary solutions that
enable an adequate understanding of the physical laws and their practical application.
He refers to them as parts of a “context of pedagogy”, different to both the context of
discovery and the context of justification. 
 The  context  of  pedagogy  represented  by  science  texts  corresponds  to  the  anti-
historical and dogmatic attitude that Kuhn sees in scientific training. He points out that
the most singular feature of scientific training is that we introduce science students to
their respective discipline only through textbooks, while other students are encouraged
to read the classics  in  their  fields.  In contrast  to  other  disciplines,  the difference in
alternative textbooks is mainly for technical and pedagogical details, but all display the
same  approach  to  their  problem-fields.  This  is  because,  in  order  to  develop  its
characteristic dogmatism, scientific pedagogy voluntarily refuses a historical approach
to its matter, for example the historical approach that characterizes disciplines such as
philosophy or arts: obviously, this is not intended as a criticism of scientific learning:
science  would  probably  not  be  possible  without  such  ideas.  The  question  is  to
distinguish between the context of pedagogy and the history of science (and the contexts
of discovery and justification) 33. 
33 Auguste Comte had already noticed that the chronological order of scientific discoveries does not
coincide with the actual organization of knowledge. Communicating and teaching the achievements
of science require a certain reconstruction which produces a new order of the arguments and their
mutual relationship (“the dogmatic order”) different from the orders of discovery and justification
(“the  historical  order”).  Moreover  on  this  matter,  Gaston  Bachelard  has  emphasized  the  role  of
textbooks for scientific pedagogy and focused especially on their normative and social function. For a
comparison between Comte, Bachelard and Kuhn on scientific pedagogy and textbooks see García-
Belmar, Bertomeu-Sánchez, Bensaude-Vincent 2005: 219-222. Additionally,  Ludwik Fleck studied
the authoritative and dogmatic nature of scientific learning and related it  to the use of textbooks,
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The reference to the typical  organization of scientific  knowledge in  science texts
according to the order of pedagogy highlights another aspect of scientific dogmatism:
textbooks represent the product of the institutionalized scientific practice, i.e. a social
self-authenticating practice that “justifies” the normativity of paradigms. I have already
discussed the concept of self-autentication and normativity referring to paradigms in the
last chapter. Now the main point is the institutional structure of science, that is to say its
social organization through training, textbooks, scientific communities and so on: it is a
precondition for the organization of meaningful scientific discourse. This is the nature
of the paradigm, it creates and constrains the possibility of scientific practice. What is
important for dogmatism is not the acceptance of particular beliefs, but the adherence to
the “formal” normative structure of the paradigm. We can only consider what we learn
in  certain  ways  and  from  certain  books  approved  by  scientific  communities  to  be
scientific knowledge.       
5. Dogmatism: a new place for doubt and critique
So, in the end, dogmatism is not the scientists’ psychological and ethical attitude
towards the theories  they work on, or the unjustified conviction in  certain specified
beliefs. It might be this way only if the paradigm were a conceptual scheme or a system
of propositions we believe to be true, but I have argued that paradigms have nothing to
do  with  the  personal  beliefs  of  scientists.  On  the  contrary,  paradigms  have  no
descriptive  nature,  but  rather  a  normative  one:  they  are  networks  of  rules  for  the
production and organization of scientific knowledge. Dogmatism does not refer to a
system of beliefs, but to a system of norms, not to the specific content of knowledge but
to  the  way  scientific  communities  authenticate,  organize,  and  transmit  scientific
knowledge. Although the way we organize knowledge inevitably influences the possible
content of such knowledge (and so a distinction between formal and material aspects of
knowledge is not satisfactory), paradigms are the formal matrix of our knowledge or a
matrix for the construction of knowledge.
This  is  clear  from  referring  to  the  interpretation  of  scientific  changes.  Let  me
concede for a moment, for the sake of the argument, the hypothesis that dogmatism is a
psychological attitude of the individual scientist (or, as Popper says, a dangerous lack of
intended as the main instrument of that “indoctrination” (See Cederbaum 1983: 195-196).          
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critical  approach).  This  hypothesis  does  not  explain  correctly,  for  example,  the
distinction between normal and revolutionary change in the history of science. In fact,
one  should  not  take  the  difference  between  normal  and  revolutionary  science  too
literally and think that the characteristics of the former are completely opposite to the
ones of the latter34. Normal science is not a totally crystallized practice and it allows
transformations and adjustments, which are sometimes substantial (see Part 1 – section
4). According to the psychological-ethical-individualist interpretation of dogmatism (the
scientist irrationally clings to his ideas and beliefs), we can interpret every change as
revolutionary,  since  it  requires  a  suspension of  the  dogmatic  attitude.  Kuhn tries  to
elaborate a more complex theory of revolutionary change by means of the distinction
between the empirical features of scientific theories (the paradigm broadly speaking, as
system of beliefs) and the normative features (the paradigm strictly speaking, as system
of  norms).  A revolutionary  change  involves  the  normative  backbone  of  scientific
practice in depth, it is a substitution for the rules of the game.
From the outset, we can see that the role of scientific dogmatism is linked to the idea
that  some  sections  of  scientific  theories  (synthetic  a  priori,  detection  properties  or
concrete  structures)  behave  as  constitutive  (and  at  least  partially  implicit)  rules  of
scientific practice. These rules allow scientists to produce empirical propositions, open
to criticism, doubt and empirical falsification, whereas, dogmatism deals with the blind
adherence  to  the  rules  of  scientific  practice.  Of  course,  as  I  have  already said,  the
distinction  between  empirical  and  normative  propositions  is  not  so  sharp:  it  is  not
grounded in the empirical reality. Just like Wittgenstein, Kuhn does not distinguish two
different kinds of proposition, but two different uses. The same proposition can be in
certain circumstances an empirical proposition that we can test by experience and, in
other circumstances, a normative proposition that we use as rule of testing; but it cannot
be at the same time an empirical and normative proposition
Therefore,  I  do  not  intend  the  agreement  within  scientific  communities  to  be
conventionalist or relativist. It does not mean that what is true (or false) is the result of
the conventional decision of the specialists and from that moment forward, we consider
the result of such decisions unquestionable; just like in Wittgenstein’s famous statement,
that is “not an agreement in opinion, but in forms of life”35 (Wittgenstein 1958: 88) or “a
34 Kuhn admits that, in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, he had overly emphasized the normal-
revolutionary science distinction and that if he were rewriting his book he would focus less on such a
distinction (Kuhn 2000: 57).
35 In order to avoid the conventionalist problems related to the word “agreement”, Cavell proposes to
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consensus of action” (Wittgenstein 1976: 183-184). This is a plausible interpretation as
far as this reference to the agreement in action as an agreement in forms of life explains
also a passage of The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, which could be misunderstood.
Kuhn  writes  that  the  choice  between  competing  paradigms  concerns  incompatible
modes of social life (Kuhn 1970: 94). This idea could look like a relativist affirmation
about the incomparability of scientific theories, together with an underestimation (or an
exaltation) of the intolerance towards different ideas. Instead he says just that different
paradigms correspond to different models of social action and, in the end, to different
forms of life, but this does not involve considerations about relativism or intolerance.
The paradigms do not determine the truth,  but the way scientists critically evaluate,
discuss, test and challenge truths. Finally, Kuhn’s dogmatism reveals a similarity with
Wittgenstein’s conception of certainty, where accepting a proposition as certain means
using it as a grammatical rule (and this is undoubtedly related to the role played by
those propositions in the learning process). An important point in this comparison is that
both dogmatism and certainty are preconditions for meaningful doubts. In fact, when
Kuhn enumerates the advantages of scientific dogmatism, along with the elimination of
skepticism and pointless doubts, he says that scientists can recognize the failures and the
problems of their theory only by referring to the background provided by the paradigm: 
The practitioners of mature sciences know with considerable precision what sort
of result he should gain from his research. As a consequence, he is in a particularly
favorable position to recognize when a research problem has gone astray. […] The
practice  of  normal  puzzle-solving  science  can  and  inevitably  does  lead  to  the
isolation and recognition of anomaly. That recognition proves, I think, prerequisite
for  almost  all  discoveries  of  new sorts  of  phenomena  and  for  all  fundamental
innovations in scientific theory (Kuhn 1963: 364-365).
This  is  what  Kuhn  calls  the  “essential  tension”  in  scientific  research:  scientific
progress needs divergent and convergent thought, dogmatism and criticism, but we can
understand the combined presence of these elements only from a social standpoint that
acknowledges the centrality of scientific communities in the explanation of scientific
development. Both dogmatism and criticism are meaningful only as social phenomena.
translate  Wittgenstein’s  term  Übereinstimmung  with  the  word  “attunement”  and  not  with  the
traditional “agreement”.  That is because “the idea of agreement here is not that  of coming to or
arriving  at  an  agreement  on  a  given  occasion,  but  of  being  in  agreement  throughout,  being  in
harmony, like pitches or tones, or clocks, or weighing scales, or columns of figures” (Cavell 1978:
32). Cavell and Kuhn worked together at the University of Berkley and Cavell’s interpretation of
Wittgenstein could have been an important influence on Kuhn (see Kindi 2010).  
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Consequently, dogmatism leaves space for criticism, except when it is necessary to
avoid  ceaseless  scientific  revolutions  and  theory  changes  that  threaten  scientific
progress.  It  only  safeguards  the  normative  backbone  of  scientific  theories  from
skepticism, saving this structure from the possibility of empirical falsification. Normally
it involves only a few interrelated terms and laws, such as “mass”, “force”, “weight”,
the  laws  of  motion  etc.,  in  Newton’s  physics.  Except  for  this  backbone,  scientific
assertions  produced  and  organized  through  it,  are  subject  to  criticism,  doubt,  and
rational  discussion  by  means  of  the  classical  tools  of  experience,  logic,  evidence,
persuasion and so on. These tools help scientists to determine what is true (and what is
false), although obviously any theory choice involves deliberative and fallible features.
The paradigms deal with the determination of what can or cannot be empirically true-or-
false, that is to say, they are normative preconditions for the formation of meaningful
scientific statements.  
6. Conclusion
Finally, in this chapter I have discussed how the normative nature of Kuhn's paradigms
is related to the process of scientific learning by exemplary problem solutions and how
this contributes to the generation of the typical scientific dogmatism. I have argued that,
in a scientific context, the distinction between meaningful doubt (which is positive for
scientific progress) and pathological doubt (which turns into skepticism) is clear only
from a social viewpoint about the nature of science and the organization of scientific
communities. Social dogmatism and organized skepticism are complementary concepts.
On the one hand, organized skepticism guarantees the safety of scientific knowledge
from skeptical and iconoclastic attacks, since it states that we should regulate scientific
doubt institutionally according to methods, criteria, and procedures established at the
level  of  communities  and  subject  to  peer  judgment.  On  the  other  hand,  social
dogmatism fixes the accepted methods, criteria and the procedures to practice science,
and in  turn,  to  exercise  doubt  and critical  thinking.  I  have  stressed  again that  such
methods,  criteria,  and procedures  are  “formal  concepts”:  they do not  deal  with  the
content of scientific knowledge, but with the organization and production of scientific
knowledge. They do not influence the truth, but the way scientists critically evaluate,
discuss, test and challenge truths. In a scientific context, both dogmatism and skepticism
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are, at the same time, both dangerous and necessary. This does not mean that scientists
should be simultaneously dogmatic and skeptical;  rather,  it  means that certainty and
non-pathological  doubts  emerge  at  the  institutional  level  of  scientific  communities.
According to Kuhn's conclusion, this entails that paradigms are not true-or-false in any
ordinary or classic sense (correspondence to the facts). In the next sections of my work I
will  discuss  this  claim  in  depth,  starting  with  Kuhn's  arguments  against  truth
(incommensurability  thesis  and  comparison  objection)  and  proceeding  with  other
objections against correspondence truth.
Incommensurability, Truth, Historicism
1. Introduction
In the last chapters I have discussed a perspective on the meaning and the reference
of scientific terms based on some ideas defended by Kuhn. But, in his view, this theory
entails that scientific theories are not true strictly speaking and, in the next chapters, I
am going to criticize this point. I will start with the incommensurability thesis, which is
Kuhn's most basic argument for the linkage between meaning of scientific terms and
rejection of the correspondence theory. In this section I will not discuss the reception
and the different interpretations of the incommensurability thesis, since I think that the
discussion has often been out of focus. Rather, I will follow the most recent works about
incommensurability,  taking  for  granted  that  the  incommensurability  thesis  does  not
entail incomparability or radical untranslatability. The main thesis of this chapter is that
the  concept  of  incommensurability  is  strongly  related  to  the  rejection  of  the
correspondence  theory  of  truth  and  the  historicist  epistemology.  Roughly,
incommensurability  has  three  different  meanings  (see  Buzzoni  1986:  111  and
Hoyningen-Huene, Sankey 2001b: ix):
1. Methodological  Incommensurability:  each  scientific  theory  defines  its  own
methods, standards, aims and criteria.
2. Semantic Incommensurability: the meaning of scientific terms changes during
the history of science.
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3. Ontological Incommensurability: the world changes over the course of scientific
revolutions.
Since (3)  is  a  very complex concept  which involves many problems such as the
relation between theory and observation, the correspondence theory of truth, scientific
realism and the concept of reference (and many others), I will focus on (1) and (2). I
will argue for the following theses:
1. Both methodological (1.1) and semantic (1.2) incommensurability are closely
related to the rejection of the correspondence theory of truth. They do not refer
to  incomparability  and  untranslatability  in  general.  Rather,  methodological
incommensurability means that we cannot compare scientific theories to find out
their respective truthlikeness. And semantic incommensurability means that we
cannot translate scientific theories keeping unchanged their truth-value relations.
2. The concept of incommensurability depends on Kuhn’s historicist epistemology,
i.e. the idea that we can study scientific knowledge only from the viewpoint of
the  dynamic  of  scientific  theories:  a  historical  viewpoint  interested  in  the
relations between successive theories. From this perspective, each paradigm has
a dual-directionality: from the one hand it looks outside to the world, from the
other hand it looks back to the scientific tradition that produced it. The relation
between paradigm and reality is not a one-to-one relation: it always involves
other paradigms36.
3. Methodological incommensurability depends on semantic incommensurability.
The  change  in  the  methodological  standards,  values  and  aims  accepted  by
scientific communities is a consequence of the semantic change in the lexical
structure of the theory. Or, perhaps better, this is a consequence of the language-
learning process experienced by physicists during their student years. 
Therefore, at first I will present methodological incommensurability and explain the
36 In my view, historicism has nothing to do with the idea that each scientific paradigm is a historical
entity determined by (and relative to) the relevant historical and social conditions. I think that this
thesis (a kind of historicist relativism) is false,  even as interpretation of Kuhn’s ideas (as I have
claimed in Part 2 – section 1).
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relation between methodological incommensurability, truth and historicism. Then, I will
analyze the connection between methodological and semantic incommensurability and I
will conclude with the relation between semantic incommensurability and truth.
2. Does methodological incommensurability entail incomparability?
In  this  section  I  will  briefly  introduce  methodological  incommensurability  and
explain  the  difference  between  methodological  incommensurability  and
incomparability.  Here  I  will  focus  on  the  following  idea:  the  proponents  of  rival
paradigms do not agree about methods, standards and aims of science. According to this
thesis there are no shared, objective methodological rules or neutral scientific standards
for theory comparison and choice; and that is because each paradigm determines its own
standards  of  rational  evaluation.  Incommensurability  is  due  to  the  lack  of  external
standards, which do not depend on the paradigms themselves and can reduce theory
choice  to  a  neutral  and  mechanical  algorithm.  In  sum,  two  paradigms  are
incommensurable from a methodological viewpoint because: a) they focus on different
problem fields; b) they disagree on the priority to be given to these problems in the
context  of  their  research  program;  c)  they  define  in  different  ways  the  most  basic
problems, which reflect the pragmatic, the research strategies and the specific interests
of the same paradigm (see Doppelt 1983: 121).
Many scholars have interpreted this claim as something like radical incomparability
between rival scientific theories (Lakatos 1970: 179 n. 1, Newton-Smith 1981: 9-10,
Putnam  1981:  118,  Scheffler  1967:  16-17,  Shapere  1966:  67-68).  Methodological
incommensurability has been regarded as a kind of epistemological relativism about
theory comparison: if theories are incommensurable (or, according to this interpretation,
incomparable),  scientific  changes  are  irrational,  since  they  cannot  be  explained  by
means of rational procedures and scientific revolutions would be mere “conversions”.
But such an interpretation has been strongly refuted by Kuhn himself: he explicitly says
that incommensurability does not imply incomparability (see also Bernstein 1983: 82
and Hoyningen-Huene 1993: 218-221). In fact, he recalls that incommensurability is a
mathematical term, which expresses the relation between the hypotenuse of an isosceles
right triangle and its side (or the circumference of a circle and its radius); it means that
there is no unit of length contained without residue an integral number of times in each
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member of the pair. But, obviously, this does not mean that we cannot compare them,
since  incommensurable  magnitudes  can  be  compared  to  any  required  degree  of
approximation.  Replying to  his  critics,  Kuhn affirms  that  his  aim was  not  to  make
theory choice irrational.  Rather,  he meant that,  although theory choice is rational in
general,  it  is  not  “algorithmic”  and  regulated  by  only  one  scientific  method.  The
evaluation  of  scientific  theories  is  necessarily  a  practical  process,  which  involves
decisional, deliberative and subjective elements; and logic and experience are not able
to force theory choice.
To  replace  the  scientific  standards-based  model  for  theory  comparison,  in  the
seventies  Kuhn  has  provided  a  value-based  model  (Kuhn  1977:  320-339).  He  lists
several values used by scientific communities: a) accuracy (of the factual statements,
both from a quantitative and qualitative viewpoint); b) consistency (absence of internal
contradictions); c) scope (the domain of possible applications); d) simplicity (the ability
to unify apparently different groups of phenomena); e) fruitfulness (the ability to predict
and to apply to new phenomena). Scientists do not consider these values rules which
determine theory-choice, but rather values, which influence it; moreover they can be
interpreted in different ways and, in some situations, they can conflict with one another. 
Without going into the details of Kuhn’s theory of scientific method (Nola, Sankey
2000b: 26-30), we are probably dealing with a reason which forced Kuhn, in his latest
works, to separate the incommensurability from the problem of scientific method. In
fact, as Siegel noted, this argument for incommensurability involves only a theory of
value-based theory choice  (Siegel  1987:  57).  Bird,  too,  says  that,  in  the  version  of
semantic  incommensurability  defended  in  his  latest  work,  the  relativism-absolutism
dichotomy about theory comparison is simply not being asked (Bird 2000: 240-241). At
first  sight,  it  seems  that  Kuhn  merely  gives  up  the  problem  of  methodological
incommensurability  and  relegates  incommensurability  to  his  semantic  aspect.  Kuhn
himself  seems  to  confirm  this  interpretation  where  he  says  that  the  differences  in
methodological standards are a consequence of the language learning process (Kuhn
2000:  34  fn.  2).  Kuhn  makes  methodological  incommensurability  dependent  on
semantic  incommensurability.  But  this  assertion  does  not  imply that  methodological
incommensurability is deflated; rather, we have to look for the foundation of this kind of
incommensurability in his semantic dimension. For this, I will divide Kuhn’s thesis of
methodological incommensurability in two sub-theses:
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- There is no scientific method which constraints theory choice and assures its
correctness:  theory  choice  is  a  deliberative  process.  This  thesis  does  not
necessarily imply relativistic consequences or incommensurability and has been
defended by anti-relativist philosophers like Popper as well (Popper 1959: 61).
- Incommensurability  does  not  mean  incomparability:  we  can  compare  the
accuracy, fruitfulness, scope, consistency, simplicity of scientific theories. But
we cannot compare them to discover which theory is closer to the truth. While
the first sub-thesis has been abandoned by Kuhn, the second one constitutes the
linkage between methodological and semantic incommensurability and has been
defended by Kuhn throughout all his works. I will discuss it in the next section.
3. Truth and methodological incommensurability
Discussing  some objections  concerning  epistemological  relativism,  Kuhn  himself
relates methodological incommensurability to his rejection of the correspondence theory
of truth37. Referring to the above analysis of the role played by proof in theory choice,
he compares mathematical  proof with truth,  since they both assume inter-theoretical
applications, where incommensurability comes into play. Proof and truth are meaningful
concepts  only  within  a  shared  practical  context,  which  constitutes  the  basis  of  the
agreement between scientists. But, when we try to extend the use of terms like ‘proof’
and ‘truth’ beyond the infra-theoretical context, Kuhn affirms that we should be more
cautious. Incommensurability blocks the possibility of any neutral comparison between
scientific  theories.  This  statement  does  not  mean  that  paradigms  are  incomparable,
because  we  can  always  compare  their  accuracy,  consistency  and  so  on;  instead,
paradigms are incomparable relative to the evaluation of their respective truthlikeness.
In  his  evolutionary  account  of  the  development  of  science,  truth  has  no  place.
Incommensurability, at least, in its methodological sense, does not involve relativism
about the rationality of theory choice, but rather it is a form of relativism about truth.
Kuhn has always countered the charge of irrationalism, but, about truth, he says that he
we  can  consider  him  a  relativist  (Kuhn  2000:  160).  Thus,  methodological
incommensurability  does  not  imply  that  all  theories  are  equally  good,  but  that  all
37 For Kuhn’s objections to truth as correspondence, see Bird 2000: 209-266 and Kuukkanen 2007. 
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theories are equally close to the truth. Kuhn returns more explicitly on this argument in
his latest works: the evaluation of theory change is now embedded in the evolutionary
dimension of scientific knowledge. This evolutionary account does not try to explain the
rationality of our beliefs, but, rather, theory change in itself; this is in opposition to the
non-evolutionary viewpoint, which aims to evaluate isolated scientific theories, in order
to calculate their degree of truth or probability. 
Kuhn insists that truth and proof are not inter-theoretical; a theory cannot be tested
by means of any direct match between theory and reality. Moreover, scientific values
are meaningless in so far as they do not belong to concrete practice; in such a context
the  application  of  scientific  values  is  more  fruitful,  although  it  cannot  eliminate
disagreement once and for all. The main advantage of the evolutionary perspective is
that, while a clash between two rival theories is conceivable and can be productive in an
evolutionary  perspective,  a  direct  clash  between  theory  and  reality,  in  a  classic
perspective, is just not an option. Theory evaluation is a historical process which can
only be realized by a comparative viewpoint; and, as Kuhn says, incommensurability is
an  essential  component  of  any  historical,  developmental,  or  evolutionary  view  of
scientific knowledge.
4. Evolutionary historicism
In the previous section I have argued that two theories can be incommensurable from
a methodological viewpoint because they self-impose their standards of correctness and
the evaluation of the truth-values of their statements is not a direct clash between theory
and reality. We can know which is the best scientific theory, but we cannot know which
is the truest theory. Since theory-choice consists in a comparison between two (or more)
theories (not between a theory and the world), theory-choice is, in turn,  a historical
question, from an evolutionary viewpoint. According to my interpretation, a connection
between methodological incommensurability, truth and history of science is emerging.
This  connection  is  clarified  in  The Structure  of  Scientific  Revolutions,  where  Kuhn
introduces  methodological  incommensurability  by  means  of  a  passage  about  his
historical and evolutionary conception of science:
Paradigms differ in more than substance, for they are directed not only to nature
but also back upon the science that produced them.  They are the source of the
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methods,  problem-field,  and  standards  of  solution  accepted  by  any  mature
scientific  community  at  any  given  time.  As  a  result,  the  reception  of  a  new
paradigm often necessitates a redefinition of the corresponding science. Some old
problems may be relegated to another science or declared entirely “unscientific”.
Others  that  were  previously non-existent  or  trivial  may,  with  a  new paradigm,
become  the  very  archetypes  of  significant  scientific  achievement.  And  as  the
problems change, so, often, does the standard that distinguishes a real scientific
solution from a mere metaphysical speculation, word game, or mathematical play.
The normal-scientific tradition that emerges from a scientific revolution is not only
incompatible but often actually incommensurable with that which has gone before.
(Italics mine) (Kuhn 1970: 103)
Here Kuhn describes the change in scientific standards, problem fields, and scientific
aims  during  scientific  revolutions.  But,  after  summarizing  the  features  of
methodological incommensurability, he associates it with a remark about the historical
structure of paradigms: they are directed not only to  nature but also back upon the
science that produced them. According to Kuhn, paradigms have a dual-directionality.
From the one hand they look at the world and, from the other hand, at their historical
tradition. This assertion summarizes Kuhn’s historicism. He does not mean that each
scientific paradigm is relative to the historical and social context in which it develops;
rather  the  historical  structure  of  paradigms  is  inextricably  linked  to  their  implicit
knowledge.
In fact,  as we have just  seen,  theory-choice is  not a  direct  match,  since a direct
contact  between  theories  and  reality  cannot  exist.  However,  Kuhn  does  not  merely
affirm that the comparison between paradigm and nature is influenced by the paradigm
itself. If this were the case, Kuhn would only say that observation is theory-laden, which
is a point accepted by nearly all philosophers of science. Instead Kuhn’s claim is more
radical.  He  states  not  only  that  the  relationship  between  paradigm  and  nature  is
mediated by the paradigm, but that it is mediated by the relationship between the current
and the past paradigms as well. Accordingly, the relation between successive paradigm
is  incommensurability,  and  especially  semantic  incommensurability,  since  each
paradigm  inherits  his  lexicon  by  the  paradigm  that  preceded  it.  Roughly,
incommensurability  influences  the  connection  between  paradigm and  nature  and,  if
successive theories are incommensurable, we cannot determine which one is closer to
truth. To sum up, the historical nature of paradigms (their constitutive relation with the
paradigms which produced them) plays a fundamental role in the determination of the
relationship between paradigm and the world, which, consequently, cannot be a direct
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clash,  but  only a  comparative  evaluation between two theories.  That  is  because the
historical relation between successive paradigms is incommensurability, which blocks
the  possibility  of  the  evaluation  of  the  pure  truthlikeness  of  a  theory.
Incommensurability, truth and historicism give rise to a circle.
Before  analyzing  in  depth  the  relation  between  semantic  and  methodological
incommensurability, let me conclude the discussion of Kuhn’s historicism.
5. The standard meter
I have concluded the last section saying that, for Kuhn, incommensurability and truth
are historical concepts. More precisely, the fact that incommensurability is a historical
concept does not mean that it is a concept gathered from the analysis of the history of
science. Kuhn tells us that incommensurability is the result of his activity as a historian
of science (Kuhn 2000: 16-17). The historian experiences incommensurability when he
is studying an ancient scientific text and notices seemingly nonsensical passages. While
many researchers have considered these passages to be mere mistakes, Kuhn believes
that they results from the incommensurability between rival paradigms. Kuhn means
that  there  is  no  external  Archimedean standpoint  to  see  the  history of  science  as  a
cumulative process.
The  connection  between  this  kind  of  historiography  and  the  alethic  relativist
conception of methodological incommensurability is remarked by Kuhn: even though
he was concerned with the problems of rationality and relativism, what is fundamentally
in question is the correspondence theory of truth. As we have seen referring to truth and
proof,  the  concept  of  an  external  Archimedean viewpoint  on  the  history of  science
assumes inter-theoretical applications as well. But, again, scientific theories cannot be
evaluated in isolation, since only the change in the beliefs can be justified, while all
individual theories are equally far from the truth: 
On the developmental view, scientific knowledge claims are necessarily evaluated
from  a  moving,  historically  situated,  Archimedean  platform.  What  requires
evaluation cannot be an individual proposition embodying a knowledge claim in
isolation: embracing a new knowledge claim typically requires adjustment of other
beliefs as well. Nor is it the entire body of knowledge claims that would result if
that proposition were accepted. Rather, what's to be evaluated is the desirability of
a  particular  change-of-belief,  a  change  which  would  alter  the  existing  body of
knowledge claims so as to incorporate, with minimum disruption, the new claim as
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well. Judgments of this sort are necessarily comparative: which of two bodies of
knowledge-the original or the proposed alternative-is better for doing whatever it is
that scientists do. (Kuhn 2000: 95-96)   
In other words, there are only provisional, historical situated pseudo-Archimedean
viewpoints, constituted by the very consensus within the relevant community: it is not
fixed, but, rather, it moves with time and changes with community and sub-community.
To that extent, the traditional non-evolutionary perspective fails because, according to
Kuhn, it claims that only neutral languages and observation can serve as the judges of
the  truthlikeness  of  scientific  theories;  or  as  the  Archimedean  platform for  theory-
choice. On the contrary, Kuhn's point is that each evaluation is relative to a scientific
community and its shared lexicon.
Thus, just like proof, truth can be only an infra-theoretical and historical concept:
truth is not correspondence with a mind-independent world, but only the result of a
rational evaluative process. What results from a successful theory comparison is internal
to the historical situation which enables it: merely, the problem of the truth or falsehood
(as correspondence) is not the question being asked. In the end, referring to the lack of
an Archimedean standpoint: “only a fixed, rigid Archimedean platform could supply a
base from which to measure the distance between current belief and true belief. In the
absence of that platform, it's hard to imagine what such a measurement would be, what
the phrase 'closer to the truth' can mean” (italics mine) (Kuhn 2000: 115).   
In the last passage I have stressed the words “measure” and “measurement” because
they are strictly related to the incommensurability thesis. As Kuhn has repeated several
times, incommensurability is a mathematical term which means “no common measure”.
But outside of its original context, it is a metaphor: “no common measure” becomes “no
common language”; in other words, two theories are incommensurable if there is no
language into which both theories, linguistically construed, can be expressed without
loss. But the measure-metaphor does not stop here. As well as denouncing the absence
of  a  common  measure  to  explain  inter-theoretical  relations,  Kuhn  does  compare
paradigms with units of measurements or to metric or coordinate systems.  
A metric system is a condition for the possibility of truth-value attributions in the
relevant  domain  and,  as  I  have  said  in  the  last  sections,  here  Kuhn  refers  to
Wittgenstein’s discussion about the standard meter38. Kuhn’s description of paradigms is
38 For a discussion of Wittgenstein’s standard meter see (Baker and Hacker 2005: 189-199).
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very similar to this analysis: truth, proof and justification are meaningful only in an
infra-theoretical  context,  while  it  is  impossible  to  evaluate  the  truthlikeness  of  a
paradigm. Each paradigm is a system of measurement which enables theory evaluation
and justification by means of shared scientific values such as accuracy, consistency and
so on. Thanks to these values, we can compare the results of rival theories relative to
their  respective  methods,  standards,  aims:  but  such  a  meter  is  not  an  absolute
Archimedean platform, but the relevant historical situation. So, in the end, according to
Kuhn, there is no meta-metric system to evaluate the absolute truthlikeness of a theory.
Kuhn calls this system Archimedean platform, common measure, neutral observational
language, truth, the world-in-itself. All these non-evolutionary concepts assumes that we
can compare theories from a non-historical standpoint: a direct clash between theories
and reality, that Kuhn considers pointless.   
6. The route to semantic incommensurability
In the previous sections I have individuated two theses:
1) The rejection of the correspondence theory of truth: truth is an infra-theoretical
concept  which  depends  on  accepted  standards,  values  and aims  of  scientific
practice. 
2) Historicism: paradigms are not oriented (only) to the world, but to the historical
tradition that produced them: they have a dual-directionality.
I have discussed the relation between these theses and the thesis of methodological
incommensurability,  concluding  that,  according  to  this  model,  both  truth  and
incommensurability  are  historical  concepts,  since  they  depend  on  the  evolutionary
epistemology:  theory choice  is  relative  to  the  dynamic  of  scientific  theories,  i.e.  to
concrete scientific practice and its relation with past paradigms. I have showed that: 
1.1) from a methodological viewpoint, incommensurability means that we cannot
evaluate the “absolute” truthlikeness of scientific theories; 
2) that is because, from the evolutionary viewpoint, the relation between theory and
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nature  is  not  a  one-to-one  relation:  it  involves  the  relation  between  successive
theories.
But  the  relation  between  successive  theories  is  a  semantic  relation:  each  theory
inherits  its  lexicon  by  the  relevant  scientific  tradition.  For  example,  the  theory  of
relativity adopts the term ‘mass’, but the meaning of such a term changed during the
transition from classical mechanics to Einstein’s theory. Therefore, before focusing on
semantic  incommensurability,  I  will  focus  on  thesis  (3):  methodological
incommensurability is a consequence of semantic incommensurability.
In  fact  Kuhn,  in  his  latest  works,  leaves  aside  the  methodological  thesis  of
incommensurability  to  defend  its  semantic  implications.  We  have  seen  that  the
discussion  about  the  justification  of  belief  change can  be  meaningful  only from an
evolutionary perspective which does not aim to overstep the historical situation. Kuhn's
point is that only a neutral lexicon, in which the statements of rival theories can be
expressed and compared, could constitute a direct access to the facts and a tool for inter-
theoretical  evaluation.  The  transition  from  methodological  to  semantic
incommensurability is  due to  Kuhn’s analysis  of the origin of the agreement within
scientific communities about paradigms. As we have seen in the last section, it is the
constitutive role played by scientific learning. The applicability of scientific values in
theory  choice  takes  for  granted  a  shared  perspective,  made  possible  by  scientific
training (Kuhn 2000: 34 fn. 2. See also Kuhn 2000: 60 fn. 4). Since scientific learning is
prior  to  methodological  rules,  it  moves  the  foundation  of  methodological
incommensurability to the semantic question of the meaning of scientific terms (their
use in concrete scientific practice).
Anyway,  this  thesis  does  not  solve  the  main  consequence  of  methodological
incommensurability: since a direct clash between a theory and reality is impossible, all
theories are equally close to the truth. Thus, basically, this is the main argument for the
connection  between  incommensurability  (and  meaning  theory)  and  rejection  of
correspondence  truth:  from  the  one  hand,  semantic  incommensurability  implies
structural  non-homogeneity  between  rival  theories;  on  the  other  hand,  we  cannot
directly  compare  theories  and  facts  and  therefore  we  cannot  deal  with  this  non-
homogeneity from a logical or empirical viewpoint. This argument rests on the so-called
“comparison objection” (we cannot compare theories and facts) and I think that it is
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misguided. But I will reject it in the next chapter; at first, let me proceed with semantic
incommensurability.
7. Does semantic incommensurability entail untranslatability? 
In the previous section, I have argued that methodological incommensurability is a
consequence  of  semantic  incommensurability  as  well  as  the  different  trainings
experienced  by  physics  students  (thesis  3).  Now,  I  will  introduce  semantic
incommensurability  and  briefly  explain  the  difference  between  semantic
incommensurability and radical untranslatability.
Kuhn claims that scientific revolutions entail a meaning change in the fundamental
terms  employed  by the  theories.  For  example,  Newtonian  mass  is  conserved  while
Einsteinian mass is convertible with energy; At the same time, he links the question of
the determination of the experimental field of the theory (its reference) to the difficulties
faced by scientists who try to translate rival scientific theories. Since a neutral language
which allows us to express the empirical statements of the theories is not available, the
problem is  that  we cannot  find  out  whether  rival  theories  affirm or  deny the  same
content.  In the received view, semantic incommensurability is  a kind of conceptual-
scheme  relativism  which  entails  untranslatability  and  the  irrationality  of  scientific
revolutions. The impossibility to fully translate the lexicon of a theory is not only a
persuasive  argument  against  rational  theory  choice,  but  also  against  mutual
understanding between human beings. For example, for Putnam
The incommensurability thesis is the thesis that terms used in another culture, say,
the  term  ‘temperature’ as  used  by  a  seventeenth-century  scientist,  cannot  be
equated in meaning or reference with any terms or expressions we possess.  As
Kuhn puts it,  scientists  with different paradigms inhabit ‘different worlds’.  […]
The rejoinder this time is that if  this  thesis were really true then we could not
translate other languages — or even past stages of our own language — at all. And
if  we  cannot  interpret  organisms’ noises  at  all,  then  we  have  no  grounds  for
regarding them as thinkers, speakers, or even persons. In short, if Feyerabend (and
Kuhn at his most incommensurable) were right, then members of other cultures,
including seventeenth-century scientists, would be conceptualizable by us only as
animals producing responses to stimuli (including noises that curiously resemble
English or Italian). To tell us that Galileo had ‘incommensurable’ notions and then
to go on to describe them at length is totally incoherent. (Putnam 1981: 114-115) 
This objection does not sound good for many reasons. I will briefly summarize two
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clarifications  to reply to this  kind of critics39.  At first,  Putnam’s  argument  takes  for
granted  that  untranslatability concerns  language as  a  whole.  On the  contrary,  Kuhn
argues that semantic incommensurability is always a local event, i.e. it involves only
specific “pieces” of language and not language as a whole (Kuhn 2000: 36). As we have
seen in Part 1, incommensurability concerns small groups of inter-defined terms, which
are  usually  introduced  by  the  fundamental  equations  of  the  theory.  For  example,
Newtonian ‘force’ and ‘mass’ are untranslatable into the Aristotelian lexicon because
they are acquired together by means of the second law of motion, which does not work
in Aristotle's physics.
Moreover, in his argument, Putnam affirms that we cannot understand untranslatable
languages.  His  premise  is  that  “we  could  not  translate  other  languages”  and  his
conclusion is that “we cannot interpret organisms’ noises at all”. This inference assumes
that  interpreting  a  language  means  translating  the  words  and  sentences  of  such  a
language into the respective words and sentences of another language. On the contrary,
Kuhn rejects the identification of translation with interpretation40.  Translation strictly
construed consists in the systematic substitution of a set of words and sentences for the
respective  words  and  sentences  of  another  language;  therefore,  a  translator  should
understand  both  languages.  Instead,  interpretation  is  similar  to  Quine’s  radical
translation,  i.e.  a situation where the object-language is totally unknown: the radical
translator is not a translator, but rather an interpreter, who learns a new language. The
interpreter can succeed in understanding the unknown language and fail in technically
translating it at the same time. Ordinary translation is always possible, but it necessarily
implies  compromises,  difficulties,  meaning  shifts,  neologisms  and  so  on.  Thus,
translation  strictly  construed  is  impossible,  while,  pace  Putnam,  interpretation  can
always be achieved. 
Therefore, in the next section, I will argue that, although untranslatability does not
entail conceptual-scheme relativism, it involves a kind of relativism about truth (thesis
1.2). This kind of relativism is consistent with Kuhn’s rejection of epistemological and
conceptual  relativism.  Semantic  incommensurability  does  not  rule  out  translation  in
itself, but a technical translation which keeps unchanged truth-value attributions across
successive theories.
39 For the translational rejection of incommensurability see Sankey 1994: 102-137. 
40 For the relevance of this distinction in the latest developments of Kuhn’s incommensurability thesis
see Chen 1997.
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8. Truth and semantic incommensurability
In this section I will explain thesis (1.2): semantic incommensurability depends on
the  rejection  of  the correspondence theory of  truth.  It  means that,  although we can
translate scientific theories, the preservation of the internal truth-value relationships is
problematic.
In fact,  while many philosophers argue that semantic  incommensurability implies
conceptual  relativism,  I  think  that  incommensurability  is  deeply  linked  to  Kuhn’s
skepticism  about  truth  and  especially  to  the  impossibility  to  preserve  truth-value
relationships  across  translation.  Inter-theoretical  translation  entails  losses  and
modifications in the truth-values of some statements of the old theory. Kuhn is very
clear on this problem: the impossibility to translate (strictly speaking) involves many
problems about the preservation of the truth-values: “it is a quasi-mechanical activity
governed in full by a manual which specifies, as a function of context, which string in
one language may, salva veritate, be substituted for a given string in the other” (Kuhn
2000: 60). 
Thus, untranslatability refers to the perfect preservation of the relationships between
the most basic terms of the symbolic generalizations of the respective theories. In such a
sense,  translation  implies  compromises  and  meaning  changes;  and  these  changes
provide truth-value alterations: 
The preservation of truth values when translating scientific prose is very nearly as
delicate  a  task  as  the  preservation  of  resonance  and  emotional  tone  in  the
translation  of  literature.  Neither  can  be  fully  achieved;  even  responsible
approximation  requires  the  greatest  tact  and  taste.  In  the  scientific  case,  these
generalizations apply, not only to passages that make explicit use of theory, but also
and more significantly to those their authors took to be merely descriptive. (Kuhn
2000: 62) 
In  Newtonian  mechanics,  terms  like  “force”,  “mass”  (and  so  on)  are  acquired
together through the second law of motion and the experimental situations associated
with it.  The introduction of such terms, for example, in Einstein’s mechanics entails
many problems, since Newton’s second law of motion does not work in this context.
Consequently, the translation (strictly construed) from the Newtonian lexicon into the
theory of  relativity  causes  internal  (language-dependent)  contradictions  in  the  truth-
value relationship linked, for example, to the different meanings of the term ‘mass’:
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“enriching the Newtonian conceptual vocabulary with Aristotelian terms (or vice versa)
would build contradictions about observable phenomena  into language itself” (Kuhn
1999: 36). Recall  Kuhn's objections against  the causal theory of reference (Part  1 –
section 3). He does not focus on the alleged referential  continuity,  but,  rather, he is
interested in the consequences of the introduction of new information about water in the
context of our old lexicon. The only news about chemistry that we can infer from the
identification of H2O with XYZ is that something is badly wrong with our chemical
theory.
As we have seen, referential change (which is essential from Putnam’s viewpoint) is,
according to Kuhn, a by-product of the influence exercised by the structure of scientific
lexicons.  Such a  structure blocks  the expression of  both ‘H2O’ and ‘XYZ’ (and the
relevant knowledge embodied in these expressions) into the same language without a
substantial revision of our beliefs in this field. And that is because the introduction of
‘XYZ’ in a  lexicon in which we have ‘H2O’ and rival  descriptions  and applications
implies essential errors in the truth-values of the propositions that involve such terms
(for example the evaporation temperature of water). 
And, as we have seen in Part 1 – section 1 – the origin of this puzzle is Kuhn’s theory
of the structure of and the access to the possible worlds of science: the access to certain
experience fields may exclude the access to other  fields. In front of  many anomalies,
breaking down the limits of a lexicon implies a change in the meaning of its terms and
some modifications in the truth-values. This is another Wittgensteinian theme: a change
in the lexical structure might provide major meaning changes, just like a modification in
the grammar implies a meaning change (Wittgenstein 1974: 184).
Recall  the comparison between paradigm and standard meter.  Kuhn says  that the
analysis of the truth-value of an empirical proposition is necessarily an activity internal
to a lexicon. But, for Kuhn, this implies that paradigms are neither true nor false. These
remarks  clarify  the  kind  of  alethic  relativism  associated  with  semantic
incommensurability. Kuhn does not mean that a proposition, which is true in a given
paradigm, may be false  in  another  context;  this  relativism is  not  based  on context-
dependent truth-value attributions41. Rather, some propositions, which are true-or-false
in a lexicon, are not candidate for truth or falsehood in another one (see Wang 2002).
This argument has been proposed by Hacking (1982: 49), in his attack to conceptual
41 This is a discussed position in the contemporary debate about alethic relativism. See for example
Kölbel 2002 and MacFarlane 2003.
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relativism. In his latest works, Kuhn accepts Hacking’s suggestion and affirms that the
evaluation  of  an  empirical  statement  consists  in  two  phases.  At  first  we  have  to
determine the status of this statement: is it a candidate for truth-value attribution? The
answer to this question depends on the structure of the lexicon we are using. Only once
we have established the status of the statement we can understand if it is “true”: this
second process involves experience, logic and evidence. 
The  point  is  that  scientific  revolutions  imply  the  revision  of  the  most  basic
propositions  of  the  respective  scientific  theories  (for  example,  Newton’s  laws  of
motion). According to my previous interpretation, a change in these propositions entails
the  meaning  change  of  the  terms  employed  (for  example  ‘mass’,  ‘force’  and
‘acceleration’) and then the difficulties to attribute truth-values. 
9. Conclusions
I this  chapter,  I  have analyzed Kuhn’s incommensurability thesis (methodological
and semantic), discussing its relation with the rejection of the correspondence theory of
truth  and  the  historicist  epistemology.  Criticizing  the  received  view  on
incommensurability,  I  have argued that  methodological  incommensurability does not
mean  incomparability  and  that  semantic  incommensurability  does  not  mean
untranslatability. Rather, I have argued for three theses:
1) The incommensurability thesis is related to the rejection of the correspondence theory
of truth. It claims that there is no meta-theoretical Archimedean platform to evaluate and
translate scientific theories:
1.1) from a methodological viewpoint, it means that, although we can compare
scientific theories, we cannot know their absolute truthlikeness; because, since
theory evaluation depends on accepted standards and rules,  truth is  an infra-
theoretical concept.
1.2)  from  a  semantic  viewpoint  the  translation  of  scientific  theories  should
preserve the truth-value relations, but, since each theory defines its own terms, a
change  in  the  physical  laws  provides  a  meaning  change  such  that  some
propositions are meaningless.
138
2) The thesis of incommensurability is related to Kuhn’s historicism, i.e. the idea that
we cannot  evaluate  isolated scientific  theories,  but  only theory-change.  The relation
between theory and world is not a one-to-one or direct relation, since it always involves
other  theories.  Specifically,  it  involves  the  historical  relation  between  the  actual
paradigm and the tradition that produced it.
3)  Methodological  incommensurability  is  a  consequence  of  semantic
incommensurability.  That  is  because  the  historical  relation  between  successive
paradigms is a semantic relation which deals with the different meanings of the same
term within rival scientific paradigms. Ultimately, incommensurability depends on the
different trainings experienced by physics students introduced to rival paradigms.   
But  the  main  controversial  point  is  that  the  connection  between  truth  and
incommensurability is based on the idea that the correspondence theory means that we
should be able to compare theories and facts and this is pointless (comparison objection,
since we can only compare rival theories from a dynamic and historicist viewpoint). In
the next chapter I will focus on this argument to reject it, while in Part 3 (section 2) I
will try to save semantic incommensurability.
Section 4: The Comparison Objection to the Correspondence Theory
of Truth
1. Introduction
In the last chapter I have presented Kuhn's incommensurability thesis and how it is
related to the rejection of the correspondence theory of truth. I have concluded that his
argument  ultimately  depends  on  the  comparison  objection,  a  traditional  argument
against correspondence truth. Since in the last part I will be concerned with whether the
perspective  that  I  have  just  defended  entails  some  skeptical  conclusions  about
correspondence truth (as Kuhn thinks), I will take seriously this objection. Thus, the aim
of this chapter is to discuss the comparison argument and especially Kuhn's version of
the argument. Roughly, the comparison objection states that the correspondence theory
should be rejected because it  entails  that  we should be able  to compare beliefs and
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reality; and this is pointless because we do not have independent access to one of the
things to compare (the world). Kuhn’s argument is more complex because it challenges
the very idea that scientific progress is a process tending toward a fixed goal, namely,
the  truth or  the  “objective reality”.  Thus,  his  argument  is  divided in  two parts:  the
comparison objection to the correspondence theory and a historical argument against
scientific  progress  as  ontological  convergence  (like  the  confutation  of  convergent
realism or pessimistic meta-induction). I will start showing that, although pessimistic
meta-induction is an important problem concerning scientific realism, the argument fails
due to the comparison objection (whatever idea one may have about pessimistic meta-
induction and scientific realism). So, I will remain agnostic with respect to the historical
argument and I will face the epistemological question. After spelling out exactly the
steps of the argument, I will reject the assumption that, as far as scientific knowledge is
concerned,  the  correspondence  theory  of  truth  implies  some  kind  of  comparison
between  the  entities  postulated  by scientific  theories  and  the  “real  entities”,  or  the
objective world. I will argue that the empirical testing of scientific theories has not just
to  do  with  such  “ontological”  worries.  Therefore  I  will  conclude  that,  while  the
argument  is  untenable  from  an  empirical  viewpoint,  it  could  make  sense  from  an
ontological viewpoint, but it would not threaten the correspondence theory of truth.   
2. Kuhn’s argument against the correspondence theory
In The Structure of Scientific Revolution Kuhn adopts a neutralist attitude toward the
relation between truth and science: he does not argue against the correspondence theory.
Merely,  he  says  that  science  can  do  without  truth  and,  in  the  famous  last  chapter,
outlines scientific progress by means of the evolutionary analogy: we have to substitute
evolution from what we do know for evolution to what we wish to know. But, since the
“Postscript-1969”  he  has  formulated  an  argument  against  the  applicability  of  the
correspondence theory to scientific knowledge:
A scientific theory is usually felt to be better than its predecessor not only in the
sense that it is a better instrument for discovering and solving puzzles, but also
because it is somehow a better representation of what nature is really like. […]
Perhaps there is some other way of salvaging the notion of ‘truth’ for application to
whole theories, but this one will not do. There is, I think, no theory-independent
way to reconstruct phrases like ‘really there’; the notion of a match between the
ontology of a theory and its real counterpart in nature now seems to me illusive in
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principle. Besides, as an historian, I am impressed of the implausibility of the view.
I do not doubt, for example, that Newton’s mechanics improves on Aristotle’s and
that Einstein’s improves on Newton’s as instruments for puzzle-solving. But I can
see in their succession no coherent direction of ontological development. (Kuhn
1970: 206)
In  the  proceeding  of  this  chapter,  I  will  analyze,  discuss  and  reject  this
argument, since, as we have seen in the last chapter, it is the main assumption of
the incommensurability thesis.
2.1 Clarification about truth and scientific realism
Before discussing the argument, there is an important point to make. This argument
is  quite  confused,  since  it  deals  both  with  the  relation  between  science  and  truth
(comparison objection) and with the question of scientific realism (pessimistic meta-
induction). But truth and realism are different issues. It has been said that there is a
philosophical relation between the correspondence theory and metaphysical realism. For
example,  Davidson  equates  the  correspondence  theory  of  truth  with  transcendental
realism (Davidson 1990: 308-309), relying on the idea that they both assume truth and
knowledge to be non-epistemic. Clearly, “being non-epistemic” seems to be an essential
property of scientific truth, but it is not an exclusive property of the correspondence
theory:  for  instance,  deflationism  and  alethic  pluralism  are  non-epistemic  as  well
(Wright 1992: 34 and Horwich 1990: 104-105). The correspondence schema (roughly, a
proposition is true if and only if it corresponds to the facts or propositions are true or
false and facts make propositions true) requires that a given fact (or state of affairs and
so on) obtains and it can obtain in several different ways, even if it is mind-dependent.
For example an idealist philosopher may argue that the world consists of her mental
states and that truth means correspondence between truth-bearers and her mental states
(the facts). Here, truth is non-epistemic, but the facts are mind-dependent (see Kirkham
1992: 133-134 for some examples of non-realist correspondence theories)42. Therefore,
although some philosophers affirms that correspondence truth and realist commitment
cannot be separated, actually every theory of truth is consistent with any metaphysical
thesis about the existence (and the essence) of facts. Assuming Tarski’s definition of
truth,  we would conclude  that  the  semantic  theory means that  the  truth  property is
42 See also Devitt  1984: 42 and Vision 2004: 14-16 for the distinction between truth and scientific
realism. 
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metaphysically neutral: “we may accept the semantic conception of truth without giving
up any epistemological attitude we may have had; we may remain naive realists, critical
realists  or  idealists,  empiricists  or  metaphysicians  –  whatever  we  were  before.  The
semantic conception is completely neutral toward all these issues” (Tarski 1944: 362).
Hence,  I  will  discuss  the  correspondence  theory  regardless  of  any  question  about
scientific realism. Admittedly, there is some relation between them, but, as I will discuss
further  below,  there  is  no  direct  conflict  between “realism”  and “antirealism”  here.
Rather, the point that needs to be underlined is about two different kinds of theories of
truth: 1) truth deals with the correct representation of the mind-independent world; 2)
truth can be defined independently of notions  such as  “representation”,  “reference”,
“denotation” (realistically construed) (see Lynch 2009: 36). Consequently,  of course,
this  is  not  thought  to  deny that  Kuhn is,  to  some extent,  concerned with  scientific
realism. Perhaps Kuhn’s rejection of the correspondence theory depends on his rejection
of metaphysical realism, not the other way round (Bird 2000: 237). But, leaving aside
Kuhn’s  position  in  the  scientific  realism  debate,  the  objection  addresses  the
correspondence theory.  
2.2 Comparison objection and pessimistic meta-induction
  
Coming back to the main issue, in his analysis of the argument, Hoyningen-Huene
notes that it can be divided into two sub-arguments: a historical argument (pessimistic
meta-induction) and an epistemological one (comparison objection) (Hoyningen-Huene
1993:  262-264.  See also Kuukkanen 2007).  Although my discussion focuses on the
epistemological argument, I will start with the historical one, since it introduces some
premises  of  the  comparison  argument.  Pessimistic  induction  does  not  question  the
correspondence (it questions scientific realism); therefore, let me show to what extent it
is relevant to my discussion and to what extent it is not relevant.
The historical argument aims to prove that no evidence is available to demonstrate
that the history of science is an “ontologically convergent” process. This argument is
similar to Laudan’s confutation of convergent realism (Laudan 1981) and aims to show
that there is no connection between the empirical success of science and the increasing
closeness to the truth of its ontological claims. According to Laudan, convergent realism
is  a  theory  that  links  scientific  realism to  the  correspondence  theory  of  truth  (and
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reference) in order to clarify scientific progress in terms of improving approximation to
the truth. It is based on four premises: 1) mature scientific theories are approximately
true and the newer theories are truer than the older ones; 2) the terms used by mature
scientific theories usually refer; 3) the older theories are limiting cases of the newer
ones;  4)  the  more  recent  theories  should  explain  the  empirical  success  of  their
predecessors.  If  we  accept  these  premises,  we  will  conclude  that  mature  scientific
theories should be successful and that their success constitutes evidence for scientific
realism, thanks to the realist notion of reference and the relation between truth (and
increasing verisimilitude)  and successful  reference.  But  pessimistic  induction replies
that  this  argument  does  not  sound  good,  because  many  mature  (and  successful)
scientific  theories  were  not  referring.  For  example,  we  are  quite  sure  that
dephlogisticated  air  does  not  exist,  but  the  phlogiston  theory  explained  many
phenomena in the chemical field and therefore the connection between truth and success
seems to be undermined. 
From this argument, Laudan and many others (including Kuhn) conclude that, since
several past theories were non-referring, there is no evidence for thinking that our best
theories are currently succeeding in individuating the real entities. Each theory has its
own ontology and here the comparison objection comes in: comparing the ontology of
our  best  theories  to  the  real  world  does  not  make  sense,  because  we  do  not  have
independent  access  to  the  objective  world.  Convergent  realism rests  on  the  relation
between  reference,  truth  and  realism.  Arguably,  Kuhn  would  have  rejected  all  the
premises of convergent realism, but the main point is (2), i.e., the concept of reference. 
(1) depends on (2) because truth is defined by means of the concept of reference,
since  the  terms  deployed  by  true  scientific  sentences  should  refer43.  For  example,
Tarski’s theory of truth is usually supposed to provide this kind of connection. Given a
language L, a reference scheme for L is a function which associates one (or no) object
or  a  range of  values  with any predicate  or  variable  of  L.  Since reference-in-L is  a
mapping from names and predicates to denotations and extensions, given a domain of
discourse, reference-in-L is one of the reference schemes for L. Additionally, truth-in-L
assigns  to  each well  formed sentence  of  L a  truth-value.  For  Tarski,  reference-in-L
determines truth-in-L: when we know the definition of reference for L, we can define
truth for L. The reference scheme connects any sentence of L to its truth-value (Leeds
43 This does not mean that, on the contrary, every proposition which includes referential terms is true.
We can formulate false propositions by using referentially successful terms. 
143
1978).  
Moreover, (3) and (4) depend on (2) as well,  because, without a realist theory of
reference, one may use the concepts of reduction and explanation without any realist
commitment,  for  example  from an  instrumentalist  standpoint.  The  relation  between
successive theories can be logically explicated and justified, but this is not sufficient to
vindicate scientific realism, unless we interpret scientific theories in a realist way, by
means of a definite concept of reference. This thesis holds that the referential function
of scientific languages is able to capture some essential properties of the objects with
increasing verisimilitude, although sometimes our beliefs about such objects are wrong.
And that referential success can be preserved across theory-change. Therefore the main
problem is about reference. 
Here I do not wish to talk about the confutation of convergent realism in depth. I
would just like to clarify that the fact that truth and reference are interdefinable notions
does  not  mean  that  the  semantic  theory  of  truth  implies  some  particular  theory  of
reference,  for  example  a  realist  theory  of  reference  (or  that  the  semantic  theory is
necessarily a kind of correspondence theory of truth).  For example,  the deflationary
theory states  that  “being true” and “reference” work in the same way.  Just  like the
schema “p is true if and only if  p” is exhaustive of the notion of truth, the schema “a
refers to a” is exhaustive of the notion of reference (see Båve 2009) and this does not
have any metaphysical implication. This is controversial as well, but what I mean is that
one can accept the truth schema (following the correspondentist or deflationary or any
other interpretation) without committing herself to a specific theory of reference. And
this does not jeopardize the correspondence theory. I will return to this question in the
last  section,  but  at  first  I  shall  illustrate  the  connection  between  reference  and
comparison objection.
In fact, as I have pointed out in Part 1 – sections 3-4 – Kuhn endorses a non-realist
theory  of  reference.  According  to  his  theory,  reference  is  a  function  of  a  lexical
structure, which, in turn, determines the meaning of the terms of the structure (mass,
force and acceleration in classical mechanics; or element and compound in chemistry).
In such a way the connection between scientific language and reality is not a neutral or
realist  connection,  but,  rather,  a  function  which  associates  lexical  structures  with
experimental problem situations. Leaving aside the consequences for scientific realism,
according to Kuhn, this entails that the entities posited by scientific theories have no
144
independent  “ontological  nature”,  since  reference  does  not  provide  us  with  reliable
evidence about the essence of the objects that are “really there”, in the objective world.
This is questionable, but, as I have just said, does not deal with the nature of truth. I
have  stated  that  the  theory  of  reference  we  endorse  does  not  necessitate  anything
concerning our theory of truth, although truth and reference (and meaning) are inter-
defined concepts. Thus, since Kuhn’s argument is against the correspondence theory of
truth,  he  has  to  introduce  the  comparison  objection  to  extend  his  question  about
reference to cover the problem of truth (as correspondence). Basically, the language-
dependence of reference is not a threat to scientific truth (although it may be a problem
for scientific realism); on the contrary, it concerns truth in so far as the non-independent
access to  scientific  reality (for  the language-dependence of reference)  is  used as an
argument  against  the  correspondence  theory  of  truth.  And  that  is  the  comparison
objection.
3. The comparison objection
In the last section I have affirmed that the first premise of Kuhn’s argument against
the correspondence theory is taken from his historical argument (pessimistic induction):
the idea that reference is language-dependent and that it cannot be considered a proof of
the ontologically convergent nature of the history of science. While I have not taken a
stand on pessimistic meta-induction44, I have stated that a non-realist theory of reference
is not a problem for the correspondence theory (and has nothing to do with the theories
of truth).  By contrast,  it  may be a question for scientific truth in so far as you can
connect it to the epistemological argument that I have sketched at the beginning of the
chapter: the comparison objection, which states that (since reference and ontology are
language-dependent and we cannot have direct access to the world) we cannot compare
our beliefs with reality to check their degree of verisimilitude and therefore the idea of
truth as correspondence does not make sense. But, before discussing this argument, I
have to make another clarification.
44 For a discussion of pessimistic meta-induction and its consequences for scientific realism see, among
the  others,  Hardin  and  Rosenberg  1982,  Psillos  1999,  Chakravartty  2007  and  the  debate  about
selective realism.
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3.1 Why an epistemic argument?
The claim that  truth is  non-epistemic is  controversial.  Of course,  there are  some
venerable epistemic theories of truth, such as coherence or pragmatism. But, even if the
non-epistemic nature of truth is not unquestioned, the comparison objection challenges
the correspondence theory and it is definitely a non-epistemic theory. This is one of the
advantages of such a theory with regard to scientific knowledge, since it  states that
propositions are true or false and facts make propositions true. And this seems to be
exactly the case  of  scientific  knowledge:  science consists  of  empirical  propositions,
which are verifiable or falsifiable by means of experiments. The correspondence theory
affirms that there is no philosophical relation between truth and justification (see Alston
1996 and Devitt 1997). On this perspective, truth depends on the world and the relevant
states of affairs; it does not deal with the rationality or the justification of our beliefs and
therefore  no  epistemic  condition  is  included  in  the  correspondence  theory.  All
champions of the correspondence theory stress the non-epistemic nature of truth and
therefore the comparison objection has a weak point: it is an epistemic argument. At
first sight, it does not attack essence of truth, but our methods of verification (the very
idea of comparison). It rejects the correspondence theory in virtue of the fact that we
cannot verify the truth-value of scientific propositions independently of our system of
belief (since we do need our system of beliefs to refer to these states of affairs). But the
comparison is the method by which we check the truth-values of propositions, not the
truth in itself.  One can reply that method of verification and truth are very different
things  and  that  many  propositions  are  certainly  true-or-false,  although  actually  we
cannot verify whether they are true or false. For example the sentence “all swans are
white” is true if and only if all swans are white or, according to the correspondence
theory, it is true if it corresponds to the fact that all swans are white. As a matter of fact,
this proposition cannot be verified (because it is an unrestricted universal statement),
but this does not rule out the correspondence theory as regards this kind of proposition. 
All these observations are right and I agree with the distinction between truth and
justification. But, as regards the application of the comparison objection to scientific
knowledge  the  question  is  not  so  clear.  The  relation  between  truth  and  science
necessarily includes methodological considerations. A true scientific proposition is not
merely true; rather it is a proposition considered true according to the current and shared
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standards and methodology of scientific inquiry. Otherwise, it would not be a scientific
proposition, but, rather, an ordinary proposition or a proposition from other domains of
discourse.  Therefore,  perhaps  the  comparison  objection  does  not  apply  to  the
correspondence theory of truth, but it applies to the correspondence theory of “scientific
truth”, since a proposition may be true or false, but (whatever is its truth-value, if any) it
is  not  a  scientific  proposition  if  it  does  not  rest  on  some  accepted  methodological
standards. Therefore, I think that the discussion of the comparison objection is relevant
to  scientific  knowledge  (a  connection  between  scientific  truth  and  methodology  in
Hacking  1979).  Moreover,  in  the  next  sections,  I  will  further  explain  that  the
comparison objection does not reject the correspondence theory because it  does not
provide a criterion of verification, but, rather, because it entails skepticism. But, at first,
let me spell the argument out in more details. 
3.2 Analysis of the argument
This argument was first proposed by Kant (Vanzo 2010) and is very popular in the
pragmatist  tradition  (Dewey,  Goodman,  Rorty,  Putnam,  Davidson and many others)
(McDermid 1998).  Roughly, the comparison objection states that, if the correspondence
theory  were  right,  we  should  be  able  to  compare  our  beliefs  (or  propositions,  or
sentences) with the facts to find out whether they agree with the relevant states of affairs
or facts. But such (direct) comparison is not possible and therefore it follows that, if we
take the correspondence theory for granted, we will not be able to explain knowledge.
Thus,  if  we  aim  to  save  knowledge  against  skepticism,  we  have  to  reject  the
correspondence theory. The argument goes as follows:
1. The most basic claim of the correspondence theory of truth is that p45 is true if
and only if it  corresponds or agrees with a given “piece” of reality,  usually
objects, facts,  states of affairs or events. You know that  p is true when you
know if it corresponds to that section of reality.
2. If you want to know if  p is true, you have to compare it with its portion of
reality,  i.e.,  you have to  check if  the facts  are  exactly how  p  states  in  that
45 By  p, I  mean  a  truth-bearer,  the  kind  of  things  that  can  be  true  or  false  (propositions,  beliefs,
statements, speech acts, sentences and so on). 
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section of reality.  If  the result  of the comparison is positive,  then  p  is true.
Otherwise it is false.
3. But, if you want to compare p with its section of reality, you must have some
independent knowledge of both the things to compare. Basically, we know  p
with good approximation, since it is the belief we are testing and we have direct
access to it. Comparing p with its specific state of affairs means knowing if it is
confirmed by a  certain  piece  of  reality.  But  how can we have  independent
access to such piece of reality?
4. We cannot have any independent or direct access to the world. That is for many
reasons,  for  example  that  our  knowledge  is  fallible  or  that  reference  is
language-dependent. Consequently, we do not compare  p with the facts, but,
rather, with other “linguistic” or “conceptual” entities, such as judgments or
other beliefs and, in turn, such entities should be justified by means of their
agreement with reality.
5. From this argument, we conclude that, if truth means correspondence between
truth-bearers and reality, truth is a useless concept, since we will not be able to
distinguish between true propositions and false propositions. The consequence
of  the  acceptance  of  the  correspondence  theory  is  radical  skepticism about
knowledge. 
At  first,  note  that,  from  the  conclusion  of  the  argument,  it  follows  that  the
correspondence  theory should  be  rejected  because  it  entails  skepticism (there  is  no
effective difference between true and false propositions); therefore, the main point of
the comparison objection is not the conflation of truth and justification (see the counter-
objection about the non-epistemic nature of truth), but rather, the skeptical results of the
adoption  of  the  correspondence  theory.  This  is  another  reason why I  think  that  the
comparison  objection  is  relevant  to  scientific  truth  and  cannot  be  addressed  by  a
reaffirmation of the distinction between truth and method.
But,  of  course,  there  are  many possible  options  in  front  of  us.  Replying  to  the
skeptical challenge, the philosophers who propose the argument usually reject (1) and
state that there must be another concept of truth (different from the correspondence
theory), which can explain knowledge and defend it against skepticism. They claim that
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the reason of the skeptical conclusion (that they reject) is the theory of truth we hold.
Therefore, for example, we may adopt a pragmatist theory of truth. If we do so, the
skeptical conclusion is ruled out, since the pragmatist theory allows us to distinguish
true propositions from false propositions. Since it does this (while the correspondence
theory  does  not),  many  philosophers  (such  as  Rorty,  Putnam…)  charge  the
correspondence theory with our skeptical puzzle, and insist that we should reject the
correspondence theory and embrace another theory. 
But this is not the only possible solution: one can draw different conclusions from
this argument.  At first, you can accept the argument as well as the skeptical conclusion:
all the steps are correct and we cannot find out the truth-values of propositions. This is a
good conclusion for all the skeptic philosophers, since they welcome the assumption
that  in  principle  human  knowledge  cannot  provide  a  criterion  for  identifying  true
beliefs. Moreover you can reject (4) and say that there are some experimental data or
privileged sensory presentations that are available for direct access and knowledge is
grounded in these basic experiences. The comparison objection takes for granted the
rejection of the “myth of the given”, i.e. the idea that the mind is basically a passive
receiver  and that  it  mirrors  the  objects  of  knowledge without  any distortion.  But  a
follower of the “myth of the given” (even in a minimal form) may disagree with (4).
Additionally, one can reject (3), for example from a non-realist viewpoint. According to
my previous clarification about the relation between correspondence truth and scientific
realism (every theory of truth is consistent with any metaphysical thesis about the nature
of the world), one can connect the correspondence theory to an idealist metaphysics: the
world consists of mental states. Therefore, the problem of the independent access to an
unconceptualized  reality  does  not  affect  such  a  theory.  The  comparison  does  not
involve, from the one hand, a linguistic entity (truth-bearer) and, from the other hand,
the “real world”,  but rather,  two conceptual entities:  truth-bearers and mental states.
These options are interesting, but I will not discuss them. That is because I think that
skepticism and idealism are not viable choices for scientific knowledge and that the
philosophers  of  science  have  sufficiently  argued  against  the  “myth  of  the  given”
(although I  do deny that it  is  still  a controversial  point).  But,  before presenting my
counter-objection to the comparison argument, I shall say that there is another way of
rejecting the argument and that I agree with it. Bird (Bird 2000: 227) argues against the
comparison objection by means of an example. Consider a lock and a key and that I
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succeed in using the key to open the lock; I know that key works because there is a
match between the key and the levers of the lock, even if I do not have independent
access to the levers of the lock. And, in the same way, the idea of a match between
scientific theories and facts makes sense even if I do not have independent access to the
relevant scientific facts. Bird rejects the step (3) of the comparison objection and I am
sympathetic with this argument. But, although I agree in the substance, my argument
differs in two respects from this one: a) it has a more narrow domain of application; b) it
is more focused on the correspondence theory. According to (a) Bird's argument applies
to  knowledge  and  facts  in  general,  while  my  argument  is  limited  to  scientific
knowledge. According to (b), Bird's argument addresses the concept of truth by means
of the concept of knowledge: I can know that the facts exist (and play a causal role),
even  if  I  cannot  directly  know  them.  On  the  contrary,  my  argument  focus  on  the
correspondence theory straightaway.   
So, I will argue against (2): the idea that the correspondence theory requires some
kind of comparison. 
3.3 Correspondence truth and the concept of “comparison”
In the  previous  section  I  have  summarized  the  comparison objection  and I  have
stated that, in my view, the most intriguing premise is (2): roughly, if you want to know
if  p is true (according to the correspondence theory), you have to compare  p with the
relevant section of reality. I do not agree with this claim and I will try to show that truth
(especially scientific truth) bears no relation to such kind of comparison. But the idea of
comparing a theory and its “real” counterpart is basically the core of Kuhn’s argument
against the correspondence theory. Therefore, let me come back to the argument.
In fact, on the light of these clarifications, I think that Kuhn's argument is now clear.
Since “there is no theory-independent way to reconstruct phrases like ‘really there’” (the
second premise of pessimistic induction, i.e., reference is language-dependent) and “the
notion of a match between the ontology of a theory and its real counterpart in nature is
illusive”  (the  second  premise  of  the  comparison  objection),  therefore  the
correspondence theory cannot  account for the development of science.  Since I  have
stated that the language-dependence of reference is not a problem for truth in principle,
the  core  of  the  objection  is  the  second premise  of  the  comparison objection.  Kuhn
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affirms that it is pointless to talk about a match between scientific propositions and a
purely  object-sided  reality.  That  is  because  this  match  requires  that  they  are  both
accessible independently of one another; but if we could have independent (or direct)
access to reality, we would not need to elaborate hypotheses about reality and compare
them with reality. 
Therefore,  in order to reject this  argument,  I will focus on the idea of the match
between  the  ontology  of  the  theory  and  its  “real”  counterpart.  For  example,  the
comparison objection says that Einstein's concept of space is more similar to Aristotle's
space than to Newton's absolute space and therefore it is not clear what it means that the
theory of relativity is closer to the truth than classical mechanics. Since, according to the
correspondence  theory  (and  the  argument  from  empirical  success  to  truth),  both
Newton’s and Einstein’s theories should “correspond” to some aspects of the world, it
seems that the correspondence theory cannot account for scientific progress. The idea of
a comparison between theory and reality does not make sense here,  because we are
dealing with very different models and, if scientific progress consisted in the increasing
verisimilitude of our theories, this would not be the case.
But, I think that both in the basic version and in Kuhn’s version of the comparison
objection,  the major weak point is the idea that the correspondence theory entails a
comparison  between  p and  the  respective  facts  and  that  such  comparison  requires
independent knowledge of p and the facts. The comparison objection states that we need
p to have access to the piece of reality described by p and therefore we cannot consider
“the fact that  p” an independent truth-maker of  p.  But the correspondence theory of
truth does not entail the existence of theory independent truth-makers. It claims only
that there is a certain kind of relation between the truth-bearer p and the state of affairs
described by  p46.  Thus,  I  have affirmed neither  that there is  a metaphysical relation
(causation,  necessitation  and  so  on)  between  propositions  and  facts,  nor  that  the
correspondence  theory  entails  specific  theses  about  the  metaphysics  of  facts  (for
example  a  realist  metaphysics)  or  the  epistemology  of  facts  (that  we  should  have
independent access to the relevant scientific facts). 
According  to  the  comparison  objection  (and  as  we  have  seen  referring  to  the
46 The correspondence relation can be described by very different viewpoints. The most famous are
Russell’s congruence and Austin’s correlation. Anyway, the comparison objection does not attack a
specific kind of correspondence: it is a purely epistemological objection (McDermid 2006: 14). This
allows us to characterize the correspondence theory in a very minimal way, without dealing with
metaphysical implications. 
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evolutionary epistemology in the last section), scientific theories are always compared
with one another, rather than with the facts. One can compare Newton’s and Einstein’s
models to find out which is the best one to explain some empirical facts. But, for the
comparison objection, one cannot compare Einstein’s model (or Newton’s model) with
the world. This insight is partially right: comparing theories is very useful because each
theory  should  respond  to  the  anomalies  of  its  rivals  and,  moreover,  scientists  are
allowed to reject a theory only when they have a better theory. It is meaningless to reject
a theory if you do not have another good option. But, at the same time, this does not
mean that the determination of the truth-values of scientific theories has nothing to do
with the world. In its application to the philosophy of science, the comparison objection
poses a problem about the ontologies of scientific theories: the problem of the match
between the ontology of a theory and the relative section of reality. But the empirical
testing of scientific theories does not mention ontology. Scientists do not compare the
ontological  claims  of  their  theories  with  reality;  rather,  they  compare  empirical
propositions (broadly conceived) with the results of their experiments. For example, if
the verisimilitude of scientific theories depended on their ontology, every heliocentric
theory would be better than any geocentric theory, since it is quite certain that the Earth
revolves  around  the  Sun,  but  this  is  not  true.  From  an  empirical  viewpoint,  the
Ptolemaic model was more successful than the early Pythagorean geocentric  model,
since it had much more verified consequences than the heliocentric theory before the
Copernican revolution (even if it was based on a false assumption).   
Therefore,  I  think that,  when we refer  to the verisimilitude of scientific  theories,
ontology is not the main problem. In order to explain this question, I will introduce a
distinction between empirical verisimilitude and ordinary verisimilitude.
4. Empirical and ordinary verisimilitude
In the last section I have summarized the steps of the comparison objection and I
have  affirmed  that  it  assumes  an  idea  of  “comparison”  that  is  not  required  by the
correspondence  theory.  Specifically,  as  regards  scientific  knowledge,  it  mentions  an
impossible  “match”  between  ontology  and  reality  and  I  think  that  this  idea  is
misleading.  On  that  matter  I  propose  a  distinction  between  empirical  and  ordinary
verisimilitude; it is a distinction between the empirical and the ontological features of
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science as well. For example, Lakatos claims that:
‘Verisimilitude’ has two distinct meanings which must not be conflated. First, it
may be used to mean intuitive truthlikeness of the theory; in this sense, in my view,
all  scientific theories  created by the human mind are  equally unverisimilar  and
‘occult’. Secondly, it may be used to mean a quasi-measure-theoretical difference
between  the  true  and  the  false  consequences  which  we  can  never  know  but
certainly may guess. (Lakatos 1978: 101 n. 1)
The  term  “verisimilitude”  has  two  meanings:  at  first,  it  refers  to  the  intuitive
verisimilitude of the theory, the ontological similarity between the entities posited by
scientific theories and the entities that are “really there”. This is the commonsensical or
ordinary meaning of ‘verisimilitude’. Referring to  a,  p is verisimilar if it looks like a,
according  to  some  relevant  features.  The  comparison  objection  may  apply  to  this
concept  of  verisimilitude,  but,  as  regards  ordinary verisimilitude,  we can accept  the
skeptical conclusion of the argument without rejecting the correspondence theory. Since
our  knowledge is  fallible,  it  is  not  a problem that  all  scientific  theories  are  equally
unverisimilar from an ontological viewpoint. For example, the analogy between atoms
and the Solar System does not entail that they really look like the Solar System. 
But what is important is that the empirical statements that we infer from the analogy
are  confirmed  by  the  relevant  experiments.  Therefore,  let  me  present  the  second
meaning of “verisimilitude”: from a technical viewpoint (presented by Popper and many
others), verisimilitude refers to the difference between the true and the false empirical
consequences of a theory. Of course, this is a controversial thesis and there are many
different accounts of the concept of verisimilitude that I cannot discuss here (See for
example  Niiniluoto 1987 and Oddie  1986).  But  my point  is  that  such a  theory can
account for many important facts about truth that the “ordinary theory” cannot explain.
For example that, just like some falsehoods are closer to the truth than other falsehoods
(and  some  truths  are  closer  to  the  truth  than  some  other  truths),  sometimes  some
falsehoods  are  closer  to  the  truth  than  some  truths:  it  depends  on  the  empirical
consequences  of  our  theories.  For  example,  take  a  sentence  which  lacks  empirical
content by definition, such as a tautology. Tautologies are true: the proposition “all the
atoms  are  atoms”  is  true.  On  the  contrary  the  proposition  “electrons,  protons  and
neutrons are the fundamental elements of the atom” is false,  but, from an empirical
viewpoint, it is  truer than “atoms are atoms”. The example of the tautology may be
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misleading, but take a proposition like “atoms are divisible”; it is true, but, anyway, it is
less  true  than “electrons,  protons  and neutrons  are  the fundamental  elements  of  the
atom” (if the words “electrons”, “protons” and “neutrons” are meaningful). The same
remark applies to the Pythagorean sentence “the Earth revolves around the Sun”, which
is true from the commonsensical viewpoint, but it is trivial from an empirical viewpoint,
since  we  cannot  verify  many  empirical  sentences  if  we  take  for  granted  such
Heliocentric statement. The question is that the correspondence theory does deal with
the  empirical  sentences  that  we  are  allowed  to  express  (and  test)  by means  of  the
theoretical  structure  of  the  theory.  Here  the  comparison  objection  does  not  apply
because no ontological  comparison is  involved in  the  empirical  testing  of  scientific
theories.  Consequently  the  correspondence  theory  of  truth  applies  to  empirical
statements: if p is a scientific statement, p is true if and only if it corresponds to p; i.e., it
agrees  with  the  results  of  experimental  practice.  Scientific  truth  is  necessarily  an
“alleged truth”, that is to say truth according to the current methodology of scientific
research  (including  fallibilism).  But  this  does  not  put  in  doubt  the  correspondence
theory.
4.1 Ontological verisimilitude
I have stated that ontological verisimilitude is not a criterion for scientific progress. It
is not required that the entities posited by scientific theories look like the “real entities”.
Anyway, I think that here we are dealing with reference and scientific realism, not with
the truth. Or perhaps, truth and ontological verisimilitude are related in so far as truth
involves concepts such as reference and representation. One can think that, according to
the  correspondence  theory,  scientific  theories  should  provide  us  with  a  “reliable
representation” of the real states of affairs. But I have argued that the correspondence
theory  does  not  entail  a  specific  theory  of  reference  or  representation.  As  I  have
sketched at the beginning of the chapter, this is a dividing line between two kinds of
theories of truth: the former states that truth deals with the correct representation of the
mind-independent world (representational truth); the latter that truth does not depend on
(realist) notions such as “representation”, “reference”, “denotation”. 
The representational theory of truth (Lynch 2009: 21-32) rests  on the concept of
reference. It can be expressed as follows:
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• RCT (Representational Correspondence Truth): the snow is white is true if and
only if the object denoted by “the snow” has the property denoted by “being
white”.
The  idea  is  that  the  truth-values  of  propositions  are  determined  by  the
representational relation between their components and the objects and the properties
they stand for  (and by the  logical  connectives).  Obviously,  (RCT) should include a
theory of how names and concepts denote the respective objects  and properties and
there  are  several  possible  answers  to  this  question  (reflecting  our  metaphysical
commitment). But I think that this is not an effective objection, since, as I have argued
in Part 1, a strictly realist concept of reference is not necessary for scientific statements.
Reference is not essential to explain empirical success in terms of approximate truth
(Hardin, Rosenberg 1982).
At first, as regards truth in general, note that Tarski's theory does not necessarily go
in that direction. In fact, Tarski defines the truth of a sentence by means of the concept
of satisfaction by every sequence of objects. So the concept of satisfaction (as well as
the concept of truth) is defined appealing to the relation between infinite sequences of
objects and atomic sentential functions. “Facts” as something referred by whole true
sentences do not appear in Tarski's theory, which is an (infinite sequence of) object-
based theory, rather than a fact-based theory. From this premise, Davidson concludes
that the semantic theory is not a kind of correspondence theory (since if a sequence
satisfies  a  sentence,  then  the  same  sequence  satisfies  any  other  true  sentence;  see
Davidson  1996).  On  the  contrary,  other  scholars  conclude  that  the  structure  of  the
semantic theory allows us to elaborate a weak or modest correspondence theory that
avoid the comparison objection, since there is no need to compare whole sentences with
the world (see Marino 2006 and 2008 and Kitcher 2002). My discussion is consistent
with the idea of a weak correspondence theory (that I will develop in Part 3), but, since
my  discussion  is  restricted  to  scientific  knowledge,  there  is  a  more  direct  way of
addressing the problem.
In fact, at second, as regards scientific truth, Cruse and Papineau (2002) argue that,
referring to the question of approximate truth, the answer to the problem of reference
(and referential  failure) is  not a “generous” theory of reference (just  like the causal
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theory  of  reference).  For  example,  a  traditional  strategy  adopted  by  the  generous
theories of reference to explain the success of non-referential theories consists in the
identification  of  co-referential  terms  (see  Part  1  –  section  2).  According  to  this
perspective, ether and electromagnetic field refer to the same entity and this explains the
success of the theory of ether (although ether strictly construed does not exist); but, as
the generous model argues, the ether theory fails  to account for certain phenomena,
which are explained by the electromagnetism theory. But this is precisely a too generous
criterion, since we may arrange every theory to be co-referential with any other theory,
if  we  admit  this  kind  of  exception:  for  example  we  might  say  that  the  theory  of
gravitation  and  the  theory  of  “natural  place”  are  co-referential  (because  they  both
explain  the  cause  of  fall),  although  Aristotle’s  theory  fails  to  account  for  some
phenomena explained by Newton. Cruise and Papineau suggest that the correct solution
is exactly the opposite: they reject this concept of reference.
According to this model, the relevant content of scientific theories is captured by
their  Ramsey sentences.  Ramsey sentences  express  the  theoretical  predicates  of  the
theory by means of existentially quantified variables. Roughly, the theory
T (F1,…, Fn)
can be expressed as follows by means of its Ramsey sentence
(E!x1)…(E!xn)T(x1…xn).
The Ramsey sentence says that there are some objects which are correlated to some
experimental data through certain postulates. But it does not say what those entities are.
Therefore Cruse and Papineau conclude that “the referential success or failure of the
terms in a theory is irrelevant to the approximate truth of its Ramsey-sentence, since the
theoretical  terms  do not  occur  in  the  Ramsey-sentence” (Cruse and Papineau 2002:
147). For example a theory that uses the word “ether” fails to refer, but the truthlikeness
of the relevant Ramsey sentence does not depend on the referential failure of the word
“ether”. Ether may be not-existing, but a sentence deploying the word “ether” may be
approximately true if it says that there is an entity which is the seat of electromagnetic
phenomena,  involves  a  given kind  of  radiation  and has  other  (detection)  properties
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confirmed by the electromagnetism theory47. Here I am not committing myself to the
distinction between theoretical and observational terms (rather, I am using the Ramsey-
sentence to clarify non-referential terms). My point is that the rejection of the generous
theories of reference (and the fact that we can “deflate” the non-referential theoretical
claims of science) is not problematic for the correspondence theory of scientific truth:
we can explain the approximate truth of scientific  sentences  without  appealing to  a
realist concept of reference and therefore the comparison objection is not effective.
 Finally, I can conclude that the comparison objection to the correspondence theory
should be rejected, because it does not apply to the empirical statements of science,
since their verification does not involve a comparison between “scientific entities” and
“real entities”. 
5. Conclusions
In this chapter I have discussed the consequences for the philosophy of science of the
comparison objection to the correspondence theory, which states that we should reject
the correspondence theory because it entails the idea of a direct comparison between
theory  and  reality,  and  such  comparison  is  meaningless.  In  the  first  part  I  have
distinguished the comparison argument from pessimistic induction and I have concluded
that the former is based on the most basic premise of the latter: that there are genuine
cases of referential failure and reference is, to some extent, language-dependent. But
this does not threaten scientific truth, since the correspondence theory does not entail a
specific  theory of  reference.  Therefore,  in  the  second part  I  have  reconstructed  the
comparison  objection  and  I  have  argued  that  its  weak  point  is  the  idea  that  the
correspondence  theory  requires  some  kind  of  comparison  between  real  entities  and
theoretical entities.  I  have rejected this  idea distinguishing the ontological claims of
science  (from  a  commonsensical  viewpoint)  from  the  empirical  claims.  From  the
empirical  viewpoint,  the  verisimilitude  of  scientific  theories  does  not  involve
ontologies,  but,  rather  the  evaluation  of  the  empirical  content  of  scientific  theories;
therefore, the fact that successive theories postulate very different ontologies does not
question their empirical content. On the contrary, from the ontological viewpoint, the
47 This kind of solution is sympathetic with epistemic structural realism; but ontic structural realism can
address the comparison objection as well as every theory that is not literally committed to a one-to-
one relation between theoretical entities and “real entities”; I will explain in Part 3 – section 2 why
the ontic way fails for other reasons.
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comparison  objection  is  not  a  problem  for  scientific  truth,  since  the  questionable
theoretical claims can be expressed by means of the Ramsey sentence, which allows us
to distinguish the problem of truth from the problem of referential success and failure.
Finally,  my conclusion  is  that  the  comparison objection  should  be  rejected,  and so
Kuhn's version of the incommensurability thesis.
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Part 3: Defending Correspondence Truth
In  the  last  section  I  have  explained  why  Kuhn's  arguments  against  the
correspondence theory of truth (based on the ideas that I have endorsed in Part 1) do not
sound good and I have concluded that a weak correspondence theory (no one-to-one
correspondence or isomorphism between theory and facts, no strong commitment to the
notion of fact) is consistent with the language-dependence of reference and with the
claims that I have presented so far. But now, it is time to develop a positive view about
scientific truth, defending the weak correspondence theory that I have sketched in Part 2
– section 4. This chapter is totally apart from Kuhn's works and the debate based on
them; even though it is dependent on the Kuhnian concepts that I have exposed in the
previous sections, it is an analysis of the concept of scientific truth that take us further
away from traditional issues in the philosophy of science. Above all, the main point is
that the concept of interpreted structure (and exemplary cases) that I have introduced,
far from being a problem for the correspondence theory (as Kuhn thought to be), is a
plus point of weak correspondence. In fact, I will argue that a proper correspondence
theory is not consistent with the idea that pure mathematical structures are the essential
part  of  scientific  theories;  on  the  contrary  only  interpreted  structures  (based  on
previously fixed meanings) can be true or false in any significant sense.  So, at  first
(section 1), I will say that, besides not needing the concept of fact, weak correspondence
does not need a unitary account of the correspondence relation as well. So, the fact that,
in scientific contexts, the correspondence relation can obtain in different ways is not
problematic, once we have realized that this does not imply that there is more than one
truth property. Therefore, I will highlight the importance of the concept of interpreted
structure  (and  language)  in  order  to  use  a  proper  truth  predicate  (section  2);  this
differentiates my approach to the current ones in scientific realism and model theories.
Finally (section 3), I will explain the difference between my modest correspondentist
approach and pure deflationary theories: to do this, I will focus on the explanatory role
played by the truth predicate in the inference from truth to success (and vice versa). In
particular, my point is that the deflationary theories fail to account for the concept of
approximate truth, while weak correspondence does not. Moreover, in the last chapter
(section 4), I will summarize weak correspondence, present a concrete application of the
theory and reply to some questions and objections. Thus, in the end, contrary to what
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Kuhn himself believed, the Kuhnian perspective on meaning and reference is not only
consistent with correspondence truth, but it constitutes, to some extent, evidence for the
correspondence  theory  (for  the  concepts  of  exemplary  applications  and  physical
interpretation).
Section 1: Can a Philosopher of Science be an Alethic Pluralist?
1. Introduction
In  the  last  chapter  I  have  discussed  and  rejected  a  classic  objection  concerning
correspondence truth. Now, in this chapter, I will focus on another important point: the
ways the correspondence relation can obtain. In fact, it seems that, at least in scientific
context, the correspondence relation can obtain in different ways; and this may be a
problem for the correspondence theory, which claims that there is only one way of being
true (one truth property). Rather, basing on the plurality of the correspondence relation,
one may conclude that we should endorse some kind of alethic pluralism. Thus, in this
chapter, I will analyze this pluralist theory in the formulation recently proposed by Ian
Hacking (2012). Here Hacking claims that there is a parallel between his theory of the
styles of scientific reasoning (and the idea of scientific truth that they entail) and the
pluralist  theory presented by Wright (1992). But he merely says that his theory (the
styles of reasoning) “gibes well with Crispin Wright's pluralism” and does not clarify
this  idea  in  depth  and at  length.  Here I  will  try  to  explain  and discuss  this  thesis.
Roughly, just like alethic pluralism claims that there are as many truth properties as
there are discourse-fields (empirical, moral, legal, mathematical and so on), scientific
truth  pluralism claims that  there are  as  many truth  properties  as  there are  styles  of
scientific reasoning (mathematical, experimental, probabilistic, analogical and so on).
Since  this  is  still  unclear,  I  will  identify  three  feasible  kinds  of  scientific  alethic
pluralism:  (1)  method-dependent  (alethic  pluralism  follows  from  methodological
pluralism);  (2)  discourse-dependent  (alethic  pluralism follows  from the  plurality  of
styles  of  reasoning);  (3)  language-dependent  (alethic  pluralism  follows  from  the
impossibility to define a language-independent truth predicate). I think that the only
tenable position is (3), but it is not a kind of standard alethic pluralism, since it does not
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imply that there is a correspondence relation for each style of reasoning. So, at first, let
me present the terms of the question. 
Styles of Reasoning (SR). By styles of reasoning, Hacking means what Crombie calls
styles  of  scientific  thinking:  simple  postulation  in  mathematics,  experimental
exploration  and  measurements,  construction  of  analogical  models,  ordering  by
taxonomy, calculus of probability, historical analysis of genetic development. The styles
of reasoning allow scientists to express meaningful scientific sentences (candidates for
truth-value  attributions)  in  a  given context  and establish  what  counts  as  rational  or
irrational in that field. 
Alethic Pluralism (AP). In the basic interpretation, alethic pluralism is the claim that
there is more than one truth property48. For example, in scientific contexts, the idea that
truth  means  correspondence  between  sentences  and  facts  seems  to  be  intuitively
plausible. But this idea is less plausible referring to contexts such as ethics or aesthetics.
So truth (T) is a substantive property (the property T exists and any true sentence is true
in virtue of being T and this is not transparent in our concept of truth), but consists of
several properties T1, T2, …, Tn. 
Moreover,  the  possible  kinds  of  pluralism  that  I  will  propose  to  apply  (AP)  to
scientific knowledge and practice are as follows:
Methodological Pluralism (MP). Methodological pluralism argues against the idea of
a single and universal scientific method, invariant through the history of science and
scientific  fields  (Sankey  2000).  On  the  contrary,  we  can  recognize  a  plurality  of
methodological  rules  governing  theory  evaluation  and  choice.  Methodological  rules
may be modified through the history of science, may apply in different ways in different
fields of scientific investigation and different scientists may interpret the same rules in
different ways.     
Discourse-Field  Pluralism  (DFP).  According  to  discourse-field  pluralism,  our
discourse (D) shows some natural and intuitive divisions, such that we can divide D in
some quite stable regions of discourse D1, D2, …, Dn (See for example Putnam 1994). In
ordinary discourse, such fields are the empirical field, the juridical field, the moral field
48 Here my discussion is based on Wright's standard alethic pluralism (Wright 1992). Actually I am not
considering the functionalist variant (see Lynch 2009), claiming that there is only one truth property,
which manifests itself in different ways. 
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and so on. As regards science, (DFP) claims that scientific discourse, too, is divisible in
different,  natural  and quite  stable  regions  of discourse,  mainly corresponding to the
styles of scientific reasoning. 
Language Pluralism (LP). Language pluralism is the thesis that a universal scientific
language (L) does not exist and therefore scientific language consists of several sub-
languages  independent  of  each  other  (see  for  example  Kuhn  2000).  Each  language
defines  its  own  terms  and  sentences  and  the  stability  of  meaning  (within  a  given
language L1 or L2 or Ln)  is a precondition for the definition of a truth predicate for L1 or
L2 or Ln. Languages are distinguished basing on the semantic relations between the most
basic  sentences,  concepts  and  terms  deployed  by  the  mathematical  core  (if  any,
otherwise the general core) of scientific theories.
Therefore, in this chapter I will try to clarify the relation between (SR) and (AP),
taking into account the possible kinds of pluralism in scientific discourse and practice,
i.e. methods (MP), discourse-fields (DFP) and languages (LP). If my interpretation is
right, Hacking's idea rests on a combination of (MP) and (DFP), but I will argue that
either  it  does  not  entail  (AP)  (but,  rather,  only  epistemological  pluralism)  or  it  is
untenable.  On the  contrary (LP) is  tenable,  relevant  to  scientific  truth  and partially
consistent with (SR), but it does not entail (AP), at least in its standard interpretation
(the number of truth properties is greater than one). So, I will conclude that the pluralist
argument does not threaten the correspondence theory, which is consistent with the idea
that there is no available unitary account of the correspondence relation. Moreover, I
will go into the details of language pluralism in the next chapter, but actually the point is
that is not a metaphysical claim about the essence of truth is, but rather a linguistic
question concerning the relation between meaning and truth (and the truth predicate,
rather than the truth property).
2. From the styles of scientific reasoning to alethic pluralism
In  this  section  I  will  explain  how  alethic  pluralism  follows  from  Hacking's
conception of scientific knowledge and practice. At first, I shall remind that an explicit
definition of “style of reasoning” is not available. Anyway, we can provide a tentative
list of the most important styles of thinking in the history of science.   
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1. Simple postulation in Greek mathematical sciences
2. Experimental exploration and measurement
3. Hypothetical construction of analogical models
4. Ordering of variety by comparison and taxonomy
5. Statistical analysis and calculus of probability
6. Historical derivation of genetic development
These  styles  are  listed  by  Crombie  and  Hacking  adds  the  laboratory  style
characterizing contemporary science: the construction of instruments for the isolation of
existing phenomena and the “creation” of new ones. Roughly, the styles of reasoning
have four features49: 1) they introduce new objects, laws, kinds of sentence and kinds of
explanation  within  scientific  investigation;  2)  they  are  self-authenticating,  i.e.  they
define  their  own criteria  of  adequacy,  rationality and meaningfulness;  3)  each  style
develops its techniques of stabilization (and some techniques are more efficient than the
others); 4) at the same time, each style is grounded in the cognitive capacities of human
beings (depending on evolution and natural selection) and in human history and culture. 
For my purpose, the most important feature is the second one: self-authentication.
Roughly, self-authentication (or autonomy) means that the styles of reasoning are not
good because they help us to track truth. Rather, they have established standards and
criteria of truthfulness and these criteria justify themselves without recurring to further
criteria.  This  is  a  possible  answer  to  the  problems  concerning  foundationalism and
justification,  for example the problem of the criterion.  Consider  the problem of the
epistemic  justification  of  a  given  belief  and  that  this  belief  deals  with  something
immediately  perceptible,  for  example  the  presence  of  an  object  in  the  room I  am
working in. We will say that the belief is epistemically justified if the relevant sensorial
experience obtains (for instance,  if I  see the object with my eyes).  But this process
assumes an epistemic principle: that we should trust in our senses and use immediate
experience as a criterion. But how can we justify the criterion itself? There are three
possible answers to this question (Sankey 2011):
• appealing to a further criterion (to meta-justify the original criterion), but, in
turn,  such  criterion  should  be  justified  by  another  criterion,  falling  into  an
infinite regress;
• appealing to the original criterion (for example, using sensorial experience to
49 For a recent introduction to the styles of reasoning see Ruphy 2011.
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justify our trust in sensorial experience), but this kind of justification is circular;
• blocking the  infinite  regress,  claiming that  there  is  a  criterion  that  does  not
require justification, but in this case justification would be a dogmatic matter.
The theory of the styles of scientific reasoning provides us with an answer to this
puzzle,  since  it  claims  that  styles  do  not  ask  for  a  meta-justification.  They do not
respond to any other, independent or higher standard than their own50. I will return on
the problem of the criterion further below. Now I just mean that the self-authentication
of the styles of reasoning consists in the fact that nothing more primitive or fundamental
can be said in meta-justification of their standards. But, in order to understand how self-
authentication is related to scientific truth, I have to introduce the notion of candidate
for truth or falsehood. 
In fact, defining its standards, a style of reasoning defines the kinds of sentence that
are available for truth-value attributions. A candidate for truth or falsehood is a sentence
that  can  be  expressed  and  tested  or  justified  according  to  the  current  and  shared
standards  of  scientific  investigation  (formulated  by  the  relevant  style  of  scientific
reasoning). Hacking suggests to consider the truth-value of a sentence such as “the gross
national product of Württenberg was 76.3 million adjusted to 1820 crowns” and claims
that,  before  the  beginning  of  the  19th century,  it  was  not  candidate  for  truth-value
attribution. From the one hand, it is because the concept of gross national product was
not defined before, but, above all, it is because “there was no procedure of reasoning
about the relevant ideas” (Hacking 1992: 143) since the statistical style of reasoning is a
precondition for the possibility of being true-or-false of this sentence. Of course, this
does  not  apply  to  all  sentences,  but  only  to  those  sentences  whose  conditions  of
verification (and expression) are strictly related to the existence of the relevant style.
For example,  it  is arguable that the sentence “the cat is on the mat” is true-or-false
independently of any style of reasoning and at any time of human history and culture.
Moreover, the theory of the styles of scientific reasoning is neither anti-realist (the truth-
makers  of  scientific  sentences  are  language-dependent  or  style-dependent  or  mind-
dependent)  nor  relativist  (the  truth-value  of  a  sentence  may  vary  across  cultures,
theories, styles and individuals). The style determines the sentences having positivity
50 Now one may associate the styles of reasoning is with pragmatism, since it is based on the fact that
styles of reasoning work. But this is not the case, since success helps us to determine what will count
as success, since it characterizes what will count as success in the future.
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(the candidates for truth and falsehood), but does not determine the actual truth-value of
such sentences,  while  the world does.  The facts  make sentences  true (or false),  but
sentences are available for truth-value attributions thanks to the style they belong to.
The combination of these two claims (self-authentication and candidate for truth-value
attributions) has two consequences about the relation between truth and the sciences.
From the one hand, at a macro-level (scientific progress as increasing convergence to
the objective world) the pursuit of truth cannot be considered the general aim of science:
since each style justifies itself and is true according to its own standards, it is pointless
to look for a uniform and coherent direction in the history of science, namely increasing
approximation to the truth. This deals with Hacking's conception of the disunities of
sciences (Hacking 1996) and could be an argument for pessimistic meta-induction, but I
will not discuss it here. 
From  the  other  hand,  at  a  micro-level  (the  truth-value  of  individual  scientific
sentences), we might conclude that the correspondence theory of truth is not sufficient
to account for scientific knowledge and practice. Hacking does not deny that scientific
sentences are true because (to some extent) they correspond to the world; rather, he
rejects the pretension to universality of the correspondence theory (Hacking 1992: 135).
This  is  the  origin  of  alethic  pluralism.  According  to  the  monist  theories,  all  true
sentences share a property, namely the property of “being true”, where “being true” may
mean “corresponding to the mind-independent world” or “belonging to a coherent set of
beliefs” or “being warrantedly assertible” and so on. To the question “is there something
that all  true sentences share?”,  the monist  would respond, for example,  that all  true
sentences correspond to the facts; or that all true sentences belong to a coherent set of
beliefs; or that all true sentences are warrantedly assertible. On the contrary, according
to the theory of the styles of reasoning, the answer is negative: there is no theory of truth
which applies to all the contingent empirical sentences and therefore there are as many
ways of being true as there are ways of reasoning about the relevant sentences51.    
In the following sections I will discuss how truth works at the level of the truth-
values of scientific sentences; but now, I have to outline the pluralist theory entailed by
the styles of reasoning.
51 Some theories of truth affirm that truth is correspondence, but there are many ways of corresponding
to the facts (see for example Horgan 2001 or Sher 2013). But they claim that the correspondence
theory is the common basis to understand how truth works, while Hacking denies that it is exhaustive
of the notion of truth. 
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3. Outlining a pluralist theory of truth for scientific sentences
Therefore,  to  summarize,  the  relation  between  alethic  pluralism  and  styles  of
reasoning is based on two premises:
• Self-authentication:  each  style  defines  its  own  standards  of  meaningfulness,
rationality, objectivity (and so on) and such standards are not asking for a meta-
justification. The relation between style and truth is circular: “the truth is what
we find out in such and such way. We recognize it as truth because of how we
find it. And how do we know that the method is good? Because it gets at the
truth” (Hacking 1992: 135).
• Candidates for truth or falsehood: some scientific sentences are not true-or-false
in  general,  but,  rather,  true-or-false  referring  to  the  style  of  reasoning  they
belong  to.  That  is  because  some  sentences  are  not  available  for  empirical
procedures independently of the existence of such styles. A sentence that is true-
or-false according to a given style of reasoning could not be candidate for truth-
value attribution in another style.
Basing on these premises, Hacking concludes that the number of truth properties is
greater than one in scientific context as well. Roughly, such theory of truth has three
features and shares them with the standard interpretation of alethic pluralism:
1) Substativism: unlike the deflationary theories, the substantivist theories of truth claim
“being true” to be a genuine property and that the schema “p is true if and only if p” is
not exhaustive of the notion of truth. Better, according to both the theory of the styles of
reasoning and to alethic pluralism, the nature of the truth property is not transparent
from the analysis of the concept of truth (just like the property denoted by water, i.e.
“being H2O”, is not transparent from the concept of water). And, of course, claiming
that there is more than one way of being true is not consistent with the idea that truth is
transparent52. Since the relation between style of reasoning and truth is circular, if truth
had no nature,  we would not  be able  to  individuate the styles  of  reasoning;  that  it
52 In some works, Hacking seems to suggest that the deflationary theory can be applied to scientific
knowledge. But I think that this claim should not be literally interpreted and he really means that: 1)
there is no unitary theory of truth for scientific knowledge; 2) truth cannot be used as explanation for
any metaphysical issue.
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because,  just  like  a  style  of  reasoning  allows  scientists  to  express  true-or-false
sentences,  we  would  appeal  to  what  counts  as  true-or-false  in  a  given  context  to
distinguish that context from the others. If truth has no nature, we will not be able to
appeal to the truth to recognize the differences between the various styles of reasoning
(since we cannot use truth as explanation. See Lynch 2009: 5 for this argument).
2) Objectivism: unlike the subjectivist theories of truth (coherentism and pragmatism),
both the theory of the styles and alethic pluralism claim that the truth (or falsehood) of a
sentence depends on how things are and not on how someone (individual or group or
culture) might think or wish them to be. So, the relativization of truth to the styles does
not undermine its objectivity. Both truth-makers and truth are mind-independent (and
language-independent and culture-independent), but the relation between sentence and
truth-maker can obtain in different ways according to the relevant way of reasoning
about it. The actual truth-value of scientific sentences is determined by the world, while
the possibility to attribute a truth-value to such sentences (the sentences whose essence
is strictly related to the style) is determined by the style of reasoning. The sentence “the
gross national product of Württenberg was 76.3 million adjusted to 1820 crowns” is
made true by the relevant empirical facts, but it is meaningless (it cannot play any role
in scientific investigation) in so far as it is not related to the style it belongs to.
3)  Pluralism:  while  the  monist  theories  of  truth  claim  that  there  is  only  one  truth
property, which is shared by all true sentences, pluralism claims that the there is more
than one truth property. In its application to the philosophy of science, it states that in
the history of science many different truth properties coexist.  This means that some
scientific sentences are true in virtue of the property T1, others are true in virtue of the
property T2  or Tn. Standard alethic pluralism states that the correspondence theory does
not apply to all sentences (for example it does not apply to moral sentences), but that
only empirical sentences are true in virtue of their correspondence to the facts. On the
contrary, the theory of the styles of reasoning claims that the correspondence theory is
not satisfactory even in scientific context; and therefore we need a plurality of scientific
truth properties, explaining the several ways of being true (or false). A true sentence
from the probabilistic field does not have the same property of a true sentence from the
taxonomic field.
So, in this section I have sketched the theory of truth related to the theory of the
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styles of  reasoning. I have concluded that, basing on the self-authentication of the styles
and the idea of truth-value candidate, this theory is substantivist, objectivist and pluralist
(just like standard alethic pluralism). But this claim is not sufficiently justified yet. The
fact that scientific sentences are part of different procedures of reasoning about them is
not sufficient to justify the existence of more than one truth property. One may object
that there is only one property (correspondence) and that the styles of reasoning entail
only epistemological pluralism and not alethic pluralism. Therefore, in the next sections
I  will  discuss  three  possible  sources  of  alethic  pluralism  in  scientific  context:
methodological pluralism, discourse-field pluralism and language pluralism. 
4. Option (1): methodological pluralism
In  the  last  section  I  have  stated  that  scientific  alethic  pluralism  is  a  theory  of
scientific truth (substantivist, objectivist and pluralist) claiming that there is more than
one truth property in scientific discourse.  In order to justify such claim, one should
show how the metaphysical thesis about the existence of a plurality of truth properties is
related to the epistemology of the styles of  reasoning. In this section and the following
ones I will  discuss three possible answers:  methodological pluralism, discourse-field
pluralism and language pluralism.  
In  this  section  I  will  focus  on  methodological  pluralism.  Theories  of  scientific
method  are  usually  divided  in  two  main  sets:  monist  and  pluralist53.  Roughly,
methodological monism argues that there is only one universal scientific method, which
applies to all scientific puzzles, independently of historical changes, research fields and
subjective  preferences.  On the  contrary,  methodological  pluralism is  the  claim that,
through the history of science, many different (and valid, even if not necessarily equally
valid) scientific methods were used. Moreover, scientific method does not change only
from a  historical  viewpoint.  Scientific  communities  working  in  different  fields  can
adopt different methods and, finally, the same methodological rules may be interpreted
in different ways by individuals or groups. 
Methodological pluralism can be construed historically and/or normatively. From a
historical viewpoint, it claims that the succession and coexistence of several scientific
methods (and interpretations of methodological rules) is merely a matter of fact. And
53 Of course there are many intermediate positions, for example Worrall 1988.
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from a  normative  viewpoint  it  claims  that  methodological  pluralism is  worthy,  for
example because scientific problems are complex and we are more likely to solve them
with multiple approaches54. 
Methodological  pluralism is  obviously consistent  with the theory of the styles of
reasoning. Actually, it is a direct consequence of the plurality of the styles: in fact each
style is related to a set of (more or less explicit) different methodological rules. The
methodological  patterns  used  by  scientists  working  in  the  laboratory  sciences  are
different from the ones used, for example, for computer simulation. But methodological
pluralism is a kind of epistemological pluralism and not of alethic pluralism. It states
that there is more than one way to achieve significant scientific results and therefore, in
the realist interpretation of scientific practice, to get closer to the truth. But this does not
mean  that  there  is  more  than  one  way  of  being  true.  The  extension  of  the
methodological claim to the metaphysical one is based on the argument of the criterion
and the self-authentication thesis. Recall that self-authentication means that each style
of reasoning defines its own standards and no meta-justification is required. Moreover,
in the previous sections, I have argued that the problem of the criterion goes as follows:
- the  acceptance  (or  rejection)  of  a  belief  (or  a  set  of  beliefs)  is  regulated  by
epistemic norms, stating the conditions under which a belief is justified;
- the  acceptance  of  epistemic  norms  should  be  justified  by  means  of  other
epistemic norms;
- the attempt to justify epistemic norms leads to a) infinite regress; b) circularity;
c) dogmatism.
The styles of scientific reasoning welcome circularity since each style justifies itself.
This is a controversial but defensible claim (see D'Amico 1993). What, I think, is not
defensible is the claim that the plurality of truth is a consequence of the plurality of
methods. The argument seems to be something like this:
1. rival theories are justified by different standards (problem of the criterion);
2. dealing with justified beliefs as if they were approximately true is rational;
54 This and other two arguments are provided in Chang (2012), a recent defense of scientific pluralism:
1)  since  liberal  democracy  is  the  best  form of  social  organization  and  pluralism is  essential  to
democracy, science should be organized in the same way; 2) the plurality of actual scientific methods
cannot be reduced to a single and universal scientific method in any way.
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3. truth is relative to the standards of scientific research.
This argument does not sound good, even if it  is based on a correct insight.  The
correct  insight  is  the  strong  methodological  import  of  scientific  truth.  Of  course,
scientific research is not interested in trivially true sentences, but, rather, in sentences
considered  approximately  true  according  to  the  current  and  shared  standards  of
scientific inquiry. But this is a methodological advise to scientific communities: that one
should not compare scientific theories recurring to the ordinary standards of truth (for
example isomorphism between the structure of the truth-bearer and the structure of the
state  of  affairs),  but  recurring  to  other  standards  provided  by  the  community  (for
example the possibility to apply the actual achievement to other problems). And the fact
that there is more than one truth property does not follow from this methodological
advise. For example, take the property of “being yellow”. Such property can be detected
in different ways according to our purposes and fields of inquiry: the sentence “x is
yellow” is considered true or false according to different standards. For example, for
x=my t-shirt, I can trust my senses and my immediate sensorial experience. But, for x=a
chemical substance,  the property of “being yellow” is  usually a consequence of the
excitation of electrons due to an absorption of energy (by the chemical), where what I
see by my senses is not the absorbed color, but the complementary color. But obviously
this does not mean that there is more than one “yellowness” property. 
Therefore,  methodological  pluralism  is  an  epistemological  thesis  (plurality  of
scientific  methods)  which  does  not  necessitate  any thesis  about  the  metaphysics  of
science (like alethic pluralism). In the next sections I will discuss other options to justify
alethic pluralism.
5.  Option (2): discourse-field pluralism
In the last section I have considered whether or not the methodological pluralism
entailed by the styles of reasoning is a source of alethic pluralism. Since my answer is
negative, in this section I will focus on the second option, which is more true to the
spirit of standard alethic pluralism. In fact, while in the last section I have discussed the
methodological nature of the styles of reasoning, here I will discuss the style as a whole,
and how it divides scientific discourse. The hypothesis that I am going to examine is
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that scientific alethic pluralism depends on discourse-field pluralism.
Roughly, discourse-field pluralism claims that human discourse (D) presents some
stable and intuitive divisions: D is divided into D1, D2, …, Dn. Alethic pluralists add that
there are many truth properties (T1, T2, …, Tn) and each truth property is such for a given
discourse-field. Discourse-fields can be considered mere fragments of a language, i.e.
proper and disjointed sub-sets of the sentences of that language. The distinction between
domains of discourse is ambiguous, but intuitively clear. They are bare areas of thought
and we can identify them by means of the kind of sentences they are composed of; and,
in turn, the kind of sentences can be identified by means of the concepts they use and
that we employ to speak about  specific matters (see Lynch 2004: 399-400).  This is
ambiguous since it assumes that we already have a clear classification of the relevant
concepts and the discourse-fields they belong to. But obviously it is quite clear that
sentences such as “torture is wrong” belong to the moral field. And the same applies to
sentences about aesthetics or the physical processes that shape the world. 
The  same  considerations  should  apply  to  the  sub-set  of  D  called  “scientific
discourse”  (DS).  According to  the  theory of  the  styles  of  scientific  reasoning,  DS is
divided in (at least) seven sub-sets corresponding to the styles that I have listed in the
previous  sections.  Therefore,  the  styles  of  reasoning  are  obviously  consistent  with
discourse-field pluralism. From the one hand (historical viewpoint), the coexistence of
several fields of discourse in the history of science is a matter of fact. From the other
hand (normative viewpoint), such a plurality of styles is both a means and an end of
scientific progress: it is a means because different styles are necessary to solve problems
from different fields; and it is an end since styles are cumulative and the accumulation
of styles constitutes scientific progress in itself (see Hacking 2012: 607-608).  
But,  as regards the styles of reasoning,  the question of the individuation and the
mutual relationships between them is even more crucial. In fact, while the distinction
between discourse-fields can seem arbitrary, but it is intuitively clear, the question of the
styles is more controversial. Since the beginning of this chapter, I have recognized that
there  is  no  definition  of  style  of  reasoning (even if  there  are  some basic  features).
Hacking is aware of this and states that it is impossible to define a style: they have no
essence and are bound together only by family resemblances (Hacking 2012: 601). This
is not necessarily a problem, but it is such in so far as alethic pluralism entrusts an
important task to the sub-sets of D: the possibility of distinguishing the truth properties.
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Hacking does not seem to be too concerned with this question: he does not go beyond
Crombie's list and restricts himself to add the “laboratory science” style. In the previous
section,  I  have  summarized  the  features  of  the  styles  (new  objects,  laws  and
explanations,  self-authentication,  techniques  of  stabilization,  interaction  of  cognitive
capacities and culture) and Hacking has often stressed the role played by the techniques
of  stabilization  (to  exclude  “humanistic”  styles  of  reasoning)55,  the  techniques  that
enable a style to stabilize itself. But he does not elaborate this criterion in depth and, on
the other hand, the intuitive criterion used by standard alethic pluralism (the kinds of
sentences and concepts used in a given domain) is suspicious for the styles of reasoning.
In fact, in scientific context, it is quite difficult to distinguish between the lexicon and
the concepts of a style of reasoning and those of the leading theories in that context. We
run the risk of moving from a style-based theory to a theory-based theory of science.
And one of the main points of the theory of the styles of reasoning is the possibility to
downsize the importance of theories to explain scientific knowledge and practice (see in
particular Hacking 1983). 
So, in the end, the theory of the styles claims that 1) there are no necessary and
sufficient conditions to identify a style and demarcate it from the others; 2) that the style
of reasoning are interwoven and “can all be called upon in a single research project”
(Hacking 1992: 137). While the former claim is consistent with alethic pluralism, the
latter is not. According to discourse-field pluralism, the sub-sets of D (and DS) should be
disjointed56. That is because there is a mutual relation between the truth properties  T1,
T2, …, Tn and the domains of discourse D1, D2, …, Dn. From the one hand, the features
of a given domain of discourse allow us to understand how the truth property works in
that context. For example,  the presence of terms such as “good”, “wrong”, “just” is
characteristic  of  moral  language  and  creates  expectations  about  the  kind  of  truth
property  that  we  will  find  in  this  domain  of  discourse.  On  the  other  hand,  the
substantiveness of the truth predicate  allows us to identify the difference in  content
between sentences from different fields. For example the content of a moral judgment is
different from the content of a physical statement because the former pretends to be
“super-warranted” and the latter pretends to “correspond to the facts”. Otherwise, the
appeal  to  different  truth  properties  to  explain  the  differences  between  domains  of
55 For example Hacking 1996, where he suggests that they can “characterize and constitute a style”
(Hacking 1996: 72-73). For the question of the identity of the styles and their mutual relations see
Kusch 2010.
56 See Lynch 2004: 400. For some objections see Sher 2005.
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discourse (and the other way round) would be superfluous (Lynch 2004: 402).    
In fact, if this relation between truth properties and discourse-fields does not obtain,
we will find the same method-dependent alethic pluralism that I have rejected in the
previous section. If we cannot really individuate the different domains and truth plays
no role in this distinction, what we can conclude is that truth is merely dependent on the
styles. In other words, there is no mutual dependence (the kind of dependence which
allows the pluralist to recognize the differences in the content, for example, of moral
sentences and non-moral sentences) between truth properties and discourse-fields and
the result is that truth is style-relative. In other words, following the methodological
insight  that  I  have  sketched in  the  previous  section  (the  fact  that  scientific  truth  is
methodologically-oriented), we should give up truth and replace it with an “objective
surrogate for truth to be found in methodology” (Hacking 1979: 386), as Hacking says
commenting on Lakatos and concluding that the task of post-Kantian philosophy of
science is to replace the concept of representation (namely, truth as correspondence)
with  the  concept  of  methodology.  So,  my  claim  is  that,  as  a  consequence  of  the
impossibility to provide a clear distinction between the styles of reasoning (and the
impossibility to use the truth property to achieve this aim), scientific alethic pluralism
collapses  into  epistemological  pluralism:  truth  plays  no  role  (except  some minimal
logical role), unless we consider truth a mere by-product of the styles. To that extent,
Hacking's  pluralism  seems  to  be  more  similar  to  the  theories  that,  resting  on  the
dissatisfaction with the correspondence theory, ascribe a limited role (or no role) to truth
(like historicism or the sociology of scientific knowledge), than to alethic pluralism.
Moreover, to strengthen this interpretation, the hypothesis of the interwoven styles
seems to be more plausible than the hypothesis of the disjointed sub-sets.  Take,  for
example, an important issue in the logic and methodology of science: the conjunction
between  scientific  theories.  As  pointed  out,  for  example,  by  Friedman  (Friedman
1983)57, we can conjoin the molecular theory with other theories, such as the atomic
theory, to explain atomic energy and therefore the molecular theory will receive indirect
evidence from electrical phenomena. Additionally, a theoretical assumption can receive
a double confirmation at the same time: the molecular theory contributes to the gas laws
and, in turn, they play a role in the explanation of other facts. The same applies to novel
57 Note that Friedman's discussion about theory conjunction is part of an argument for scientific realism.
Here I am not committing myself to his conclusions; for an extensive analysis of Friedman's realism
see Morrison 2000.
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predictions.  Take  two  reductions  or  explanations  A  and  B.  Both  A  and  B  receive
individual confirmation at different times (t1 and t2). Imagine that the conjunction of A
and B entails a novel prediction x that does not individually follow from A or B and that
is confirmed at another time t3. Indirect confirmation is an important methodological
feature of scientific practice and we are allowed to make these predictions only basing
on the truth of the conjoined explanations. Since we believe that  A and B are true, we
are allowed to deduct the prediction x and to verify (or falsify) this prediction. Logical
laws such as conjunction are truth-preserving, but, taking this for granted, we should
recognize  problems  related  to  the  conjunctions  involving  sentences  employed  by
theories from different styles.  Recall  that  sentences from different styles  are  true in
different ways. As a consequence, if A belongs do D1 and then it is T1, and B belongs do
D2 and then it is  T2,  it  is not clear what kind of prediction we can deduct from the
conjunction of A and B. And, in this case, in what sense the conjunction of A and B is
true (or false). But, in the end, we cannot find any kind of methodological rule about
that and then we can conjoin explanations from different fields of discourse58. And this
seems to show that the difference between the styles of reasoning does not stand at the
level of the logic and the metaphysics of truth, but, rather, only at the epistemic level.
So, in this section, I have argued that scientific alethic pluralism does not follow
from discourse-field pluralism. Especially because the relation between truth and style
of  reasoning  does  not  reflect  the  relation  between  truth  property  and  domain  of
discourse. To sum up, my argument goes as follows:
1. alethic pluralism is an inflationary theory of truth (by definition);
2. according to the inflationary theories, the truth property must play an essential
metaphysical  and  explanatory  role  (according  to  the  concept  of  explanatory
property);
3. the only explanatory role that different truth properties could play in the theory
of the styles of reasoning is to enable us to distinguish a style from the others
(for the relation between truth and content);
4. but  truth does  not  play this  role  (for  the  identity conditions  of  the  styles  of
reasoning).
58 Maybe Hacking may disagree about that, for his theory of the disunities in science. But, again, I am
not considering unity either a metaphysical virtue (and a desiderata for scientific explanation and
progress)  or  evidence  for  metaphysical  realism.  I  am only dealing  with  the  logical  structure  of
conjunction.
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6. Option (3): language pluralism
In  the  previous  sections  I  have  tried  to  explain  how scientific  alethic  pluralism
follows from the pluralist  epistemology of  the styles  of scientific  reasoning;  I  have
analyzed  two  hypotheses  that  are  consistent  with  Hacking's  theory  (methodological
pluralism and discourse-field pluralism), but I have concluded that they do not entail
alethic pluralism. In this section I will analyze the last option, which is less related to
the styles of reasoning than the other ones: language pluralism. 
Language pluralism is  the idea that,  given a language  L,  some parts  of  L  can be
isolated and formalized independently of each other, giving rise to several languages L1
or L2 or Ln, whose meaning conditions are stable (within the relevant sub-set of L). Kuhn
claims  something  like  this  when  he  talks  about  the  possibility  to  divide  scientific
languages into sub-sets (or lexical structures), that we can individuate in a quite similar
way to Lynch's identification of the different fields of discourse: by means of the kind of
proposition they employ and their key concepts, i.e. the concepts deployed by the most
basic assumptions of the language we are interested in (for instance, as we have seen in
Part 1, the mathematical core for the theories of mathematical physics). For example,
the language of classical mechanics is characterized by the concepts that occur in the
laws of motions and their relations. In such a way we can establish the minimal identity
conditions  of  the  sub-sets  of  L;  these  identity  conditions  guarantee  the  stability  of
meaning within  L1  (or  L2  or  Ln), which is a precondition for the definition of a truth
predicate for  L1  (or  L2  or  Ln). In fact, the connection between language pluralism and
alethic pluralism is  based on Tarski's  definition of truth and the idea of truth-for-L.
Thus, the definition of a restricted truth predicate for a fragment of L, given a truth
predicate T and a proper fragment L1 of L, goes as follows:
TR(x) := T(x) and x ∈  L1
(Beall 2013)
But the main problem is that language pluralism is not consistent with the styles of
scientific  reasoning.  Ideally,  a  style  of  reasoning  should  be  distinguished  from the
theories that we are allowed to express by means of the style (and Hacking does aim to
undermine the role played by theories);  on the contrary,  language pluralism is more
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theory-oriented, since the identity conditions of the different languages depend on the
concepts employed by the theories. But, as I anticipated in the last section, it is hard to
distinguish the lexicon of a style from the lexicon of the most important theories in that
field. 
So,  since  there  is  no  correspondence  relation  between  styles  of  reasoning  and
fragments of language, language pluralism cannot entail that there are several ways of
being true, and therefore it is not an argument against the correspondence theory. I shall
focus on how language pluralism is related to scientific truth in the next chapter, but,
right now, the point is that the correspondence theory (I mean, one truth property) is
consistent with the fact that the correspondence relation can obtain in different ways.
7. Some morals about correspondence truth
Before concluding, it is time to draw some morals about the correspondence theory.
The main point of this chapter was the question of whether there is a correspondence
principle underlying all areas of scientific truth. Basing on the theory of the style of
reasoning,  it  is  plausible  to  think  that  the  answer  is  negative,  since  principles  of
correspondence are systematically different in specific areas of scientific practice. But
this  is not a question that can be solved  a priori,  by means of platitudes, as alethic
pluralists usually aim to do: it is a practical matter, that should be solved looking at the
various fields of scientific investigations, and not only at the truth. Anyway, what we
can  conclude  about  correspondence  truth  and the  correspondence  relation  from this
discussion  of  the  styles  of  reasoning  is  that  (see  Sher  2013  for  some  of  these
conclusions):
• we cannot determine in advance the way the correspondence relation between
sentences and reality will obtain; and this is not a task of the theory of truth to do
this;
• it admits that the correspondence relation can differ from one field to another,
obtaining in direct ways in one field, in indirect ways in other fields and being
sometimes influenced by contextual and epistemic concerns;
• but, after all, it demands a systematic and significant connection between true
sentences  and  the  world  in  all  genuine  fields  of  knowledge  (and  especially
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scientific knowledge).
So, in the end, the correspondence theory maintains that there is a relation between
sentences and the world; and the truth property expresses such a relation. But that, at the
same  time,  a  theory  of  truth  is  not  required  to  give  advice  about  how  this
correspondence relation obtain; this is a problem that we can solve only by going into
the details of how scientific practice goes on, as the theory of the styles of reasoning
does, for example. 
8. Conclusions
Finally, in this chapter I have analyzed the possibility to apply alethic pluralism to
scientific  knowledge  and  practice,  in  order  to  overcome  the  alleged  limits  of  the
correspondence theory to account for the different ways of “being true” in scientific
context. I have discussed Hacking's thesis that there is more than one truth property in
scientific context and, after showing how this thesis is related to the theory of the styles
of scientific reasoning (by means of the concepts of self-authentication and candidate
for  truth or  falsehood),  I  have discussed how alethic  pluralism in  scientific  field is
related to methodological pluralism, discourse-field pluralism and language pluralism.
But I have concluded that the first two options do not entail the existence of more than
one  truth  property  (so  the  correspondence  theory  is  consistent  with  several
correspondence relations), while the third option does not entail the existence of more
than one way of being true (so it is not an argument against correspondence).     
Section 2: The Ultimate Argument for Incommensurability
1. Introduction
In the last chapter I have concluded that the correspondence theory of truth is not
committed to a unitary account of the correspondence relation and that the fact that it
can obtain in several ways (one for each style of reasoning) does not entail that we
should  endorse  alethic  pluralism.  But  I  have  left  open  the  question  of  language
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pluralism and whether it  can threaten scientific truth.  In this  chapter I  will  face the
language-dependence  of  the  truth  predicate  and  I  will  conclude  that  it  can  be  a
compelling  argument  for  incommensurability.  Actually incommensurability  is  out  of
fashion and most philosophers of science agree that the most widely accepted realist
theories  succeed in  resisting  the attacks  of  the  incommensurability thesis;  from this
perspective, there is little point in trying to reflate the incommensurability challenge.
Therefore, the perspective that I will present in this chapter is quite different from the
received view about incommensurability: unlike Part 2 – section 3 – this chapter is not
intended as a historical reconstruction or interpretation of what Kuhn (or Feyerabend)
really meant. To that extent, my discussion is apart from the reception of Kuhn's works
and sometimes it conveys different picture. Rather, the motivation of this chapter is that
I do think that incommensurability thesis (properly updated on the light of the current
theories about scientific realism and truth) can play a role in the debate about scientific
realism and truth. Pace Kuhn and Feyerabend, I do not believe the incommensurability
thesis to be a serious threat to scientific realism. But, assuming that every complete and
satisfactory theory pretending to be realist should accept the semantic thesis broadly
conceived (see for example Psillos 1999: scientific theories are descriptions of their
intended domains and are literally construed as true or false), the incommensurability
thesis can help us to understand what kind of theory of truth is involved in the semantic
thesis (plausibly a correspondence theory) and what problems it arises. 
The  main  claim  of  this  chapter  (the  conclusion  of  my  argument  for
incommensurability) will be that even the best realist theories actually at the heart of the
debate (like structural realism) cannot overcome the challenge of the definition of a
proper cross-theoretical truth predicate between non-homologous structures. Structural
realism  aims  to  solve  the  problem  of  inter-theoretical  relations  by  means  of  the
possibility to preserve the structure of one theory in that of a second, regardless of the
“objects” mapped by the respective theories. But my point is that the definition of a
truth predicate does depend on the denotation relation, since the truth predicate can be
defined only for interpreted languages. Structure preservation can constitute evidence
for scientific realism, but it is not sufficient to include a theory of truth into scientific
realism.  Furthermore, I will show that there is a tension between the deflated concept of
reference associated with structural realism and the semantic theory of truth. To achieve
this aim, this chapter is divided in two parts: in the first part I will explain the relation
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between incommensurability and language-dependence  of  the truth  predicate;  in  the
second part I will argue that, in so far as incommensurability is intended as a thesis
about  the  relation  between truth and the sciences,  structural  realism cannot  face its
challenge. 
Finally, before I start, I shall recall some points that I have discussed in the previous
chapters and that I will take for granted now. The first and most important is that we
should not interpret incommensurability as incomparability or untranslatability; I have
discussed this point in Part 2 – section 3. Rather, following Kuhn's latest works (Kuhn
2000),  here  incommensurability  is  construed  as  a  structural  dissimilarity  between
scientific theories, which prevents the truth predicate from properly working in inter-
theoretical contexts. But I will not literally follow Kuhn's approach, since his attempt to
connect  incommensurability  and  rejection  of  the  concept  of  truth  (especially  Kuhn
1970: 206) is completely different and merely fails59. Secondly, I will assume that the
semantic theory of truth is the best way to define a truth predicate for a given language
(including scientific languages) and my criticism against structural realism is based on
its incompatibility with the semantic theory. I do not exclude that it might be consistent
with other kinds of theories of truth.
2. True-in-L
In this section I will introduce the notion of true-in-L by means of Tarski's semantic
theory of truth and, in parallel with Quine's attack to the notion of analyticity, I will
claim that the semantic theory does not fit well with the general or relational concept of
truth.
Tarski claims that the concept of truth can be defined only referring to a given object-
language  L1.  Roughly,  this  is  for  two  reasons:  1)  the  choice  of  sentences  as  truth-
bearers; 2) the necessity to construe a meta-language to define truth (Haack 1978: 114).
Taking for granted Tarski's approach, the problem is which part of scientific theories
(sentences, models, mathematical structures...) we can correctly say to be true-or-false. I
will come back to this question in the second part of this chapter, but, anyway it is
intuitively clear that, from the viewpoint of the semantic theory, only the sentences of an
interpreted  language  can  be  true-or-false.  Thus,  Tarski  defines  truth  only  for  given
59 Since, as I have argued in Part 2 – section 4 – it  is  based on the comparison objection. See for
example Marino 2006.
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object-languages.  Where  he  defines  the  concept  of  “true  sentence”,  he  restricts  the
definition of sentence to the sentences of a given language:
x  ∈Tr if and only if x  ∈S and every infinite sequence of classes satisfies x (Tarski 1983:
195).
Where “Tr” denotes the class of all true sentences and the definition (in the meta-
language) “x is a sentence” (x  ∈S) is the limiting case of a sentential function without
free variables. And the definition of sentential function appeals to the basic vocabulary
of the object-language. So, if the concept of sentence is defined as a limiting case of the
sentential  function,  “S”  does  not  denote  the  concept  of  “sentence”,  but,  rather,  the
concept of “sentence of L1”. In turn, the concept of true sentence “Tr” is defined only
for  the  relevant  language  L1.  If  we accept  this  interpretation  of  Tarski's  theory (see
David 2008), we will conclude that Tarski did not define the concept of truth, but a
more restricted concept of truth, relative to a given language. For example, basing on
language pluralism we can divide a given language L (for example English) in several
(well-behaved) fragments and call them L1, L2, …, Ln; and finally we can follow Tarski's
guidelines and define a proper concept of truth for each well-behaved fragment of L. 
What conclusion should we draw about the cross-linguistic applications of the truth
predicate?  Should we give up the universal  concept  of  truth and embrace the more
rigorous concept  of true-in-L? This argument  is  very similar  to Quine's  rejection of
Carnap's concept of analyticity (David 1997)60. Carnap's account of analyticity is quite
simple:  a  sentence  of  a  language  L is  analytic  if  and  only  if  it  is  implied  by  the
conjunction of the meaning postulates of L. Given s  ∈L, and P (the conjunction of the
meaning postulates of L,  by enumeration), s is analytic if and only if it  is a logical
consequence of P in L. The role played by the meaning postulates is to stipulate the
logical  relations between some non-logical constants of L.  To that extent,  sentences
such as “all bachelors are unmarried” count as analytic in L.
Quine raised against Carnap's analyticity because the “meaning postulates” strategy
does not define the general concept of analyticity, but rather, the more restricted concept
of “analytic-in-L”, that is to say, referring to one language and the relevant meaning
postulates.  But,  in  so  far  as  the  concept  of  analyticity  is  defined  referring  to  the
60 My discussion of the relation between truth and analyticity in this section fundamentally follows
David's one.
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language  L,  it  remains  undefined  for  the  sentences  of  the  languages  L1,  L2  … Ln.
Therefore, according to Quine, Carnap's approach does not make clearer the notion of
analyticity for variable languages (the general or relational notion of analyticity), since
the definition of the restricted concepts of analyticity does not enable us to carry out the
definition of the general concept of analyticity.    
Additionally,  Quine's  objection  is  enough  general  to  apply  to  several  semantic
notions as well, including reference, satisfaction and truth; that is because no definition
of these notions is available for variable languages (including formal languages). The
only way we can define analyticity for different languages is by enumeration: given
“analytic-in-L1”,  we  can  introduce  other  languages  L2  or  Ln and  define  additional
concepts of analyticity (analytic-in-L2, analytic-in-Ln). But Tarski's definition of truth is
just  the  most  famous  example  of  definition  of  a  semantic  notion  resting  on  the
enumeration of restricted or indexed predicates and the truth predicate does not differ
from the analyticity predicate in that respect. One might claim that “true” and “analytic”
work in different ways because “being true” is less obscure than “being analytic”, since
the schema “p” is true(-in-L) if and only if p provides us with some information about
the truth predicate, such that it would be able to justify a unitary perspective on the truth
predicate (unlike the analyticity predicate). 
But this point is not sufficiently clear. The Convention T loses its explanatory power
in so far as the language L in which the truth predicate is defined is the same (or a
fragment of) by which the Convention T is expressed (in this case English). Were this
not be the case, the Convention T would be meaningless for each case concerning non-
English sentences (or false as regards sentences having different meanings in different
languages). Given this point, the definition of the truth predicate is threatened by the
same objection that concerns the notion of analyticity: Tarski defined true-in-L1, that is
an indexed and restricted notion of truth, in the same way as Carnap defined analytic-in-
L1, an indexed notion of analyticity. Finally, neither the relational notion of analyticity
nor the relational notion of truth have been correctly clarified. 
Thus, in this section I have showed why, taking for granted the semantic theory of
truth, there is no evidence for stating that the different predicates “true-in-L1”, “true-in-
L2”, “true-in-Ln” share a principle of unification, namely the general or relational notion
of truth.
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3. Incommensurability in action
In the last section, I have introduced the connection between the semantic theory of
truth and the linguistic considerations that this theory assumes. Of course, the relation
between different languages whose meaning postulates differ is not the only linguistic
weakness  of  Tarski's  theory.  For  example  he  assumes  a  “Principle  of  Uniformity”
(Andjelković, Williamson 2000) such that the same sentences of L should keep their
meaning unchanged within L (“sentences say exactly one thing” or that snow is white is
exactly  what  “snow  is  white”  means);  and  this  principle  seems  to  be  particularly
implausible, especially as regards the cases of ambiguity (ambiguous sentences do not
say exactly one thing), context-dependence (context uses to play a fundamental role in
the determination of meaning) and conventionality (sentences do not necessarily say
what they say). But, even if these problems concerning Tarski's theory of meaning are
particularly urgent, I will not focus on them (see Dutilh Novaes 2008). That is because,
for my purpose, I am primarily interested in the problem of the cross-theoretical uses of
the truth predicate, since those are the situations where incommensurability comes in.
To that extent, incommensurability has been considered a structural non-homogeneity
between the linguistic formulations of different theories, such that the structure of one
theory cannot be preserved in that of a second and the referential relations invoked by
one  cannot  be  mapped  into  the  structure  of  their  counterparts  (see  for  example
Chakravartty 1998: 401-402). 
This formulation is clear and insightful, but incomplete. If incommensurability were
a mere structural discontinuity, it would be easy to demonstrate that the structure of a
successful scientific theory can easily be mapped into the structure of more recent (and
more successful) theories; and that referential continuity is not an essential desiderata
for  scientific  progress.  This  is  just  the  strategy adopted  by structural  realism (both
epistemic  and  ontic)  and  it  has  succeeded  in  defending  scientific  realism  against
incommensurability and theoretical discontinuity. So, the aim of my argument is not to
defend again this naive version of the incommensurability thesis. I have said that this
account  of  incommensurability  is  incomplete,  since  it  does  not  give  sufficient
consideration to the role that truth play for the incommensurability thesis. The main
point is not that different theoretical structures cannot be respectively mapped or that
they cannot be rationally compared. The point is that different structures do not allow
182
the truth predicate to properly work in cross-linguistic (or cross-theoretical) contexts (as
I have said in Part  2 – section 3).  Note that  this  interpretation assumes a  linguistic
conception of scientific theories that the semantic view (accepted by most philosophers
of science nowadays) absolutely rejects. I will come back to this question in the next
sections, showing that the incommensurability thesis  does not question the semantic
view in itself,  but the possibility to introduce a proper truth predicate (from Tarski's
viewpoint) for a scientific theory semantically construed. But, at first, let me analyze the
argument in depth. 
In Kuhn's words the problem goes as follows:
The semantic conception of truth is regularly epitomized in the example: “Snow is
white”  is  true  if  and  only  if  snow  is  white.  To  apply  that  conception  in  the
comparison of two theories, one must therefore suppose that their proponents agree
about technical equivalents of such matters of fact as whether snow is white. If that
supposition were exclusively about objective observation of nature, it would present
no insuperable problems, but it involves as well the assumption that the objective
observers in question understand “snow is white” in the same way, a matter which
may not be obvious if the sentence reads “elements combine in constant proportion
by weight”. (Kuhn 2000: 161)
The  conclusion  of  this  passage  is  that  truth  works  only  in  infra-theoretical
applications. But the main claim is that incommensurability deals with the difficulties
concerning the cross-theoretical applications of the truth predicate (construed following
Tarski's semantic theory). If one would like to explain the general predicate “true-in-L”
by means of the enumeration of several restricted predicates (true-in-L1, true-in-L2 and
so on), she should assume a notion of translation between the language referring to
which the truth predicate is defined and the meta-language (for example English). In
this way, the we would be allowed to explain the relational concept of truth by means of
the indexed concepts of truth via the concept of translation. But this is not correct, since
the restricted truth predicates are not indexed to fragments of the meta-language, but
rather, to fragments of arbitrary languages (David 1997: 292-293). According to Tarski,
the definition of the truth predicate for a given fragment of language can be achieved by
means of the reference and satisfaction clauses for the relevant language:
“…” is satisfied-in-L1 by ….
“…” refers-in- L1 to …
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In order to understand and fulfill those expressions one has to know how to translate
them from L1  into English; and knowing how to do this does not help us construe the
relevant reference and satisfaction clauses for other languages. Thus, again, there is no
reason for thinking that the general notion of truth can be properly used. 
So, in the end, the argument for incommensurability goes as follows:
(Premise 1) The truth predicate can be defined only referring to the relevant
fragments  of  L,  so  that  it  is,  to  some  extent,  language-dependent  (for  the
semantic theory of truth)
(Premise 2) Scientific theories present some structural non-homogeneity at least
from a linguistic viewpoint, such that the referential function of some scientific
languages cannot be fully mapped into the structure of some rival theories. 
(Conclusion) The differences related to the different meaning conditions of rival
scientific languages prevent us from adopting a cross-theoretical truth predicate
and therefore we should not use the relational or general concept of truth in
scientific contexts as well as in ordinary contexts.
Note that, while (Premise 1) is uncontroversial,  at  least  in so far as you take for
granted the semantic theory, (Premise 2) is not unquestioned: at best, philosophers of
science disagree about the scope and the consequences of this premise. Since here I
cannot discuss in depth and at  length such an issue, I  will  adopt the perspective of
selective realism. That is to say, I will hold that (Premise 2) is right in highlighting the
(sometimes) radical discontinuities between successive and rival theories (since if Kuhn
were completely wrong about scientific revolutions, the very motivation of my work
would be scrapped), but that (contra Kuhn) these discontinuities are not an effective
threat  to  scientific  realism,  since  the  cumulative  nature  of  scientific  progress  is
guaranteed by the preservation of the relevant parts of scientific theories. I have already
discussed selective realism in Part  1 – section 2.  Now, I  will  not directly focus  on
scientific realism, but, rather, on the role played by truth in scientific languages. My
argument concerns scientific realism only in so far as the adoption of an acceptable
theory of truth is considered to be a fundamental part of the realist thesis. For example,
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according  to  Psillos  (1999)  scientific  realism consists  of  a  metaphysical  thesis  (the
world  is  mind-independent),  an  epistemic  thesis  (mature  and  successful  scientific
theories are approximately true) and a semantic thesis (ST):
(ST)  Scientific  theories  are  truth-conditioned  descriptions  of  their  intended
domain. They should be literally construed as true or false.
Thus,  the  incommensurability  thesis  does  not  directly  attack  scientific  realism.
Rather, it does so in so far as scientific realism is 1) based on the preservation-relations
between  successive  theories  (for  the  very  concept  of  preservative  realism)  and  2)
committed to the truth predicate (for ST). That is to say, it implicitly assumes a cross-
theoretical use of the truth predicate that is problematic according to (Premise 1), i.e. for
Tarski's theory. According to the incommensurability thesis, you can legitimately use
the truth predicate in any infra-linguistic or deflationary way (See Kuhn 2000: 99 and
Leeds 1978); that is to say, you can use it for logical purposes to express and test the
claims of the relevant theory. But you should not use it to express the relation between
successive  theories  and,  as  a  consequence,  to  argue  for  scientific  realism  for  a
diachronic perspective.    
Therefore,  in  the  rest  of  the  chapter,  I  will  show  how  the  best  realist  theories
(especially structural realism) react to (Premise 2), asking whether they can incorporate
a proper theory of truth or not. The main point I shall discuss is that the semantic theory
insists that sentences are the fundamental truth-bearers, while actually scientific realism
rejects the idea that the linguistic formulation of scientific theories is satisfactory. But,
at first, let me make some clarifications.
4. Clarifications
Properties and Predicates. The first point to make deals with the theories of truth.
Kuhn's  attack  to  truth  via  incommensurability  is  primarily  concerned  with  the
correspondence theory, perhaps because he thinks that scientific realism is necessarily
tied to the correspondence theory. But there is no unavoidable relation between realism
and correspondence (Devitt 1997 and Vision 2004: 14-16) and his argument does not
harm  the  correspondence  theory  more  than  it  harms  any  other  theory  of  truth.
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Incommensurability focuses on the cross-linguistic applications of the truth predicate
and therefore it is at first a linguistic thesis about the behavior of the truth predicate, not
a metaphysical thesis about the essence of the truth property (like the correspondence
theory).  The  correspondence  theory claims  that  the  essence  of  truth  consists  in  the
correspondence  relation  between  truth-bearers  and  the  world.  On  the  contrary,  the
linguistic  argument  for incommensurability claims that  we should define a  different
truth predicate for each fragment of language.  Predicates are linguistic things, while
properties  are  extra-linguistic  entities61.  The predicate  “white” is  tied to  the English
language (just  like  the  predicate  “blanc”  is  tied  to  the  French language),  while  the
property “being white” is not, since it should be universal across languages. Basically,
an n-place, m-order predicate is a form such that F(x), where x should be replaced by n
terms of order m; for example MAN(x) is a single place, first order predicate and x is to
be replaced by a single individual term. Therefore, MAN(Socrates) is a well formed
sentence. On the contrary, an  n-place,  m-order property is a metaphysical entity that
belongs to  n entities of order  m. For example, the property of “being a man” is a one
place, first order property and it belongs to single individuals. Thus, even if the relation
between semantic theory and correspondence theory is controversial62, there is no prior
connection between incommensurability and correspondence theory.
Putnam on Incommensurability. The claim that incommensurability is linked to the
linguistic relations between languages and meta-languages has been already defended
by  Putnam  (1975:  198),  so  one  may  ask  the  difference  between  my  account  and
Putnam's  one.  Putnam  analyzes  the  example  of  a  language  containing  the  world
“electron” in respect of which we can construe a meta-language to define the concepts
of truth and reference (and where “electrons” refers to electrons is a trivial theorem).
But rival languages characterized by different meaning postulates relativize truth and
reference to their meaning conditions, so that “electrons” refers to electrons only in the
sense of L1. This approach differs from mine in several respects. At first, Putnam refers
to  languages  as  a  whole,  while  incommensurability  usually  deals  with  specific
fragments of languages. It is a local concept that does not involve, for example, the
meaning  of  ordinary  sentences  like  “the  snow  is  white”,  which  can  generally  be
expressed by all languages without special problems. Secondly, Putnam is concerned
61 Even if  some properties  are  language-dependent,  for  example  the  property of  “belonging  to  the
English language”. 
62 See for example Fernandez Moreno 2001, Horwich 2005, Kirkham 1992: 170-173, Kunne 2003:208-
213, Patterson 2012: 140-143.
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with the relativity of truth, since, according to his interpretation of incommensurability,
the sentences “electrons exist” or “electron refers to such-and-such things” could be true
in L1 and false in L2. On the contrary, according to my interpretation, truth is not relative
in this  sense.  It  is  objective and entirely consistent  with the correspondence theory.
What  is  (language)-relative is  the possibility to define a truth predicate  for a  given
language or fragment of language, since it depends on the relevant language itself. And
finally  Putnam's  aim is  to  reaffirm the  language-independence  of  reference  and,  of
course, his causal theory of reference goes in that direction. But, for my purpose, the
language-dependence of reference is  a secondary problem; I  am concerned with the
truth predicate  and the semantic  theory does  not  force us to  commit  ourselves to  a
specific theory of reference. What is important is the notion of translation and it can be
defined  independently  of  the  concept  of  co-referential  terms.  Thus,  the  language-
dependence  of  reference  is  not  in  question,  unless  one  thinks  that  reference  and
translation are inter-defined.  
5. Incommensurability and structural realism
In this section I will explain how the most plausible forms of selective realism have
challenged the incommensurability thesis, concluding that, although they have solved
many important puzzles related to the “received view” about incommensurability, they
did not defeat the threat I have presented in Section 3. In fact, structural realism has
faced the  incommensurability thesis  especially as  regards  the  problem of  referential
continuity, which has always been considered one of the most compelling arguments
against scientific realism. But my point is that structural realists' referential concerns are
mainly gathered from pessimistic induction and, even if their solution applies to it, it
does  not  apply  to  incommensurability  (at  least  as  regards  my  formulation  of  the
argument). 
Roughly, pessimistic induction goes as follows:
1. During  the  history  of  science,  many mature  and  successful  scientific
theory have  been proven to  be  false  and their  theoretical  terms  were
recognized as non-referential;
2. Actual scientific theories widely accepted by scientific communities are
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not  essentially  different  from past  discarded  theories,  so  there  is  no
evidence for thinking that they will not be rejected in the future as well.
So, by induction, we conclude that probably our best theories are not referring and
that they will be replaced at some time. While standard scientific realism argues for the
connection between successful reference and empirical success, pessimistic induction
replies that successful reference is not necessary to explain the predictive success of a
theory (Laudan 1981).
There  are  two  possible  ways  to  face  pessimistic  induction  from  the  referential
viewpoint. The former consists in adopting a generous theory of reference, aiming to
analyze  rival  theories  to  identify  co-referential  terms.  From  this  viewpoint,
dephlogisticated  air  and  oxygen  refer  to  the  same  theoretical  entity  and,  therefore,
abandoned terms successfully refer after all, even if they are seemingly non-referential.
This strategy has been carried on by Putnam as well as by entity realism, but I will not
focus on that. As I have said in the previous sections (especially Part 1 – section 2), its
main week point is that it trivializes the concept of reference, since every couple of
theoretical terms can be arranged in such a way to be co-referential; for example “ether”
and “electromagnetic  field”,  or  “gravity”  and “natural  place”  since  it  permits  a  too
strong gap between what a term refers to and the relevant theoretical descriptions and
intended applications63.
Thus, let me proceed with the latter and more plausible strategy, which focuses on
the  idea  of  selective  or  preservative  confirmation  (Stanford  2003a):  we  should
realistically commit ourselves only to those part of theories that play an essential role in
the  process  of  empirical  confirmation  and  prediction.  To  that  extent,  the  parts  of
scientific theories that had been rejected over the course of the history of science are
considered non-essential for the empirical success of the relevant theories.  Structural
realism is  perhaps  the  most  widely accepted  form of  selective  realism.  Roughly,  it
claims that scientific knowledge does not catch the hidden nature of scientific entities;
on the contrary,  it  successfully describes  the  structure of  the  world with increasing
verisimilitude. Structural realism does not care about referential discontinuity between
successive theories, since it is not committed to the existence and the essence of the
63 Psillos 1999, Cruse and Papineau 2002, Cumminskey 1992. Roughly,  as  I  have said in Part  1 –
section 2, the problem is that the generous theories of reference (especially the causal theory) aim to
account for referential success, but fail to account for referential failure.
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objects that are supposed to populate the mind-independent world. Even if epistemic
and ontic  structural  realism (see  Ladyman 1998)  disagree  on the  nature,  scope and
structure of scientific knowledge, they agree in deflating the notion of reference: “ESR
and  OSR  both  depart  from  standard  scientific  realism  in  rejecting  term  by  term
reference  of  theories,  and hence  standard  referential  semantics,  and any account  of
approximate  truth  based  on  it”  (Ladyman  2011:  97);  moreover  they  both  agree  in
displaying  the  structural  similarities  between  different  theories  (rather  than  their
“ontological” disagreements). Henceforth, in so far as structural realism is concerned,
scientific realism is not undermined by theory change and referential discontinuity.       
For  example,  take  one  of  the  most  famous  cases  of  alleged  incommensurability
between successive theories: the phlogiston case. Ladyman (2011) (following Kitcher
1978) summarizes a series of empirical regularities the phlogiston theory accounts for:
• metal + heat (in air) = calx (metal oxide) + phlogiston (de-oxygenated air)
• calx + charcoal (source of phlogiston) = metal + fixed air
• metal + acid = salt + inflammable air
• metal + water = calx + inflammable air
• water = inflammable air (hydrogen) + dephlogisticated air (oxygen)
• animals phlogisticate air, while plants dephlogisticate it
These regularities are explained by the following hypotheses:
• metal = calx + phlogiston
• charcoal = fixed air + phlogiston
• salt = calx + acid
Finally the above empirical regularities are deducted by means of the categorization
of chemical phenomena in phlogistication and dephlogistication reactions (where the
inverse relation between them is confirmed by the distinction between reduction and
oxygenation  reactions).  According  to  Ladyman's  interpretation  of  the  chemical
revolution, modern chemistry preserves the fundamental identity relation between some
chemical reactions (calcination, respiration, combustion), and that these reactions have
an inverse; that animals and plants generate opposite processes concerning the changing
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properties of air and some other points.
The  conclusion  is  that,  for  structural  realism,  the  referential  question  is  of  little
interest, since the empirical success of the phlogiston theory is not explained by the co-
referentiality  of  dephlogisticated  air  and  oxygen  (even  if  some  tokens  of
“dephlogisticated  air”  may  refer  to  “oxygen”),  but  by  the  preservation  of  the  real
patterns discovered by the phlogiston theory and retained by contemporary chemistry.
Structural  realism (ontic  as  well  as  epistemic)  claims  that  it  is  arbitrary  whether  a
theoretical term is referring or not. The “ether” theory has not been rejected because
ether does not exist, but because it was associated with the idea of absolute space and
other claims rejected by Einstein's theory. Therefore, according to structural realism, the
referential role of scientific languages is irrelevant to the approximate truth of scientific
theories and has nothing to do with the adoption of scientific realism.
This  solution  is  supposed  to  apply  both  to  pessimistic  induction  and  to  the
incommensurability  thesis.  As  regards  the  former,  referential  discontinuity does  not
threaten  scientific  realism anymore,  since  it  has  been  demonstrated  that  it  is  not  a
necessary  condition  for  scientific  progress.  As  regards  the  latter,  from  structural
realism's viewpoint, scientific theories are completely commensurable, in so far as the
content and the structure of one theory can be mapped into the structure of their rivals.
And Ladyman's analysis  of the phlogiston theory does succeed in showing that it  is
commensurable with contemporary chemistry from this perspective. This is sufficient as
far  as  scientific  realism  is  directly  concerned,  but  does  not  entirely  fit  with  my
description of the incommensurability thesis,  since I  have showed that  the indented
domain of the incommensurability thesis is not the referential relation, but, rather, the
definition of a cross-theoretical truth predicate. Therefore, in the next section,  I will
wonder  whether  the  deflation  of  the  referential  function  of  scientific  languages  is
consistent with my characterization of the incommensurability thesis; and whether the
semantic theory of truth can do without reference.
6. The semantic theory and the concept of interpreted language
In this section I will  discuss whether structural realism can avoid the problem of
reference without harming the semantic theory of truth. As I have sketcher in Section 3,
Tarski's  works  defined  the  predicate  “true-in-L”  for  a  set  of  well-behaved  object
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languages. In the same way, the Convention T is expected to establish the conditions
according to which a definition of a predicate such as “true-in-L” (in the meta-language)
is an adequate definition of true-in-L. Thus, Tarski did not define the concept of truth,
but the more restricted and rigorous concept of “true-in-L”; and he provided us with the
guidelines to define other analogous predicates. One of the reasons he did so is that he
assumed  that  sentences  are  the  most  basic  truth-bearers,  where,  very  roughly,  by
“sentence” we mean any grammatically correct and complete string of expression of a
well-behaved language. I have recalled that Tarski exploits grammatical structure in his
definition  of  truth  and,  obviously,  sentences  have  grammatical  structure,  while,  for
example, propositions or statements have not, since they are extra-linguistic things64.
And this is not an accidental claim, since it is strongly related to the idea that the truth
predicate  can  be  defined  only  referring  to  interpreted languages  (including  formal
languages). For example “we shall also have to specify the language whose sentences
we are concerned with; this is necessary if only for the reason that a string of sounds or
signs, which is a true or a false sentence but at any rate meaningful sentence in one
language,  may be  a  meaningless  expression  in  another”  (Tarski  1969:  64.  See  also
Tarski 1935: 263 and Tarski 1944: 342). 
According  to  Tarski  we  should  focus  on  an  interpreted  language  (L)  with  fixed
meanings, because if one changes the interpretation of the syntactical symbols of L, it
will  result  a  different  language L'.  And since  the  truth predicate  is  defined only as
regards L (interpreted at a given time  t), it will remain undefined as regards the new
language L'. Finally, a T sentences for L will not count as T sentence for L' anymore and
different sentences will be instances of the Convention T. For example, if white referred
to a different color (for example red) in L', we should conclude that “the snow is white”
is true in L' if and only if the snow is red.
This  is  quite  different  from  the  current  work  in  model  theory  (for  example
Raatikainen 2008). Here given a language L, a structure W and a domain D, we should
fix the interpretation function I, a mapping from from the non-logical symbols of L to
the elements of D. So that an L-structure W is defined as a pair (D, I), consisting of the
domain  D  and  the  interpretation  function  I.  Since  L  is  a  purely  syntactical  and
uninterpreted language, an interpreted language can be defined as a pair (L, I). In model
theory the interpretation function I establishes a link between the object language and a
64 See Haack 1978: 79-83 for an introduction to the problem of the truth-bearers referring to Tarski's
theory.
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domain of extra-linguistic objects and therefore it is a semantic notion, just in the sense
that Tarski aims to avoid. In model theory languages are uninterpreted and, when one
switches  from a  model  to  another,  the  language  will  remain  the  same,  even  if  the
interpretation varies. On the contrary, Tarski insists that the languages referring to which
we are defining the truth predicate are always already interpreted65. The meaning of the
terms of L should be already fixed in another way, without recurring to an interpretation
function; and, as I have just said, if one changes the interpretation of the non-logical
symbols of L, the language will change to another language, and the definition of the
truth predicate for L will not obtain anymore. For Tarski, the interpretation of L (and
therefore his definition of truth as well as of satisfaction) is established  via primitive
denotation (denotation for individual constants and application for predicate constants),
which specifies the translation of the object language in the meta-language (Field 1972).
For example, as regards names, assuming that the object language L is a well-behaved
sub-set of Italian, denotation for names would work as follows:
DenotesL (x, y) ↔
[(x = “Italia” & y = Italy)
(x= “Germania” & y = Germany)
….
(x = “Francia” & y = France)]
The same results can be achieved for predicates:
AppliesL (x, y) ↔
[((x = bianco) & white(y))
((x = rosso) & red(y))
…
((x = nero) & black(y))]
One may ask a more substantial  account of the notion of denotation,  but I  will  not
65 For some paradoxes related to the purely syntactical view on language see Kunne 2003: 181-182. For
example, if languages were individuated by their syntactic properties, the sentence “one billion is one
thousand million” would be true in American English and false in British English. Here he gives a
different  definition  of  Tarskian  sentences:  “an  orthographically  individuated  declarative  type
sentence”. 
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analyze this point in depth. Therefore, let me come back to the main question of this
chapter. In the last section I have affirmed that structural realism tries to overcome the
incommensurability  thesis  bypassing  the  referential  function  of  languages,  since  it
focuses on the idea that we can justify the logical relations between successive theories
without  recurring  to  their  physical  interpretation;  where,  roughly,  by  physical
interpretation I mean the denotation relations generated by the relevant theories at  a
given time. Surely, being concerned with structures and models gives many advantages,
at first as regards the process of empirical confirmation, since it would be much more
difficult  to  compare  linguistic  entities  like  sentences  and non-linguistic  entities  like
“facts”.  And,  of  course,  dismissing  the  linguistic  formulation  of  scientific  theories
allows us to overcome the problems related to the meaning of scientific terms, their
reference and the troubles with theory change and referential discontinuities. But, in so
far as scientific theories aim to tell us something substantive about the world (something
true-or-false), one should explicitly state something asserting a relation between some
descriptions and some aspects the world. And this requires a linguistic formulation, in
terms of models, mathematical formalism and interpretation in terms of (at least weak)
correspondence (see Chakravartty 2001: 329-330). 
Now I shall come back to the physical sciences. Surely, you can think to Newton's
law F = ma as a purely mathematical equation, and, to that extent, it is preserved by
Einstein's theory of relativity. But, as we think to the second law as well as the other
laws of classical mechanics in the context of physical inquiry, all the components of the
mathematical patterns (and the variables involved by the laws) should be replaced by
their physical intended counterparts (Wójcicki 1994: 350-351). This process is what I
have called physical  interpretation and arguably it  is  the most  compelling argument
against the applicability of Tarski's theory to scientific languages. As I have sketched in
Section 3, Tarski's theory of meaning is quite defective and it assumes that scientific
languages  do  not  present  ambiguities.  But  the  concept  of  physical  interpretation  is
always “vague” or “fuzzy”, since the words often refer to blurred phenomena and this
makes reference unstable and open to modifications. 
Note that, anyway, it is not sure that the semantic theory is not consistent with an
unstable theory of reference (like that I have defended in Part  1 – sections 3,4). As
Wójcicki argues, think to the fact that a theory may be interpreted in different ways in
its intended models: for example consider how physical objects are treated in classical
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mechanics.  In  some  applications  of  classical  mechanics,  the  celestial  bodies  of  the
planetary system are considered mass points. But, for instance, in order to explain why
Kepler's laws are not satisfied by the orbit of Mercury, one may correctly say that this is
because of  the  oblateness  of  Sun,  but  of  course,  this  is  not  a  property that  can  be
possessed by a mass point. This seems to be just the kind of ambiguity that the semantic
theory excludes: celestial bodies are treated both as mass point and as extended rigid
bodies (and it is not clear under which conditions we are allowed to consider a moving
body a mass point). Anyway, one can answer that the truth-values of the sentences of
classical  mechanics  is  established  separately  for  each  application  (Niiniluoto  1999:
101);  and, relatively to  some applications,  the theory may be true strictly speaking,
while, relatively to other applications, it may be approximately true to some degree. The
possibility  to  apply  a  theory  (i.e.,  to  interpret  its  language,  giving  some  physical
referents to its terms) necessarily involves pragmatic considerations that, as I have said
in the previous parts, cannot be fully expressed by an interpretation function. They are
related to the competence of scientific communities, which, basing on the success of the
accepted  applications,  are  able  to  distinguish  between  proper  applications  and non-
proper ones66. Thus, I am inclined to think that this problem is related to Tarski's theory
of  meaning,  rather  than  to  his  theory  of  truth  and  that  the  semantic  theory  is  not
necessarily inconsistent with a pragmatic process of meaning fixing.
My point is that, resting on Tarski's concept of interpreted language, in order to apply
the  semantic  theory  to  scientific  languages  (for  example,  the  language  of  classical
mechanics) one should start assigning physical referents to the terms deployed by the
mathematical structure of the theory. You should also establish the intended domain of
objects to which such a theory is applicable and the relevant spatio-temporal notions.
And this is a puzzle for all theories (like structural realism) that claim that the realist
content of scientific theories does not depend on the referential function of scientific
language. 
Admittedly, French is aware of this problem and acknowledges that, without a proper
linguistic formulation, it is meaningless to talk about a Tarski-like definition of truth and
therefore,  as  far  as  we are  not  prepared  to  make some concession  to  the  linguistic
perspective, truth remains an unclear  notion (Da Costa, French 2003: 33). According to
66 For the problem of the relation between mathematical and applicative content of scientific theories
see Stegmüller 1976 as well as the structuralist program in the philosophy of physics that I have
introduced in Part 1 – section 4).
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French, we can distinguish the problem of the structure of scientific theories from the
problem  of  the  truth-value  attributions.  From  the  one  hand,  scientific  theories  are
intrinsically non-linguistics, as the semantic view pointed out, and structural realism is
able to account for the relevant cross-theoretical relations from a realist viewpoint. But,
from the other hand, truth-value attributions are tied to the linguistic expression of the
theory (as well as our epistemic attitudes, which are naturally sentential). One can agree
about  that,  since,  as  far  as  I  am concerned,  I  am not questioning structural  realists'
attitude  toward  scientific  realism;  anyway,  this  does  not  overcome  the
incommensurability thesis, since it attacks just the cross-theoretical applications of the
truth predicate. Finally, one may also ask whether scientific realism can do without a
general concept of truth without turning into something different (taking into account
the semantic thesis scientific realists usually hold), but this goes beyond the boarders of
my work, whose aim is  to  demonstrate  that  incommensurability can survive against
contemporary forms of scientific realism. 
Ultimately, my point is that, in order to assign truth-values, we need an interpreted
language, such that the reference of the terms deployed by physical equations should be
assigned at a given time. And, even if Tarski never specified a theory of reference, his
semantic theory is not consistent with the idea that non-linguistic scientific theories are
true-or-false in any logically proper and significant (preferably correspondentist) way.
To  that  extent,  contemporary  selective  realism  should  specify  how  it  intends  to
incorporate  a cross-theoretical  theory of truth or how it  can stay realist  without the
semantic theory.   
7. Conclusions
So, in this chapter, I have pointed out the consequences of language pluralism about
scientific truth and proposed a novel argument for incommensurability (even if I am
dealing with a form of incommensurability different from Kuhn's or Feyerabend's ones):
and finally, I have explained how it is related to the semantic theory of truth. Roughly,
for  my  argument,  the  incommensurability  thesis  prevents  us  from  using  a  cross-
theoretical  truth  predicate,  because  the  semantic  theory  allows  us  to  define  truth
predicates (indexed or restricted) tied to specific well-behaved languages. Accordingly,
the  general  or  relational  truth  predicate  remains  undefined  and  therefore  the  cross-
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theoretical  relations  between successive  or  rival  theories  cannot  be  justified  from a
truth-friendly viewpoint.  Moreover,  I  have  claimed  that  the  best  forms  of  selective
realism (like structural realism) cannot overcome the incommensurability thesis in this
respect, since they do not focus on the idea of interpreted language, but, rather on the
notions  of  structure  and  model,  deflating  the  concept  of  reference  (since  they  are
interested  in  dismissing  its  ontological  value).  On  the  contrary,  taking  for  granted
Tarski's concept of interpreted language, the possibility to apply the semantic theory of
truth to scientific languages depends on: 1) the assignation of physical referents to the
terms deployed by the mathematical structure of the theory; 2) the relation between a
theory and the intended domain of objects to which such a theory is applicable and the
relevant  spatio-temporal  notions.  Thus,  I  have  shown  that  there  is  a  sort  of
incompatibility between the semantic theory and the non-linguistic view on scientific
theories.  To  that  extent,  I  am  not  questioning  how  selective  realists  approach  the
problem of scientific realism; I am not denying that the fact that some parts of scientific
theories are preserved across theory change is an argument for scientific realism and
that  we should  commit  ourselves  to  those  part  of  scientific  theories.  But  I  wonder
whether scientific realism can do without a cross-theoretical truth predicate, assuming
that,  according  to  preservative  realism,  our  best  argument  for  scientific  realism  is
basically cross-theoretical (how the structure of one theory is mapped into the structure
of its counterparts); and that scientific realism usually holds that scientific theories are
literally construed as true-or-false (for the semantic thesis). So, my conclusion is that, in
so far as structural realism treats scientific theories as set-theoretical structures, they are
not true-or-false in any Tarski-like sense. And this constitutes additional evidence for
the concept of interpreted structure by concrete applications that I have presented in Part
1 – sections 2-3-4: the point is that mathematical structures are not scientific theories
until we provide a physical interpretation, that is a connection between structure and
applications.
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Section 3: The Inference from Truth to Success and from Success to
Truth: what the Deflationist May Say about Scientific Truth
1. Introduction
In the last sections I have defended a minimal account of the correspondence theory,
based  on  Tarski's  semantic  theory.  Here,  truth  is  thought  to  be  a  relation  between
linguistic and non-linguistic entities, but I have not provided a unitary account of the
truth-bearers, the truth-makers and the correspondence relation in itself, since I think
that they are not necessary conditions for a proper correspondence theory. And I think
that this is not a weak point, especially in scientific contexts, where, as I have sketched
in the previous parts:
• the correspondence relation can obtain in several ways (according to different
methods and styles of reasoning and so on)
• scientific  theories  express  their  claims  in  different  ways  (models,  sentences,
axioms, set-theoretical structures and so on)
• there is no agreement about what the world is made of (entities, mathematical
structures, properties, physically interpreted structures and so on)
• the identity conditions of scientific theories and languages may change with our
inquiry and with time (and actually they vary)
But  one  can  object  that,  since  the  account  of  correspondence  truth  that  I  am
proposing  is  really  minimal  (no  metaphysical  commitment  at  all),  there  is  little
difference between minimal correspondence and deflationism and therefore it would be
worthy to give up correspondence and endorse a correspondence-friendly deflationary
theory. And in fact, some philosophers of science have suggested that deflationism will
suffice to account for scientific knowledge (Giere 1988, Kuhn 2000).  
In this chapter I will discuss how the deflationary theory reacts to some problems
concerning scientific knowledge and in particular I will focus on the explanatory role of
truth and how it can face the inference from truth to success (and vice versa). In fact,
according to the correspondence theory,  it  is intuitively clear that there is a relation
between  approximate  truth  and  empirical  success.  In  the  previous  chapters  I  have
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discussed this  point  from several  perspectives,  but  now the  problem is  whether  the
concept of truth can play an explanatory role (for example that true beliefs are worthy of
being pursued since they are a better guide for action than false beliefs) and, according
to the correspondence theory, it can, since it is a substantive relation. On the contrary,
the deflationary theory replies that truth is not a property (or a property without essence)
and therefore it cannot play any role in explanation; as a consequence, the fact that true
beliefs lead to empirical or practical success can be explained without appealing to the
truth, but only to facts and questions of local epistemology. 
Thus,  in  this  chapter  I  will  challenge  this  problem. At first,  I  will  introduce the
deflationary thesis, without going into the details of the different deflationary theories
(minimalism,  disquotationalism,  prosententialism  and  so  on)  and  make  some
clarifications  about  the  intuitive applicability of  the deflationary theory to  scientific
contexts.  Then,  I  will  compare  the  approaches  of  minimal  correspondence  and
deflationism to the problem of the relation between empirical success and truth. And,
finally,  I  will  conclude with  some objections  to  the purely deflationary perspective,
which may account for truth-talk in scientific contexts at the low level of individual
sentences  (even  though  it  does  it  in  an  elaborate  and  non-economic  way),  but  is
problematic as regards how the truth works referring to whole theories.
2. Deflationism and the world
2.1 What is a deflationary theory?
It is hard to characterize the deflationary theory in a positive way, since it is usually
introduced by means of a distinction between deflationary and inflationary theories; that
is to say,  by showing what the deflationary theory has to say against the traditional
theories (correspondence, coherence, pragmatism). In contrast to the “received view”,
deflationism holds that truth is not a property (or a property with no nature or essence);
but this characterization is too wide,  since it  would include all  kinds of nominalism
(since nominalism claims that all properties have no metaphysical essence, including
truth)67. More precisely, we may say that what is claimed is that there is no substantial
67 And perhaps it is too narrow at the same time, since some deflationary theories, such as Horwich's
minimalism and Field's disquotationalism, do not claim that truth is not a property, even if it is a
“deflated” one. 
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property of truth or an underlying nature to truth of the kind that philosophers might
create  theories  about.  Basically,  there  are  two  kinds  of  questions  about  truth  that
deflationism and inflationism answer in different ways:
• (Analysis) What is truth?
• (Conceptual role) What is the conceptual (and linguistic) role of truth?
(Armour-Garb and Beall 2005: 2)
The first  question appeals  to  the analysis  of truth,  something that  must  have the
following form:
x is true if and only if x is T
Unlike  the  inflationary theories,  deflationism does  not  take  the  analysis  problem
seriously  and  focuses  only  on  the  conceptual  and  explanatory  role  that  the  truth
predicate plays in our talk, language and thought. 
Even though deflationism has received several formulations, generally it rests on the
Equivalence Schema (ES):
(ES) “p” is true if and only if p 
Where “...” are a kind of appropriate name-forming device (and can be replaced, for
example,  by “the proposition that  …”) and “p” is  replaced by sentences  to  provide
instances of the schema.  (ES) is  a  fundamental  assumption of both inflationary and
deflationary  theories,  but  the  key claim of  the  deflationary  theories  is  that  (ES)  is
fundamental, that is to say that the instances of the schema are exhaustive of everything
significant we can say about truth. This is what I meant suggesting that deflationism
dismisses the question about the analysis of truth: while inflationary theories hold, for
instance, that a proposition is true if and only if it corresponds to the facts, deflationary
theories does not provide an explicit definition of truth. For example, Horwich says that
his  minimalist  theory  does  not  offer  any explicit  definition  of  the  concept  of  truth
(Horwich 2001:  567),  but  this  does  not  imply that  the meaning of  the  word “true”
cannot  be  fully  grasped  by  a  competent  speaker.  In  fact,  deflationism  defines  the
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concept of  “having the concept of truth”: someone has the concept of truth if he is
disposed  to  accept  all  the  non-controversial  instances  of  (ES),  that  is  all  the  non-
paradoxical sentences having the form “p” is true if and only if p. 
According  to  deflationism,  (ES)  is  both  (1)  conceptually  fundamental  and  (2)
explanatorily fundamental. (1) means that the instances of (ES) do not follow from a
definition  of  truth  in  more  basic  concepts  by  which  truth  can  be  defined  (like
correspondence,  coherence  or  warranted  assertibility).  (2)  means  that  there  is  no
possible unifying account of why the biconditionals hold and that the instances of (ES)
are fundamental explainers of truth-talk. For example, the deflationary truth predicate
explains the use of indirect assertion sentences such as “what Tarski said is true” in
terms of endorsing functions; or the use of logical laws in the form of sentences such as
“every sentence of the form “everything is φ or not φ” is true”68.
Since  deflationary  and  inflationary  theories  strongly  disagree  about  the  very
possibility to analyze the concept of truth, a fruitful way to approach the problem is to
give up the question about what truth is and ask what we can do with the truth predicate,
or how truth is explanatorily related to other concepts, such as meaning, belief, truth-
conditions,  assertion,  success,  goal  of  inquiry.  In  the  next  part  I  will  discuss  how
deflationary and correspondendist  theories  face  the problem of  the  relation between
truth  and  empirical  success  of  scientific  sentences;  but,  firstly,  I  shall  make  some
clarifications about the applicability of deflationism to scientific knowledge.
2.2 Deflationism and empirical claims
By now I have assumed a minimal correspondence intuition, without appealing to
metaphysical notions such as proposition and fact, such that, if something is true, there
is something that makes it true. This seems to be particularly intuitive at least in the
contexts  where  truth  is  immediately  related  to  factual  or  empirical  questions,  and
scientific knowledge seems to fit well with this account. Moreover, several philosophers
take the correspondence intuition to be a fundamental truism that applies not only to the
correspondence theory, but to any satisfactory theory of truth (even though you are not
building your theory of truth around this intuition). For example, according to Lynch the
objectivity platitude is logically related to (ES) and claims that:
68 For some objections to the deflationary perspective on indirect assertion, endorsing functions and
generalizations see Gupta 1993, Soames 1999, Armour-Garb 2004.
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• (OP) The belief that p is true if, and only if, with respect to the belief that p,
things are as they are believed to be. (Lynch 2009: 8)
The problem with the deflationary theory is that many philosophers maintain that it
cannot  accommodate  the  correspondence  intuition  (Alston  1996,  Fumerton  1995,
Kirkham 1992). Anyway, some followers of the deflationary theory does not deny that
the  concept  of  truth is  intuitively related to  how things  are.  For  example,  Horwich
claims that, from the one hand, deflationism does not explain what truth is and therefore
it does not provide a positive answer as truth is correspondence between propositions
and facts; but, from the other hand, it does not deny that truth corresponds, in some
sense, to the facts. On the contrary, he does say that “statements owe their truth to the
nature of reality” (Horwich 1990: 105, italics mine). And, additionally, his deflationary
minimalism does not reject the idea that concepts such as truth, satisfaction, reference
and  so  on  are  inter-defined.  Horwich's  minimalism  is  correspondence-friendly  (or
representation-friendly  in  Marino  2010:  222)  as  far  as  it  tries  to  accommodate  the
correspondence  intuition  without  appealing  to  the  metaphysical  essence  of  truth;  in
other  words,  we shall  assume that  the  correspondence  theory consists  of  two main
claims:  1)  that  true  statements  correspond  to  portions  of  reality;  2)  that  such  a
correspondence  is  what  truth  essentially  is.  Correspondence-friendly  delflationism
endorses the first claim, but rejects the second and accounts for the concept of truth (as
well as the concepts of correspondence, satisfaction, reference, representation) from a
non-essentialist  standpoint.  Thus,  it  acknowledges  that  truth-values  depend  on  how
things are and that propositions are true or false because the world is in a certain way
and, to that extent, propositions are true because they correspond to the world. But it
denies that those relations are constitutive of truth and that they are what truth consists
in. This is because the deflationary perspective explains the correspondence intuition
basing on (ES), and therefore the instances of (ES) are taken to be more fundamental
than the correspondence relation. But, I will come back to the explanatory role of the
instances of (ES) in the next parts of this chapter.
So,  it  would  be  wrong  to  say  that  deflationism  is  not  applicable  to  scientific
knowledge because it is tied to a non-realist metaphysics: unlike the epistemic theories,
it does not make the truth mind-dependent. Anti-realists accounts of truth usually tie
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truth to an epistemic or potentially epistemic state; for example some theories identify
truth  with  what  an  ideal  observer  would  know  or  warranted  assertibility.
Correspondence and deflationism agree in rejecting this approach to truth. Moreover,
they are both consistent  with cognition-independence,  that  is  one of our most  basic
intuitions about truth: “nothing in the account of truth itself indicates that truth is, ever
will be, or can be entertained by minds of roughly our capacity” (Vision 2004: 38). Of
course,  correspondence and deflationism are non-epistemic for different reasons: the
correspondence theory because it claims that the essence of truth is not related to the
way we know it; the deflationary theory because it claims that there is nothing much to
be said about truth (other than the instances of ES), it does not make difference whether
epistemic or non-epistemic.  But,  anyway,  the point  is  that  deflationism is  consistent
with (OP), whatever is its logical relation with (ES). And therefore that the intuitive
argument against the epistemic theories (that truth depends on how things are and not on
how  we  think  or  wish  them  to  be)  is  not  automatically  an  argument  for  the
correspondence theory (Williams 1986: 224. See also Field 1994: 265). Finally, as far as
weak correspondence theories are based on the idea that truth depends on non-linguistic
facts, deflationism is a weak correspondence theory (Patterson 2003: 425), but, as I will
explain later, this is far to week a notion of correspondence to be of interest. So, in the
end, a correspondence-friendly deflationary theory of the kind suggested, for example,
by Horwich or Quine is the view that the right theory of truth equals the correspondence
theory  minus  metaphysical  entities  like  propositions,  facts  and  state  of  affairs  and
semantic relations such as representation and correspondence (David 1994: 53).
Finally,  in  this  section,  after  roughly  introducing  the  deflationary  theory,  I  have
explained why it can be applied to scientific knowledge and scientific sentences without
violating our most basic intuitions about truth (and scientific truth in particular). In the
next sections, I will focus on how correspondence and deflationism disagree about the
explanatory power of (ES).
3. The explanatory role of the truth predicate
In the last section, I have said that inflationary and deflationary theories approach in
different ways the problem of the analysis of truth: deflationism refuses to take this
problem seriously, since it claims that there is nothing to say about the essence or the
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nature  of  truth.  For  this  reason,  it  is  not  fruitful  to  compare  deflationism  and
correspondence on what they say (or refuse to say) about what truth is. On the contrary,
a more straightforward way to face the problem is to focus on what they claim about the
explanatory role of the truth predicate. As I have said in section 2, there are basically
two questions about truth. The former concerns the nature of truth: inflationary theories
maintain that there is something common and peculiar to true statements, for example
that a statement is true in virtue of some sort of correspondence with some parts of the
world and are committed to a description of this relation in naturalistic terms (appealing
to reference or satisfaction and so on); and I have just said that deflationary theories
reject  any  such  reductive  explanation  of  truth,  since  truth  has  no  nature  that  is
susceptible of scientific analysis.  Instead,  the second question is  concerned with the
causal and explanatory role of truth.
Typically, realists attribute to the truth property some important explanatory role, for
example, to explain the success of science or the fact that people who hold true beliefs
are generally more successful in meeting their goals; or to explain meaning in terms of
truth-conditions, where, obviously, meaning, in turn, plays an explanatory role in the
explanation of human behaviors. On the contrary, deflationism usually rejects that the
truth predicate can be used as explanation, even if, obviously, this does not mean that
the deflationist cannot use the truth predicate in explanatory sentences. For example, the
appeal to (ES) explains why a sentence “p because it is true that q” is equivalent to the
sentence “p because q”, but this does not mean that the truth is the explanation of p. Or,
in other words, consider the example “I am wet because it is raining”: following (ES),
this sentence can be rewritten as “I am wet because it is true that it is raining”. In a very
trivial way, the explanatory or causal role is played by the rain, not by the truth. In some
cases, like those I have sketched in section 2 (blind ascriptions, generalizations), the
linguistic role of the truth predicate is essential to express statements, but, anyway, this
does not make the truth metaphysically explanatory. The deflationist must convince us
to give up truth as explanation, because, if the property P is part of a significant and
informative explanation of the phenomenon Q, this is sufficient for P to be a real and
distinct property; and the main claim of the deflationary theory is that truth is not a real
property. So the main champions of the deflationary theory adopt this perspective on the
distinction between inflationary and deflationary properties (Horwich 1990: 38, Field
2001: 29): that this dichotomy is an argument over whether or not truth is a causal or
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explanatory property69.
This seems to fit well with scientific inquiry, where it appears intuitively clear that
the explanatory role is played by facts. For example, in some works, Hacking agrees
with  the  deflationist  on the  lack  of  explanatory role  of  the  truth  predicate  in  these
contexts70. He says that we would extend to truth what Kant said about existence: that it
is not a predicate, in the sense that it does not add anything to the subject (Hacking
2002:  192).  For  example,  I  may believe that  there was a  solar  eclipse this  summer
because there was one in the place where I was staying. Here, referring to my belief, the
explanatory role is played by the solar eclipse, along my experience, my memory, my
background knowledge and so on. But the truth of the proposition expressing the fact
that there was a solar eclipse this summer is not part of the explanation; or if so, it is
explanatory only in a secondary sense, as a consequence of the eclipse itself, since the
sentence “there was a solar eclipse this summer” is equivalent to “it is true that there
was a solar eclipse this summer” according to the deflationary interpretation of (ES).
Consider another example (in Levin 1984). You can explain why airplanes stay up by
appealing to
• “The pressure on the underside of a moving airfoil is greater than the pressure on
the overside” is true
or to
• The pressure on the underside of a moving airfoil is greater than the pressure on
the overside
Of course, what plays the effective explanatory role is the latter statement; better, the
former sentence is also explanatory, but the explanatory work is done in a disquotational
way,  within  the  quotes.  In  other  words,  here  explanation  appealing  to  the  truth  is
achieved  by  (implicit)  disquotation  of  the  statement  mentioned  and  therefore,  the
69 Actually, it is not entirely clear what an explanatory property is thought to be; anyway, a possible
definition is that, assuming P as an explanatory property, P should figure in effective explanations,
except those in which it is a mere logical device.
70 Hacking has developed several (and sometimes contradictory) ideas about truth, but he never really
endorsed deflationism. As I have already said, in his last works he seems to adopt some kind of
pluralist theory (Hacking 2012).
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empirical  success  of  the  theory  is  explained  by the  theory itself,  and  no  particular
explanandum of the success of a theory is required.
Now I will focus on how the deflationist aims to explain these connections between
facts and true sentences.
3.1 Horwich's Account
Therefore, I will introduce some perspectives on how the deflationist can account for
the correspondence intuition underlying science appealing only to (ES) and excluding
any metaphysical implication. I have already said that Horwich does not deny that the
truth of a sentence depends on how things are. More precisely, he says that whenever a
proposition is true, it is true because something in the world (something external to the
proposition) is in a certain way (Horwich 1990: 105). For example “p's being true is
explained by snow's being white” is taken to be equivalent to “p is true because snow is
white”. 
A preliminary problem with his account is that, if we take “p is true because the
snow is white”, where p is to be replaced by “the proposition that the snow is white”, in
conjunction with the deflationary theory, that is with the instances of (ES), it will follow
something naturally false. In fact, from “p is true because the snow is white” and “p is
true if and only if the snow is white”, it follows that “the snow is white because the
snow is white”; and this is undoubtedly false, since the explanatory relation expressed
by “because” can obtain only referring to distinct  relata and this is not the case. Of
course,  the  problem  is  that  (ES)  is  a  biconditional,  while  causation  is  irreflexive,
asymmetric  and  transitive.  But  the  deflationist  can  reply  by  arranging  the
correspondence intuition in different ways, or by saying that the word “because” creates
an opaque context, where we are not allowed to substitute co-referential expressions
preserving  truth  (Stoljar,  Damjanovic  2010).  Anyway,  since  I  think  that  there  is
something  more  radically  wrong  here,  I  will  proceed  with  the  core  of  Horwich's
argument.  Let us consider again that “the proposition that the snow is  white is  true
because the snow is white”. According to Horwich, when we analyze the explanation
relation between phenomena,  we naturally give explanatory priority to  “the laws of
physics and the initial conditions of the universe” (Horwich 1990: 105). Appealing to
those ultimate things, we can figure out the phenomenon that we aim to explain, for
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example that the snow is white, and then, basing on (ES), we are allowed to conclude
that the snow is white is true, since it is equivalent to “the snow is white”. Since “the
snow is white” has been proven to be derivative from the laws of physics and the initial
conditions of the universe, it is explanatory prior to “the snow is white is true” and this
explains that the snow is white is true because the snow is white, without appealing to
the  truth  property  and  any  semantic  notion.  The  argument  tries  to  ground  the
correspondence intuition in the concept of causation and basically goes as follows:
p is made T by x  = p is T because of x
     = p is T because x exists
     = x exists and there is an explanatory deduction from “x exists” to “p 
         is T”
Thus, assuming that T is the property of being true and p is a well-formed sentence, it
will follow that
p is made true by x = p is true because of x
     = p is true because x exists
     = x exists and there is an explanatory deduction from “x exists” 
    to “p is true”
(Horwich 2009: 191)
         
There are several problems with this argument (McGrath 2003 and Wright 1992: 27).
The  most  important  is  that  it  implicitly  assumes  that  the  concept  of  explanation  is
necessarily tied to the recognition of (and the derivation from) some laws of nature. At
first, for the sake of the argument, we can leave aside the fact that in ordinary contexts
the relation between two or more brute facts can constitute an acceptable explanation in
itself; or that mathematical, philosophical and accidental truths cannot follow from laws
of nature and the initial conditions of the universe. I am dealing with the context of
scientific inquiry and therefore, we can provisionally assume a view based on laws and
conditions. But the point is that this view does not fit even with the empirical sciences.
Firstly, it is concerned with laws or small collection of laws, but we cannot imagine how
to present biology or psychology as clusters of laws; and actually, it is not clear whether
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those sciences contain any effective natural laws. And moreover a reductionist  view
aiming to derive those sciences from physics or chemistry is problematic as well. In fact
some concepts employed by biology cannot be defined in the terms of the sciences
projected as reducing it: for example the concept of gene cannot actually be analyzed in
physicochemical terms. And anyway, even though physics is usually based on natural
laws, not  all  physical explanations appeal  to natural laws and, in  the end,  scientific
explanation is not always a matter of pointing to laws71.
Thus, since my conclusion is that Horwich's account is not sufficient to explain the
complex relations between theories and reality obtaining in scientific contexts, in the
next section I will present a more plausible deflationary account of the role played by
truth in the empirical field.
4. Leeds' account
4.1 Disquotationalism and the success argument
Stephen Leeds' account (Leeds 1978, Leeds 1995, Leeds 2007) of the deflationary
applications of the truth predicate in scientific contexts is also based on the idea that the
truth  predicate  does  not  play  any  explanatory  role  concerning  the  correspondence
intuition.  His  starting  point  is  the  success  argument,  one  of  the  most  compelling
arguments for the explanatory power of the correspondence relation and therefore for
inflationary correspondence. The core of the argument is quite similar to the no-miracle
argument for scientific realism and it claims that we cannot justify the success of our
theorizing about the world without appealing the correspondence relation; explaining
the success of our theorizing is an explanatory role and therefore we should accept the
correspondence theory rather than deflationism.
Let us start with a trivial example. Assume that F is a football player, who succeeds
in shooting a penalty kick in the best way for him to do this, given that his aim is to
score a goal. How can we explain his success? A good explanation would be some like
this:
• F wants to score a goal
71 For a perspective on scientific explanation that does not depend on the idea of law see Kitcher 2001.
207
• F believes that he will score a goal by shooting in the opposite corner after the
goalkeeper dives
• F is able to figure out when the goalkeeper will dive
According  to  Field's  interpretation  of  the  success  argument  (Field  1986),  this
explanation assumes an implicit explanatory use of the truth predicate, concerning for
example the truth-conditions of the explaining sentences. For instance, the sentence “F
believes that he will score a goal by shooting in the opposite corner after the goalkeeper
dives” has the truth-conditions that “he will score a goal by shooting in the opposite
corner after the goalkeeper dives” and this expresses a connection between sentences
and worldly conditions, just in the sense that the deflationist aims to rule out. 
The deflationist would reply to this example saying that F, in his language, is able to
express sentences like G, D and S, such that F aims to score a goal (G), he tends to
believe something about how the goalkeeper will dive (D) and he tends to succeed in
shooting in the corner when he intends to do this (S). In this way, what is needed to
explain the success of F is that F holds a belief of the form G#(D#S), where # is an
inference equivalent to “if and only if” (Leeds 1995: 17); and in such an explanation the
world “truth” is not used at all. 
So  the  main  claim of  the  deflationary account  is  that  the  analysis  of  the  causal
connection between sentences and reality is a sufficient explanation of our trust in true
sentences and our tendency to act following true beliefs; and that reference and truth are
not relations between language and the domain of extra-linguistic things, but, rather,
they obtain only in a merely formal or logical way. Now consider a more informative
example, from the field of the empirical sciences:
To take the case of viruses as an example, we can explain how the causal relations
came to  hold  by tracing the history of  research into viruses.  Such a  history –
already available in the local library – will show us, among other things, how it
came about that,  at  a certain point,  the causal  connections between “virus” and
viruses were fairly firmly set  up:  so that  from that  point  onward it  was nearly
guaranteed, given our theory of viruses, and given our inductive procedures – and
given also how viruses actually work – that the new beliefs about viruses that won
general  acceptance  would  tent  to  be  T-true  [that  is  to  say  true  under  the
interpretation that assigns “virus” to viruses and “dog” to dogs and so on].
(Leeds 1995: 10)  
In this  way the deflationist  can tell  a story on how a naturalistic analysis  of the
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words-world relations can account for the correspondence intuition and on how these
causal chains are related to the success and the reliability of our theories; all these tasks
are fulfilled without recurring to a general theory of truth and denotation. But this is not
necessarily an argument against the correspondence theory, at least in the minimal or
weak  variant  that  I  have  defended;  for  example  Kitcher's  minimal  correspondence
theory does not appeal to anything like a general theory of truth or denotation (Kitcher
2002: 347). So I will go into the details of Leeds' account to spell out the core of his
argument.
4.2 The map analogy
Coming  back  to  the  example  of  the  penalty,  we  are  in  front  of  two  possible
explanations of the behavior of F. Speaking in terms of propositions, we can say either
that the success of F is explained  by the proposition that he believes is true or that his
success  is  explained  by  the  proposition  expressed  by  F's  belief.  The  former
interpretation  proposes  an  explanatory  linkage  between  a  belief's  being  true  and
something extra-linguistic;  and this  is  an invitation  for  further  questions  concerning
what  makes  this  relation satisfied and for a  theory of truth in which truth plays  an
explanatory role. On the contrary, the latter interpretation claims that there is no deep
explanatory relation; rather, the explanatory relation is between the propositions that F
believes (about how to shoot and how the goalkeeper will act) and the proposition that a
certain kind of shot tends to work better than others. And this kind of relation has to be
justified by appealing to the game of football, not to the semantic relations between the
words and the world. The latter interpretation is adopted by the deflationist,  and his
explanation  consists  of  two steps:  1)  explaining  why F  believes  in  a  given action-
guiding sentence; 2) explaining why those action-guiding sentences are true.
So, the deflationist claim is that several questions where the correspondence theory sees
robust  semantic  relations  are  actually  problems  of  local  epistemology.  Where  the
correspondentist says that  F scores a goal because many of his relevant beliefs are true
(where  this  involves  a  referential  relation  between  his  beliefs  and  the  world),  the
deflationist believes that he succeeds because he tends to belief that the goalkeeper will
dive on his left when and only when the goalkeeper will dive on his left.  
Leeds' example (in reply to Kitcher) of the map of Venice is a typical example of
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how  deflationism  aims  to  replace  truth  and  reference  with  questions  of  local
epistemology:
[Kitcher]  has no trouble arguing that  their  [deflationary]  alternative explanation
leave  out  the  fact  that  our  map  of  the  world,  being  a  largely  correct  one,  is
endlessly and systematically versatile. But I do not see why a deflationist should
need to eliminate all use of “true” in explanations, any more than someone who
thinks there is no general, systematic account of how people come to have good
maps of Venice needs to show how we can replace every explanation of the form “I
looked on the map, and I saw that if I followed this street I would land in a canal”
with one that does not make implicit reference to the particular projection under
which the map resembles Venice. (Leeds 2007: 11)
Basically,  this  example means that  we can plausibly say that  the map guides the
tourists  well  because  it  is  accurate,  without  affirming  anything  general  about  the
representational  relation  between the  map and the  world,  for  example  that  the map
guides  us  well  because  it  corresponds  to  the  world.  Thus,  Leeds  poses  a  parallel
between maps and scientific theories: like maps, theories allow us to make successful
predictions and to fruitfully interact with the world, without saying anything general
about the relationship between theory and reality.
In this way, the deflationist tends to reject the semantic concept of reference and use
the  concept  of  “indications  relations” (Maddy 2007:  153-156;  but  also Field  1994);
roughly, the “indications relations” of a sentence p are the worldly conditions associated
with the speakers believing p. Wilson (1994) suggests to consider the example of a
rainbow: there seems to be a  tension between the fact  that  the sentence “there is  a
rainbow” is true if and only if the angle of refraction of light between my location and
that spot is just so as to produce a prism effect and the deflationist claim that the truth-
talk  related  to  this  sentence  (including  truth-conditions)  is  exhausted  by  the
biconditional ““there is a rainbow over there” is true if and only if there is a rainbow
over there”. The indications relations relevant to the sentence “there is a rainbow” are
that “there is a certain angle of refraction between water droplets and me”; from (ES),
we know that “there is a rainbow over there” is true if and only if there is a rainbow
over there; from optics, we know that “there is a rainbow over there” is true if and only
if the angle of refraction of light between my location and that spot is just so as to
produce a prism effect. And, putting these biconditionals together, we will come back to
the  intuitive  explanation  “there  is  a  rainbow over  there  if  and only if  the  angle  of
refraction is such-and-such”.
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This is how the deflationary (and, for Leeds, disquotationalist) strategy dismisses the
general concept of truth and tries to account for the correspondence intuition in terms of
problems of local epistemology. Here the complexities of the words-world relations do
not  threaten deflationism, since the indications relations  approach concerns only the
features of individual cases, not global problems on truth and reference.
5. Problems for the deflationary strategy
In the last section I have presented a plausible deflationary explanation of the success
argument that appeals only to the instances of (ES) and denies that the truth predicate
has  any explanatory power.  Now, I  will  make some objections  against  this  kind  of
explanation.
5.1 Is truth really non-causal?
The  first  objection  against  the  deflationary  strategy  has  been  developed  in
(Damjanovic 2005): his argument rests on the distinction between causal properties and
efficacious  properties.  Suppose  that  A suddenly  falls  asleep  because  he  ingested  a
sleeping pill; thus we may intuitively say that A is sleeping because he has ingested
something that has the property of being a sleeping pill. But another point is which is
the efficacious property causing A falling asleep; in fact, it seems that what is doing the
causing is that A has ingested something that has a specific chemical composition (and
therefore something that has the property of having a specific chemical composition).
Being a sleeping pill is not an efficacious property, but it is an explanatory property,
since  we  legitimately  use  it  in  explanations  about  why  A is  sleeping.  Causal  or
explanatory properties are either efficacious or causally relevant and the deflationist has
showed that  the  truth  property is  not  efficacious.  But  the  fact  that  the  explanation
appealing to the property T can be replaced by an explanation that does not appeal to T
does not entail that T is not explanatory. Thus, the first objection is that, even though
perhaps the truth property is not an efficacious property,  it  may well  be a causal or
explanatory property.
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5.2 Truth or explanation?
The second argument  concerns  the  relation  between truth  and explanation  in  the
deflationary strategy. In its application to scientific theories, the deflationist would say
that scientific research provides us with reasons for believing some theories and that
these are good reasons; and, in the end, resting on (ES),  we have good reasons for
believing them true as well.  So,  roughly,  the argument  goes as follows:  1) we give
reasons for believing A; 2) if they are good reasons, we can believe A; 3) therefore, we
can believe that A is true. The problem with this argument is that it is not showing that A
is true, but, rather that we have good reasons for believing A. All that it points out is that
we can explain some sentences by means of scientific explanation and that (ES) can
transfer that explanation into an explanation of why the relevant sentence is true. And,
of course, this is not to explain why the snow is white in terms of snow's being white,
but, rather, to explain why we are allowed to believe that the snow is white in terms of
what scientific communities find persuasive and well-confirmed72. So, in the end, the
objection is that this argument explains why we think that it is true that the snow is
white, but it does not explain why we use to infer from “it is true that snow is white”
that “the snow is white” without requiring any further explanation (see also Caputo
2010: 27). On the contrary, the task of the correspondence intuition is to provide an
account of the explanatory relation ““snow is white” is true because snow is white” and
this relation should obtain even if no physical explanation is available.  
5.3 Imperfect maps
The  third  objection  has  been  presented  in  (Marino  2010)  and  it  is  the  most
compelling one. Let us come back to Leeds' analogy between scientific theories and
maps. The point is that a good map successfully guides our action and allows us to
make predictions about the relevant portions of reality; but this does not mean that we
should  create  a  general  theory of  the  relations  between maps and reality,  since  the
successful applications of the map can be justified at a local level. But Marino (2010:
226) suggests to consider a similar example. Imagine that you have a perfect map, that
is a perfect representation of the field it aims to represent or that the map and the field
72 A similar argument in (Wright 1992: 27), referring to Horwich's argument that I have discussed in
section 3.1 of this chapter.
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are identical. The deflationist succeed in analyzing this case in terms of local relations,
since he can characterize this perfect map as follows: for any locations x and y, x stands
on the relation K to x on the map if and only if x stands in the relation K to y on the
field. To express this relation we do not need anything like a general theory of how the
map represents the world and its accuracy. 
But now imagine to have an imperfect map, that is more accurate in some respects
than in  others;  such a map uses  different  methods of  projection in  some parts  and,
referring  to  some  others,  it  is  merely  wrong.  In  this  example,  the  analysis  of  the
accuracy of the map is far more complex and involves the complexities of the relation
between words and the world that the deflationist aims to rule out. In fact, if the map is
guiding us well, this constitutes evidence for thinking that the map “corresponds” to the
field it is mapping (the global concept of truth rejected by the deflationist) and we can
derive conclusions about the causal chains that made this  possible.  On the contrary,
when the map misleads us, we should analyze the portions of reality and parts of the
map, to find out mistakes that we had not noticed (and this task can be achieved by the
local deflationary perspective).
The weak point of the deflationary argument is just that scientific theories (as well as
languages)  work  like  imperfect  maps.  Scientific  theories  are  true  strictly  speaking
referring to some applications; approximately true to some degree relatively to other
applications;  and  merely  false  to  some  others.  And  in  this  context,  the  weak
correspondence theory offers a better account of the deflationary one, since it claims
that, in investigating the complexities of the world-words relations the map analogy is
no longer accurate and sometimes we have to go beyond mere lists.
6. Global and local, upward and downward
In  the  last  sections  I  have  presented  some  objections  against  the  deflationary
explanation of the success argument and the correspondence intuition; in my view the
decisive objection is the third, especially because it is the only one directly concerned
with scientific knowledge. As I have stated in the last chapter, the phlogiston theory is a
case of successful theory that does not give us a perfect representation of the world. In
response to this case, the deflationist may say that the truth-conditions of “this air is
dephlogisticated” are that “this air is dephlogisticated” and the indications relations that
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“this air is rich of oxygen” (Maddy 2007: 155); and this is supposed to explain why
scientists were successful, even though they were substantially wrong. In the previous
chapters, I have explained several times why this interpretation of the relation between
theories is wrong. Now the point is that the weak correspondence theory entails a more
plausible answer to the phlogiston challenge. Following the spirit of selective realism,
the weak correspondence theory may say that, even if the sentences of the phlogiston
theory are themselves false, the theory itself is approximately (and partly) true. We can
admit that our map is imperfect, but, anyway, it corresponds to the world to some degree
(even if I do not think so as regards the phlogiston theory, as I have claimed in Part 1). 
So, in the end, there is no doubt that the direct argument from success to truth is not
tenable: too many successful scientific theories were proven to be false73. But, unlike
deflationism, weak correspondence allows us to recognize the fact that not only the truth
of a theory, but also its partial truth can explain empirical success. The basic idea (the
same idea underlying selective realism) is that, given a scientific theory T, some claims
of T are true, other claims are false, but the explanation of the success of T is related to
the  truths  it  contains.  And  in  the  previous  chapters  I  have  explained  how actually
scientific  realism deals  with the  parts  of  scientific  theories  we should consider  true
strictly speaking. But you can do this only adopting a (weak) correspondence theory,
since the deflationary theory is not able to account for those parts of scientific theories
that are considered essential for their empirical success (because it requires a global
perspective). Finally, the argument for the relation between success and truth goes as
follows:
• S  plays  a crucial  role  in  a systematic practice of fine-grained prediction and
intervention
• S is approximately true
(Kitcher 2002)
But this is not a direct argument since we can know whether S plays some crucial
role in empirically successful practice only basing on the preservation relation between
successive theories.
In his classic (Laudan 1981), Laudan introduces a distinction between “Downward
73 See the debate about  the No Miracle Argument,  Pessimistic  Induction and Inference to  the Best
Explanation.
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Path” (inference from truth to empirical success) and “Upward Path” (inference from
empirical success to truth). Of course, none of these strategies is viable, since they both
assume a necessary connection between success and truth. But the weak correspondence
theory,  in conjunction with the adoption of a proper form of selective realism74, can
overcome this distinction posing an indirect relation between truth and success, based
on a global perspective which allows us to deal with scientific theories as a whole and to
select the most empirically interesting parts.  
7. Conclusions
In  this  chapter  I  have  discussed  how  the  deflationist  aims  to  analyze  the
correspondence intuition in the terms of his  theory of truth,  and especially how she
faces the relation between truth and empirical success, where truth is usually supposed
to play an explanatory role, which is not consistent with the deflationary thesis. I have
introduced  Horwich's  (minimalism)  and  Leeds'  (disquotationalism)  accounts  of  the
correspondence intuition and I have concluded that,  even though, at  first sight, they
seem to apply to the local level of individual scientific sentences, they have several
problems.  The  most  important  is  that  the  deflationist  cannot  explain  why scientific
theories  are  partly  true,  or,  more  precisely,  they  are  true  to  some  applications,
approximately true to some others and false referring to others yet. Therefore we should
not replace the concept of (approximate) truth with the concept of accuracy combined
with  (ES).  We need a  correspondence  theory to  explain  how the  relations  between
scientific theories and portions of reality obtain at a global level; but, at the same time,
we need a weak correspondence theory, which is not committed to a one-to-one relation
between theories and facts and therefore to a direct inference from truth to success (or
the other way round). The relation between truth and success obtains only by means of
the selection of the parts of scientific theories that are responsible for their empirical
success.
74 This is not thought to be an argument for scientific realism, but only for weak correspondence, since
it already assumes a realist commitment and therefore, it would be a circular argument. 
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Section 4 and Conclusion: Weak Correspondence. Obections, Replies 
and Open Questions
1. Introduction
In  this  last  chapter,  it  is  time  to  take  the  stock  of  what  I  have  said  about
correspondence truth (and its  interrelated concepts)  and to  reply to  some objections
concerning the theory of truth I have presented and some relevant problems. I will start
summarizing the main requirements and claims of weak correspondence; then, I will
provide a  practical  application about  how weak correspondence applies  to  scientific
knowledge as a consequence of Tarki's semantic theory;  and, finally,  I  will  reply to
some objections and present some open questions that I have not dealt with in this work.
2. Summarizing weak correspondence
Roughly, a tenable correspondence theory should fulfill four requirements (Marino
2006):
1. Correspondence Platitude: true sentences, statements or beliefs correspond to the
way things are in the world. 
2. Cleavage: there is a gap between a sentence and the fact it expresses.
3. Propertyhood: truth is a property, i.e. there is something that all true propositions
have in common (at least in the empirical field75).
4. Content-Implication: true sentences, if not true in virtue of their logical form, are
true in virtue of something.
Unlike  traditional  correspondence  theories,  minimal  correspondence  is  not
committed to another classic desiteratum of correspondence truth:
• Independence-Congruence: true sentences mirror bits of raw, unconceptualized,
mind-independent reality.
75 My discussion is restricted to how truth works in scientific contexts; I have not analyzed or taken a
stand on what is moral truth or logical truth.
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I  have  discussed  in  Part  2  –  Section  4  –  why the  correspondence  theory is  not
necessarily  related  to  the  notion  of  comparison-mirroring.  Even  if  truth  is
correspondence  between  content  and  the  world  (for  content-implication),  often  our
theories  work  in  such  a  way the  correspondence  relation  is  not  direct,  but,  rather,
indirect  (Horgan,  Timmons  2002)  (as  in  referential  failure);  there  is  no  one-to-one
correspondence between names and objects or predicates and properties. For example
the  sentence  “the  snow is  white”  does  not  entail  that  there  is  some genuine  object
answering to the name “the snow” and a genuine property expressed by the predicate “is
white”.     
But, at the same time, I have specified that this does not mean that the referential
relations between scientific theories and the world are empty and can be satisfied by any
kind of things. I have given the example of ontic structural realism (Part 3 – Section 2),
according to which reference obtains referring to uninterpreted structures, and I have
concluded that this is not sufficient for a proper correspondence theory, since truth-value
attributions require interpreted languages and interpreted structures. On the other hand,
since Part 1 – Section 2, I have assumed that purely structural homogeneity is not a
sufficient condition for the cumulative nature of scientific progress, since it implies the
instantiation of properties of entities, individuated by theoretical descriptions. Minimal
correspondence meets those conditions since it does not aim to dismiss reference and
claims that (Kitcher 2002):
• names range over and refer to real entities
• variables range over and refer to real entities
• predicates denote sets of these entities
• truth-values can be determined in a “Tarskian” style
According to weak correspondence, there are no specific entities and facts to which
the  theory  refers  and,  above  all,  no  unitary  account  of  the  notions  of  reference,
denotation and even truth is required.
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3. A concrete application
In this section, following (Wójcicki 1995), I will present a practical application that
will show how weak correspondence can be applied to scientific knowledge, resting on
the  semantic  theory  of  truth.  He  suggests  to  consider  a  sentence,  taken  from  the
Encyclopedia Britannica,  concerning the measure,  the position and the shape of the
Sun:
• The Sun is a sphere of luminous gas 1,392  × 106 m in diameter. It is the star
nearest  the  Earth,  lying  at  an  average  distance  of  149,6  × 108 m.  The  Sun
converts five million tons of matter into energy every second. It is not expected
to undergo any dramatic change for the next 5 billion years, when it will expand
into a red giant star.
This  elementary  and  informal  description  appeals  to  notions  to  be  defined  by
advanced  theories,  like  Euclidean  geometry  (sphere,  diameter,  distance)  or  modern
physics  (gas,  luminous  gas,  transformation  of  matter  into  energy).  This  entry  is
composed  of  four  sentences,  and  each  of  them  expresses  some  content  related  to
worldly conditions.  According to  minimal  correspondence,  if  the  expressed  state  of
affairs  obtains,  the relevant  sentence is  true; otherwise,  it  is  false.  Every astronomy
student knows very well to what those sentences refer and which states of affairs should
obtain to make them true. But the philosophical point is whether this knowledge can be
expressed in the terms of a proper theory of truth; or, in other words, in the terms of a
minimal correspondentist interpretation of Tarski's semantic theory. Let us consider the
first sentence of the description:
• The Sun is a sphere of luminous gas 1,392 × 106 m in diameter.
According to the semantic theory, we shall conclude that:
• The sentence “the Sun is a sphere of 1,392 × 106 m in diameter” is true if and
only if the Sun is a sphere of 1,392 × 106 m in diameter.
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Which is a speciman of Tarski's equivalence schema (ES). But, in order to use a
Tarskian truth predicate,  we should specify the translation of this  sentence into any
language that is appropriate for Tarski's requirements; that is to say, we should express it
in (at least) semi-formal terms. This language will work as a meta-theory, whose aim is
to provide an interpretation of the language of experiments and measurements related to
it.  Since this statement expresses the shape of the Sun and its location in space, we
should appeal to a meta-theory that allows us to think about physical objects as located
in space-time. Since this is a local application, Einstein's theory is not necessary and a
Euclidean three dimensional space combined with one dimensional time will suffice.
The minimal theory we need will consists of the following rough statements:
1. Physical space is a three dimensional Euclidean space E3. Consequently, after
selecting  a  coordinate  system and a  unit  of  length,  each  point  of  E3 can  be
identified with a triple (x, y, z) of real numbers.
2. Physical time T is a one dimensional continuum, which after selecting a unit of
time can be identified with the set of all real numbers.
3. Every  physical  body  b  is  an  entity  localized  in  both  space  and  time;  the
localization of b, L(b) is a finite Euclidean subspace E3 × T. If (x, y, z, t) ∈ L(b)
we shall say that b occupies (x, y, z, t) or that it occupies (x,  y,  z) at the time t.
The geometrical figure of the localization of a body is the shape of that body.
4. For every physical body b there is a set of physical bodies called parts of b. If b'
is  a  part  of  b,  then  at  any  time  t the  localization  of  b'  is  a  subset  of  the
localization of b. If all the localizations in time of a part of b' of b are single
points, then the part b' is called physical point of b.
5. A reference system is a set of physical points (of some bodies) which define a
coordinate  system  for  E3;  such  physical  points  cannot  move  (change  their
localization with time) and cannot be all located on the same plane.
6. Every two physical points whose distance does not change with time, define a
unit of length.
7. Every cyclic movement of a physical point defines a unit of time.
8. The standard unit of length is one meter.
9. The standard unit of time is one second.
10. The set of physical bodies includes the Sun and the Earth.
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(Wójcicki 1995: 503-504)
In this semi-formal way, we have defined the notion of “localization of a body” and
fixed a relation between physical bodies and regions of physical space; actually, given a
time  t, we can identify the shape of a body with the shape of the region of space it
occupies at  t. And we can set up experiments to analyze the region of space the Sun
occupies. For example, we can measure its diameter by measuring the distance between
the Earth and the Sun and the angles under which we see the ends of the diameter of the
Sun from the Earth.  
Thus, the statements that I have sketched describe the mathematical content of the
sentence describing the location, the shape and the diameter of the Sun. They consist of
logical  symbols,  mathematical  terms  of  Euclidean  geometry  and  descriptive  terms
(physical body, parts of a physical body, localization of a physical body and so on).
Now, given a mathematical structure and a full list of descriptive terms, we can define a
language to which Tarski's definition of truth undoubtedly applies.
Of  course,  starting  with  this  meta-language,  you  can  choose  a  set  of  additional
postulates that may restrict the scope of the theory; some additional postulates could not
be empirically testable in themselves (because they are purely mathematical conditions
with  no  factual  counterpart),  but,  in  conjunction  with  the  empirically  testable
assumptions, they contribute to derive anything that can be experimentally tested. As I
have assumed in Part 1 – sections 1-2 – and Part 2 – sections 1-2 – the most important
postulates and physical laws fix the fundamental properties of the domain of the theory
(both detection properties and properties that contribute to the empirical application of
the mathematical formalism). And, as in Part 3 – section 2 – the most basic step for
truth-value attributions is to determine the class of physical bodies to which we are
applying  the  theory.  And  the  identification  of  the  domain  of  application  (and  the
relevant laws) is very important especially because the relation between mathematical
structure and physical interpretation cannot be determined in a general way, but only
referring to concrete and specific applications (see part 1, especially sections 3-4 for the
role  played  by  concrete  applications  referring  to  the  respective  mathematical
formalism). 
Another important step to achieve the results of the measurements is to assure that
the physical quantities postulated by the theory (time, position of a physical body and so
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on)  can  be  measured;  of  course,  to  do  this,  you  have  to  introduce  other  additional
postulates, for example, that the path of light in the cosmic vacuum is a straight line76.
Assuming that the relation between mathematical structure and physical interpretation is
clear  enough  referring  to  the  hypothesis  we  are  testing,  now  we  can  propose
experiments and models to experimentally test the hypothesis, in this case to measure
the diameter  of the Sun. Note that  the selection of additional  postulates  concerning
measurement  does  not  imply  that  the  theory  explicitly  defines  how  measurements
should be executed (establishing, for example, explicit definitions or correspondence
rules),  since  the  relevant  conditions  are  usually  part  of  the  tacit  knowledge  of  the
researchers, as a part of normal science work and a consequence of scientific training
analyzed in Part 2 – section 2. Of course, no scientist does this kind of analysis in the
terms of Tarski's semantic theory, but what is important is that the theory is consistent
with  intuitive  and  concrete  scientific  methodology  and  that  the  methodological
conclusions to which researchers arrive can have their counterparts in terms of theories
of truth.
Moreover, this definition poses that, following the theory of the meaning of scientific
terms that I have presented in Part 1 – sections 3-4 – the referential interpretation of a
term can be established in a procedural way. Or, in other words, we should not explain
what  physical  terms  denote,  but,  rather,  how  they  are  used:  literally  speaking,
descriptive terms do not denote anything. Obviously, you can do this again in the terms
of a meta-theory to define the applications of the hypothesis  we are testing; but the
truth-content of a hypothesis is not determined by a single procedure or application and
therefore we have to consider all the procedures and theories relevant to the hypothesis
in question. And I have discussed in Part 1 – section 4 – how the structural combination
of  different  applications  is  essential  to  the physical  interpretation of  a  mathematical
structure.       
Thus, in this section, I have analyzed how minimal correspondence is grounded in
the semantic theory and how it works in concrete scientific contexts. Additionally,  I
have showed how this theory of truth is related to the selection of the parts of scientific
theories that we consider essential for the empirical success of the theory (see especially
Part 3 – section 3, but also Part 1 – sections 1-2 and Part 2 – sections 1-2) and to the
76 Here I am calling postulates some factual claims, concerning for example how light moves. This may
be unfair, but they are postulates as far as they behave as interpretations of mathematical structures;
this does not exclude that, in other contexts, they may be empirically testable (See Part 1 – Section 1).
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theory of the meaning of scientific terms that I have defended (especially in Part 1 –
sections 3-4). And this version of the correspondence theory is immune to the objections
that I have analyzed in the previous sections: comparison objection (Part 2 – sections 3-
4), no unitary account of the correspondence relation (Part 3 – section 1) and rejection
of the success argument (Part 3 – section 3). 
4. Questions, objections and replies
After summarizing and applying the theory of truth that I am defending, now in this
section I will reply to some questions and objections concerning it and other interrelated
concepts. In fact those objections do not concern only truth, but also reference, meaning
and other concepts I have dealt with in the previous chapters.
Q1. Your  discussion  of  the  correspondence  theory  and its  applicability  to  scientific
knowledge rests on the assumption that scientific knowledge is intrinsically related to
the concept of truth. But you have not justified this assumption. In particular, you have
not discussed the empiricist claim that science can give up truth and replace it with the
concept of empirical adequacy (see in particular Van Fraassen 1980).
The use of the concept of empirical adequacy instead of the concept of truth relies on
the rejection of the Inference to the Best Explanation (IBE). IBE works both at a basic
level and at a meta-level: 1) at the basic level it claims that, if the theory T is the best
explanation of some relevant phenomena, we can infer that T is approximately true; 2)
at the meta-level, it claims that scientific realism is approximately true, since it is the
best explanation of the empirical success of science. One of the problems with IBE is
that it treats empirical success as a natural phenomena, something that can be explained
in the same way of the natural facts that constitute the domain of empirical science.
Scientific realism usually answers positively to this question and conclude that IBE can
be  applied  to  the  relation  between empirical  success  and scientific  realism.  On the
contrary,  several philosophers (Van Fraassen, but also Fine 1996) reply that the best
explanation  of  empirical  success  should  involve  only  instrumental  reliability  or
empirical adequacy (and not truth). The weak point of this argument is that, at the meta-
level,  it  is  circular  (Da  Costa,  French  2003:  176):  in  what  sense  is  instrumental
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reliability  empirically  adequate  to  the  phenomenon  we  are  explaining  (empirical
success)? At the basic-level of individual theories, it is quite clear how to explain their
success  in  terms  of  empirical  adequacy;  but,  at  the  meta-level,  how  the  empirical
success of science can be embedded into instrumentalism? Perhaps the empiricist would
appeal to the concept of evolutionary fitness, but is not clear in which terms.  
Q2.  Your  description  of  the  weak  correspondence  theory  is  really  minimal.  Unlike
traditional  correspondence  theories,  it  does  not  speak  about  facts  and  isomorphic
relations between propositions and facts. Furthermore, I am not really convinced by
your appeal to the notion of approximate truth to defend correspondence; I do not think
that  truth  is  a  matter  of  degree.  Can you provide  another  argument  to  distinguish
between correspondence-friendly deflationism and weak correspondence?
My  second  argument  for  the  distinction  between  weak  correspondence  and
correspondence-friendly deflationism is related to the same problem of the argument
concerning approximate truth: the fact that we need theoretical descriptions to select the
parts of scientific theories to which we are ontologically committed (see also Part 1 –
section 2); and that, therefore, weak correspondence fits well with selective realism. In
its  application  to  scientific  theories,  deflationism  aims  to  substitute  similarity  for
correspondence. Since it is based on the semantic view of scientific theories, it claims
that the correspondence theory is wrong because it looks for a semantic link between
theoretical  descriptions  of  models  and  the  facts,  while,  according  to  deflationism,
models  represent  the  world  in  terms  of  similarity  relations  (Giere  1988).  Here,  the
deflationary theory is supposed to suffice, since the semantic relation is replaced by the
similarity between model and the world, while theoretical hypotheses expressing the
similarity relation are treated as deflationary. 
The problem is that scientific knowledge is not merely interested in generating reliable
predictions,  but  in  whether  the  entities,  properties  and relations  associated  with  the
relevant models have real counterparts in the world (at least if the empiricist viewpoint
has been ruled out). And the deflationary theory cannot satisfy this requirement, even if
it is not necessarily tied to an anti-realist metaphysics. More precisely, there are at least
four ways in which models can represent the world (Chakravartty 2001: 336):
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1. correspondence  between  linguistic  formulations  and  the  respective  model
(conventional, or by definition);
2. correspondence between models and classes of phenomena (determined by the
domain of the theory);
3. correspondence  between  similarity  relations  claims  and  actual  similarity
relations (empirical, since the theoretical hypotheses should be true);
4. correspondence between linguistic descriptions and the world (empirical, since
the relation of correspondence obtains if and only if these descriptions are true).
The empiricist deflationist would say that a combination of (1) and (3) will suffice to
gain significant knowledge about the world; (1) is not problematic, while (3) can be
expressed in deflationary terms saying that, given a relation of similarity S, it is true that
S  obtains  if  and  only if  S  obtains.  But,  if  I  am right  in  maintaining  that  we need
physically interpreted structures to express true-or-false claims and select the parts of
the theories we are testing, this will not be sufficient for these purposes. In order to
understand what a similarity claim is  saying about  the world,  we have to appeal  to
theoretical descriptions (of the model and the world) to disambiguate the claim and
make it true (or false) in a proper way. In other words, we cannot do without (4): we
need laws and interpretations to specify how similarities obtain; and, of course, this
cannot be done in a deflationary way.
Q3. Your version of the correspondence theory rules out the concept of fact. But, not
only traditional theories, but also ordinary linguistic behaviors of competent speakers
seem to postulate that true statements correspond to the facts and that a statement is
true if and only if there is a fact to which it corresponds. How can you accommodate
those phenomena into your theory?
My view is that the statement “it is a fact that p” has been used (and it is currently
used) in a quite imprecise way, both by followers of the correspondence theory and by
ordinary speakers. Probably there are several connotations concerning the use of this
kind of sentence, but it seems to me that the most important one is something along the
lines of ““that p” has nothing to to with what we know about it and how we know it. It
is just a fact”. A first conclusion that we can draw is that someone who says “it is a fact
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that p” means that there is a gap between “p” and what makes it true; in other words,
that the fact that we express “p” and the relevant fact with the same words does not
mean that they are the same thing. Moreover, perhaps the appeal to the facts entails that
a statement either corresponds to the facts or it does not; this means that, even though it
is not clear how the correspondence relation obtains, anyway there is only one truth, and
not several truths. Finally, I would take “it is a fact that p” as an assertion of objectivity.
That is to say, people aim to distinguish between sentences such as “the snow is white”
and statements concerning moral values and subjective taste, which seem to be more
controversial.  So, in the end, I think that the most basic idea of the correspondence
theory is “how things are” and not “the facts” and that the facts are not necessarily
associated with the correspondence theory (Marino 2006). 
Q.4 You have said that, by dismissing the concept of fact, weak correspondence can
overcome  the  comparison  objection.  But,  how the  comparison  objection  (and  your
answer to it) is related to the problem of matching (Rasmussen 2014: 66), that is the
idea that a proposition cannot describe the real world because they are structurally
different?
Like the comparison objection,  the problem of matching concerns how the truth-
bearers connect to the entities they wish to describe. Basically, the problem of matching
goes as follows:
1. in order to correspond to portions of reality, propositions should be structurally
similar to them;
2. propositions  are  not  structurally  similar  to  anything  they  are  supposed  to
correspond to;
3. propositions do not correspond to the world;
The main difference between comparison objection and problem of matching is that
the former attacks the very idea of correspondence from an epistemological viewpoint,
without  going  into  the  details  of  the  correspondence  relation.  The  point  is  that  we
cannot verify whether propositions and facts are similar (to some respect) because we
do not have independent access to the facts. On the contrary, the scope of the problem of
225
matching is more narrow, since it attacks only a specific kind of correspondence theory,
which postulates an isomorphic relation between propositions and facts. For example,
Russell poses that true atomic sentences and facts have the same logical structure. The
atomic  sentence  F(a)  is  true  if  and only  if  it  mirrors  the  fact  characterized  by the
following  components:  the  object  denoted  by “a”  and  the  property expressed  by F
(Russell 1907). Of course, this is problematic because, even though it were clear how to
individuate the components of a proposition, definitely it is not clear what he means by
components of facts. Anyway, the theory of truth I have defended is not committed to
the concept of facts as well as to the concept of isomorphic relation, and therefore the
problem of matching does not apply to it.
Q5. In your work you have not paid much attention to the coherence theory of truth.
But,  by eliminating the concept of  fact from the correspondence theory and making
reference language-dependent, perhaps you are running the risk of moving from a weak
correspondence theory to a coherence theory. Can you specify the difference between
them?
The coherence theory of truth holds that, given a belief p, p is true if and only if it is
part of a coherent collection of beliefs (see Bradley 1914 and Walker 1989). This theory
shares some advantages with weak correspondence, for example they both can address
the  comparison  objection.  After  all,  for  the  coherence  theory,  there  is  nothing  to
compare with our beliefs and therefore the problem of the independent access to an
unconceptualized reality no longer arises. But the main difference is that the coherence
theory denies what I have taken to be a fundamental intuition about truth: the cleavage
intuition, that is the idea that there is a gap between a sentence and what it expresses
(Marino 2006). The coherence theory does so because, if the truth of a sentence consists
in a relation with other sentences, it  will be a relation among linguistic things. And,
since there is no place for the actual conditions related to true sentences, there is no gap
between sentences and what makes them true as well. And, even worse, this may create
problems related to the descriptive content of true sentences, since there is no role for
the  things  described  by  true  sentences.  Anyway,  the  cleavage  intuition  in  itself  is
particularly important and intuitive for scientific knowledge, since scientific practice is
entirely  devoted  to  find  non-trivial  explanations  of  how  hypotheses  are  related  to
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phenomena and empirical situations that make them true; and therefore, if there were no
cleavage, scientific practice would be pointless.
Q6. Sometimes scientific models are taken to represent their  intended domain.  How
does  weak  correspondence  account  for  the  notion  of  representation  in  scientific
contexts? The most important point is whether it is related to the concepts of truth and
approximate truth that you have presented and if it can be arranged by a deflationary
perspective.
Even though models are a fundamental part of scientific theories, I do not think that
the concept of truth directly applies to models; and, therefore,  I do not think that it
immediately  applies  to  the  concept  of  representation  related  to  scientific  models.
Perhaps, the representation relation they involve is the most easy to account for from a
deflationary perspective, appealing to the concept of similarity. For example, claiming
that the behavior of the gas atoms can be represented by the behavior of billiard balls
means that they are similar. Where, from a structural realist viewpoint, this similarity
can be presented as a partial structural isomorphism between the two cases (Da Costa,
French 2003: 49). In other words, there are elements of the relevant families of relations
that are the same referring to both the behavior of billiard balls and gas atoms. So far so
good for the deflationary perspective; but, as I have argued, this is not sufficient for a
realist theory, which aims to know the real entities, properties and relations the world is
made of (unless you hold, like ontic structural realism, that all there is, is structure, but I
have already discussed what kind of problems concerning the concept of truth it entails).
To  that  extent,  models  are  true-or-false  strictly  speaking  only  in  conjunction  with
theoretical descriptions and laws and so I think that it is inappropriate to talk about truth
referring to models and the relevant concept of representation.
Q7.  Weak  correspondence  assumes  that  the  essence  of  truth  is  a  relation  between
linguistic  and  non-linguistic  things,  but  it  denies  the  existence  of  a  universal
correspondence relation, since it claims that it can obtain in several ways. This may be
a problem, since, speaking about correspondence, we mean that it is the way sentences
are true, not only a formal relation.
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This point is quite similar to the problem of the plurality of the truth predicates-
properties that I have discussed referring to alethic pluralism and the styles of reasoning.
It  is  quite  trivial  that  sentences  can  be  correlated  to  the  world  in  several  ways,
corresponding to different referential functions. And, of course, this does not imply that
we should give up the unitary concept of truth and be interested only in the restricted
predicates (for language pluralism). But this argument does not take into account the
fact  that  we  are  referring  to  interpreted  languages.  The  recognition  of  different
languages and the creation of new ones are valuable questions, but here the point is that
weak correspondence can be specified referring to each language. So, as Niiniluoto says
“the existence of many truth-relations is not a problem for Tarski, but a natural feature
of  his  model-theoretic  approach to  formal  languages” (Niiniluoto  1999:  61).  It  is  a
consequence of the interpretation process, by which, for example, the words “dog” and
“chien” refer to the same animal in English and in French and can be justified in the
minimal terms of primitive denotation. There is no doubt that the interpretation of a
given language may change with the time, but, anyway, as far as the interpretation is
provisionally fixed,  the  correspondence  relation  can  obtain  referring  to  the  specific
language (or fragment of language) in which we have defined it.
Q8. Actually it is widely acknowledged that scientific communities are not interested in
trivial truths, but in significant truths according to the current interests and wonders of
scientific  inquiry  (Kitcher  2001).  How  can  you  arrange  the  objectivity  of  the
correspondence theory to be consistent with the methodologically-oriented nature of
scientific truth?
Recent  accounts  of  scientific  explanation stress  the fact  that  there  is  no context-
independent account of scientific explanation and that scientific practice is guided by
moral and social values, individual or group interests, contingent historical situations,
availability of relevant technologies and other pragmatic and epistemic concerns. This
seems to be a problem, since weak correspondence strongly maintains the objectivity of
truth. But, anyway, it is also a minimal theory, which can deal with the fact that the
correspondence relation can obtain in many different ways. Assume, for example, that
we should check whether Parish is the capital of France. To do so, we need to transform
the sentence “Paris is the capital of France”  into an open formula “x is the capital of
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France”; then, we are allowed to ask whether Paris satisfies this formula. Of course,
there are several ways in which this sentence can gain scientific significance referring to
the current moral and social values of scientific communities and society in general, and
the current aims, wonders and methods of scientific investigation. But, anyway, we do
not  need a  strong correspondence  relation  aiming to  compare  “Paris”  with  Paris  or
“Paris is the capital of France” with the fact that Paris is the capital of France. The basic
point is to check whether Paris satisfies the formula “x is the capital of France”. The
semantic theory (as well as weak correspondence) is not expected to give advice about
how to investigate scientific phenomena and how to provide an answer about whether
the satisfaction relation between objects and relevant conditions obtain (see Woleński
1999: 62).
Q9. Some philosophers have objected that the semantic theory cannot be applied to
scientific knowledge. One of the reasons they say this is that the acceptance of some
instances of the equivalence schema leads to ontological relativism, since they force us
to commit ourselves to non-existing theoretical entities (for example Jennings 1987).
The argument  that  tries  to  show that  the  equivalence  schema (and its  instances)
entails  ontological  relativism is  merely  wrong.  It  argues  that,  since  any competent
speaker is ready to accept that “phlogiston is given off during combustion” is true if and
only if phlogiston is given off during combustion, the acceptance of this biconditional
implies that we should believe that phlogiston exists  and this  is  certainly false.  The
argument is wrong since the equivalence schema does not entail that we should believe
in the existence of the entities cited in  the sentence taken as an instance of it.  The
biconditional ““p” is true if and only if p” will hold even if the sentence by which we
replace “p” is trivially false, since an equivalence statement is true even if both sides are
false. Therefore, for example, we will undoubtedly accept that “the snow is green” is
true if and only if the snow is green (see also Niiniluoto 1999: 60-61).
Q10. All inflationary theories of truth (like correspondence) acknowledge that the truth
property has some explanatory role, for example they use truth to explain meaning in
terms of truth-conditions. You have said that, for weak correspondence, sentences are
related  to  worldly  conditions,  but  your  theory  of  meaning  seems  to  go  in  another
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direction.
A deflationary theory is expected to explain the concept of meaning independently of
the  concept  of  truth  (see  Patterson  2003),  for  instance  appealing  to  “indications
relations”. Now, even though I have not accepted the deflationist interpretation of the
equivalence between “there is a rainbow” is true if and only if the angle of refraction is
such-and-such and ““there is  a rainbow over  there” is  true if  and only if  there is  a
rainbow over there”, I have made some deflationary claims concerning meaning: 1) that
the  concepts  of  meaning,  primitive  denotation  and translation  are  prior  to  the  truth
predicate; 2) that the meaning of scientific sentences consists in their use; 3) that there is
no global account of meaning and reference. This may seem contradictory, but my point
against  deflationary  truth-conditions  is  just  there  is  a  gap  between  the  equivalence
schema  and  the  worldly  conditions  that  scientific  sentences  point  out;  otherwise
scientific practice would be pointless. Unlike the deflationist, I do not think that the
equivalence schema is exhaustive of everything related to the truth, but, at the same
time, in my view truth-conditions are not necessary as an explanation of meaning. My
viewpoint is that the language in which we are defining the truth predicate should be
already  interpreted  and  the  meaning  fixed  by  a  pragmatic  process  involving  the
expertise of scientific communities. But it is plausible to think that the use of some
sentences  involves  knowledge  of  the  circumstances  in  which  they  can  express
something true-or-false. This may be problematic, since knowledge of truth-conditions
is propositional, while knowledge of use is not, but: 1) competent speakers often use
sentences  without  being  aware  of  their  truth-conditions;  2)  it  is  often  difficult  to
determine truth-conditions, since applications depend on their context of utterance as
well (see Récanati 2004). So, in the end, meaning is use, but this does not mean that the
equivalence schema is sufficient. 
Q11. Your theory of truth is related to the idea that meaning is context-dependent and
that we had better give up meaning and use the concept of  semantic potential.  But
Kitcher (1978) has developed the concept of reference potential, which accounts for the
plurality of uses of scientific terms in the history of science without having to leave
context-independence.
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Kitcher's theory of reference potentials rests on the idea that, even if terms were used
in  different  ways,  we can  specify when the types  are  co-referential,  by substituting
tokens of rival theories for those of the theory we wish to replace them. According to
Kitcher, this is context-insensitive, since each type is associated with two elements: 1) a
description that identifies the referent; 2) the specification of a causal agent in presence
of which the term is individuated (something like “indications relations”). In this way,
different tokens are equivalent, since, for example, we can establish (without referring
to the context) when sentences describing dephlogisticated air are successfully referring
to oxygen. There are several problems with this theory (see Psillos 1997). Basically, it is
at the same time: too strong, since it attributes to the speakers intentions when they did
not have any; too weak, since perhaps all rejected types have some referential tokens.
So, for example, since the dominant intention of Aristotle when he was working on his
theory of natural places was to analyze moving bodies, one can conclude that some
tokens of “natural places” and  “motion along geodesics” are co-referential (see also
Stanford 2003b). Moreover, historical reconstructions aiming to work out the intentions
of modern and ancient scientists in the light of contemporary physics are likely not to be
reliable. Anyway, the main differences between Kitcher's model and mine are that: 1) I
am not concerned with tokens, but with applications (which are fixed, not subjective);
2) the ambiguity of scientific terms does not depend on the fact that the same object
may be dubbed in different ways at different times, but on the existence of different
coexistent applications at the same time; 3) I am not concerned with the circumstances
under which a term has been firstly introduced. 
Q12. You maintain the context-dependence of meaning (and the process of meaning
fixing). But this may arise problems related to the cases where there are difficulties in
determining the boundaries of some natural kind terms. Since you cannot appeal to
theoretical identities (like water = H2O), how do you deal with borderline cases?
I do not think that H2O is both necessary and sufficient of water (or that it is the
essence of water). On the contrary, replying to Putnam's thought experiment of the Twin
Earth, we might conclude that XYZ is water, or better, that it is not clear whether it is in
or out of the extension of “water”. At the same time, if we have a look at some H2O with
special  features,  we might be inclined to conclude that some H2O is not water  (see
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LaPorte 2004). As I have said, the main point is that there is no metaphysical distinction
between essential and superficial properties on which we can safely rely to discover the
essence of natural kinds: sometimes the structure is the same, but superficial properties
differ,  sometimes  two  substances  are  superficially  similar,  but  their  structures  are
different. Perhaps the most famous borderline case is the concept of heavy water: is it
really water? This is problematic since this  case involves other kinds, like isotopes,
which overlap each others and apply to most cases. In these situation, I would simply
appeal to the fact that, according to the viewpoint about meaning that I have presented,
linguistic revision is ubiquitous and that, actually, no linguistic community would be
right or wrong in saying that heavy water is water, since they both agree on the relevant
facts about the world.
5. Open questions
In the last section I have replied to some questions and objections related to problems
that I have faced throughout my work. But I shall admit that there are several important
points that, for reasons of space and time, I have not directly challenged. Now, I will
briefly introduce those problems that deserve much attention and referring to which
more work has to be done.
Deflationism and the concept of reference. According to the deflationist, reference
and truth work in the same way: like truth, reference is merely a logical device and
therefore truth and reference should be defined independently of each other. Just like the
schema ““p” is true if and only if p” is exhaustive of the notion of truth, the schema “if a
exists, “a” refers to a”, is taken to be exhaustive of the notion of reference. But this
assumes that we already know (in a quite clear and precise way) what the name (or
predicate) refers to. For example, the sentence ““rabbit” refers to rabbits” is trivially
true, but it requires that we are aware of what rabbits are. In other words, the inhabitants
of the Earth would accept a sentence such as ““water” refers to water” and the same is
true for the inhabitants of the Twin Earth. But, taking for granted the circumstances of
Putnam's experiment, they would not agree about the truth-value of such a sentence and
about  the worldly conditions to which it  is  associated.  The same applies to Quine's
example  of  “gavagai”:  if  we  try  to  understand  what  “gavagai”  stands  for,  the
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equivalence (or disquotation) schema will not help us to do this. So, roughly, the open
question  is  whether  the  equivalence  schema  plays  some  metaphysical  role  in  the
determination of reference. Ideally, from the perspective I have developed, the problem
concerns meaning and translation and not reference as explanation: “gavagai” should be
translatable independently of the object it stands for.
The  relation  between  meaning,  truth  and  translation.  Several  philosophers,  for
example Hartry Field, have pointed out that the kind of theory of truth I am defending
assumes (implicitly or explicitly) a specific relation between meaning and translation:
that a theory of translation should be available without appealing to the theory of truth.
This is a consequence of the fact that Tarski's partial definitions of truth define it only
for those sentences that we grasp. Introducing propositions as metaphysical entities (for
example, state of affairs to which sentences refer) would arise several problems and
complexities that I have not dealt with assuming (like Tarski)  that sentences are the
most basic truth-bearers. The point is that, appealing to the equivalence schema, we may
say that propositions can be simply defined saying that ““S” expresses the proposition
that s”, where s is a sentence of a language we understand; in other words, we need both
the sentence s and its translation, to extend the definition to other languages (through
the  concept  of  translation).  This  perspective  might  succeed  in  making  translation
independent from the truth property, but, as far as the concept of translation is not fairly
defined, it is not much more informative than saying that a proposition is a class of
sentences expressing the same meaning, which is undoubtedly problematic.
Correspondentist and deflationary interpretations of the equivalence schema. Tarski
has repeated several times that his definition of the concept of truth is intended as a
defense of the ancient concept of correspondence, firstly defended by Aristotle, even
though the equivalence schema is metaphysically neutral. But actually this point has
been  questioned  at  several  levels  and  many  scholars  would  maintain  that  the
equivalence schema can be better accommodated in deflationary terms. I have not taken
a stand on whether the semantic theory is in itself a correspondence or a deflationary
theory.  Now,  my  point  is  that  the  correspondence  theory  can  be  grounded  in  the
semantic theory (and, in my view, it should be grounded in it); and, at that point, you
can  pick  out  your  own  correspondence  theory  by  specifying  your  metaphysical
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commitment  to  the  correspondence  relation  and  the  truth-makers.  My  weak
correspondence theory is entirely consistent with this project and I have tried to show
this by means of the example of the measurement of the diameter of the Sun. Anyway,
there are some arguments for the correspondentist interpretation of Tarski's theory that
should be analyzed in more details: 1) the objectual quantification used by Tarski and
the metaphysical implications it might entail; 2) the role played by the interpretation of
the language in which we are defining the truth predicate and the way meanings are
fixed, which may provide a connection between language and worldly conditions.
Scientific Realism. Throughout my work I have tried to postulate that we can develop
a proper theory of truth for scientific knowledge without specifying whether we endorse
scientific realism; and, in  this  case,  which specific  kind of scientific realism (entity
realism, structural realism, semirealism and so on) should we adopt for this purpose. I
have not remained as consistent as I would have liked to be on this purpose: one of my
conclusions  has  been  that  the  choice  of  the  weak  correspondence  theory  (over
deflationism)  is  tied  to  the  concept  of  selective  confirmation  and  its  relation  with
selective realism. Moreover, I have maintained an overall realist attitude that should be
analyzed  in  depth  elsewhere.  Anyway,  I  can  briefly  try  to  justify  my naive  realist
commitment  by three points,  which are not related to  a specific theory of scientific
realism,  but,  rather,  with  the  personal  “optimistic”  attitude  I  have  toward  these
questions:  I  am aware  that  these  argument  may seem subjective.  The  first  point  is
common sense:  it  is  intuitively clear  that  science provides  us  with  a  quite  accurate
description of the world. Secondly, a strong trust in science which may appear a kind of
scientism (see Ladyman, Ross 2007). And, finally, naturalism, that is the idea that we
should base our philosophy and metaphysics on what scientific theories say about the
world. Of course, all these points are very questionable, but, at this stage, by scientific
realism I merely mean the idea that we should be optimistic about what science tells us.
Detection and auxiliary properties. In this work I have tried to present a model that,
given  a  theoretical  change,  is  able  to  distinguish  between  cases  of  belief  revision
(cumulative, i.e. we modify the set of beliefs associated with a given entity) and cases in
which we are substantially wrong (referential change, i.e. the entity we were supposed
to refer to does not exists or it is radically different from how we thought it would). This
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is  based on the distinction between those properties that cannot  be rejected without
turning into a referential  change (detection properties) and those we can do without
(auxiliary properties). So, roughly, given two terms  a and  b, they are co-referential if
and only if the set of properties and structures associated with a is co-extensive with the
set of properties and structures associated with b (Chakravartty 2007). So, for example,
the  chemical  revolution  does  not  match  this  condition,  because  the  structure  and
properties  associated  with  “dephlogisticated  air”  is  not  co-extensive  with  the  ones
associated with “oxygen”. On the contrary,  other theoretical  changes are cumulative
even if rival theories map different entities. But, the problem that should be scrutinized
is:  how can we distinguish detection and auxiliary properties? Of, course, now with
hindsight, we can know which properties were essential, but it would be better to know
in principle  which properties cannot  be rejected without  rejecting the whole theory.
Moreover, it is not clear how many properties we should recognize to identify an entity
with good approximation. And this is a particularly compelling problem if, as I have
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